The Experts below are selected from a list of 324 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bing-hong Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Effect of the depreciation of Public Goods in spatial Public Goods games
Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 2012Co-Authors: Yong Zhuang, Bing-hong WangAbstract:In this work, the depreciation effect of Public Goods is considered in the Public Goods games, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r′=r(ncG)β (β≥0). It is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit r of the Public Goods if all the players of this group are cooperators. Otherwise, the value of Public Goods is reduced to r′. It is found that compared with the original version (β=0), the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for β>0, and there exist intermediate values of β inducing the best cooperation. Particularly, there exists a range of β inducing the highest cooperative level, and this range of β broadens as r increases. It is further presented that the variation of cooperator density with noise has close relations with the values of β and r, and cooperation at an intermediate value of β=1.0 is most tolerant to noise.
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Depreciation of Public Goods in spatial Public Goods games
Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2011Co-Authors: Yong Zhuang, Yu-jian Li, Bing-hong WangAbstract:In real situations, the value of Public Goods will be reduced or even lost because of external factors or for intrinsic reasons. In this work, we investigate the evolution of cooperation by considering the effect of depreciation of Public Goods in spatial Public Goods games on a square lattice. It is assumed that each individual gains full advantage if the number of the cooperators nc within a group centered on that individual equals or exceeds the critical mass (CM). Otherwise, there is depreciation of the Public Goods, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r to (nc/CM)r. It is shown that the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for CM > 1 even at small values of r, and a global cooperative level is achieved at an intermediate value of CM = 4 at a small r. We further study the effect of depreciation of Public Goods on different topologies of a regular lattice, and find that the system always reaches global cooperation at a moderate value of CM = G − 1 regardless of whether or not there exist overlapping triangle structures on the regular lattice, where G is the group size of the associated regular lattice.
Scott Barrett - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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why cooperate the incentive to supply global Public Goods
2007Co-Authors: Scott BarrettAbstract:Climate change, nuclear proliferation, and the threat of a global pandemic have the potential to impact each of our lives. Preventing these threats poses a serious global challenge, but ignoring them could have disastrous consequences. How do we engineer institutions to change incentives so that these global Public Goods are provided? Scott Barrett provides a thought provoking and accessible introduction to the issues surrounding the provision of global Public Goods. Using a variety of examples to illustrate past successes and failures, he shows how international cooperation, institutional design, and the clever use of incentives can work together to ensure the effective delivery of global Public Goods.
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Supplying International Public Goods
International Public Goods, 2002Co-Authors: Scott BarrettAbstract:As discussed in chapter 2, Public Goods have two important characteristics: use by one party does not diminish the amount of the good available to others, and others cannot be excluded from enjoying a Public good, even if they had no hand in its provision. In a national context, Public Goods provision thus raises two problems. The first is identifying the economically efficient level of provision, a problem of valuation. The second is designing policies and institutions able to supply this level of a good, a problem of incentives. These problems also frustrate the provision of international Public Goods (IPGs), but in an international context, the difficulties with valuation and the setting of incentives are compounded because, in the absence of a hierarchical command structure, the mechanisms for facilitating the supply of Public Goods are limited, and often fragile.
Todd Sandler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public Goods and Regional Cooperation for Development: A New Look
2013Co-Authors: Todd SandlerAbstract:This article takes a fresh look at regional Public Goods and their role in promoting sustainable development and cooperation in Latin America. At the outset, the article reviews the essential properties of Public Goods - nonexcludability of benefits, nonrivalry of benefits, and the aggregation technology of Public supply - and their influence on the prognosis of supply of regional Public Goods. From a collective action prospective, the article draws important distinctions among four classes of Public Goods: national Public Goods, regional Public Goods, transregional Public Goods, and global Public Goods. The role of IDB, donor nations, customs unions, and others in facilitating the provision of these Goods is investigated. Given the article’s regional focus, much of the analysis is with respect to regional and transregional Public Goods. Myriad examples of Latin American regional Public Goods are given. The article also presents the pros and cons of regional subsidiarity. Finally, the article lists numerous policy recommendations.
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On Financing Global and International Public Goods - On financing global and international Public Goods
Policy Research Working Papers, 2001Co-Authors: Todd SandlerAbstract:Three dimensions of Public Goods--nonrivalry of benefits, the possibility of being excluded from benefits, and the technology for aggregating Public supply--determine what kinds of institutions and transnational actions are required for their provision and financing. For some Public Goods--especially for those for which the exclusion of nonpayers is not feasible--these properties are such that a Public sector push is needed or the good will not be financed. This push can come from a supranational structure (such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or the European Union) that directly or indirectly collects the requisite fees from its members to underwrite international Public Goods (IPGs). To understand the role of international institutions in promoting IPGs, one must ascertain the nature of the good and whether it requires a push, a coax, or no assistance from a supranational structure or influential nation(s) and agents (such as charitable foundations). The transnational community should explicitly direct scarce resources only to those global and international Public Goods that need either a significant push or only a smaller coax by the transnational community. When clubs or markets can finance international Public Goods, the community should sit back and let incentives guide the actions of sovereign nations.
Jeremy M Weinstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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why does ethnic diversity undermine Public Goods provision
American Political Science Review, 2007Co-Authors: James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N Posner, Jeremy M WeinsteinAbstract:A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of Public Goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of Public Goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to Public Goods provision—what we term “preferences,†“technology,†and “strategy selection†mechanisms—and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful Public Goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.
Severine Deneulin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public Goods, global Public Goods and the common good
International Journal of Social Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Severine Deneulin, Nicholas TownsendAbstract:Purpose – Public economics has recently introduced the concept of global Public Goods as a new category of Public Goods whose provision is central for promoting the well‐being of individuals in today's globalized world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which introducing this new concept in international development is helpful for understanding human well‐being enhancement.Design/methodology/approach – The paper considers some implications of the concept of the common good for international development.Findings – The concept of global Public Goods could be more effective if the conception of well‐being it assumes is broadened beyond the individual level. “Living well” or the “good life” does not dwell in individual lives only, but also in the lives of the communities which human beings form. A successful provision of global Public Goods depends on this recognition that the “good life” of the communities that people form is a constitutive component of the “good life” of individual human...
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Public Goods, Global Public Goods and the Common Good
International Journal of Social Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Severine Deneulin, Nick TownsendAbstract:Public economics has recently introduced the concept of global Public Goods as a new category of Public Goods whose provision is central for promoting the well-being of individuals in today's globalized world. This paper examines the extent to which introducing this new concept in international development is helpful for understanding human well-being enhancement. It argues that the concept of global Public Goods could be more effective if the conception of well-being it assumes is broadened beyond the individual level. 'Living well' or the 'good life' does not dwell in individual lives only, but also in the lives of communities which human beings form. A successful provision of global Public Goods depends on this recognition that the 'good life' of the communities that people form is a constitutive component of the 'good life' of individual human beings. The paper considers some implications of the concept of the common good for international development, and suggests that the rediscovery of this concept, and identification of how to nurture the common good, constitute one of the major tasks for development theory and policy.
