The Experts below are selected from a list of 324 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Maria Victoria Murillo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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political competition partisanship and policy making in latin american Public Utilities
2009Co-Authors: Maria Victoria MurilloAbstract:1. Voice and light: the politics of telecommunications and electricity reform 2. Political competition and policy adoption 3. Casting a partisan light on regulatory choices 4. Regulatory redistribution in post-reform Chile 5. Post-reform regulatory redistribution in Argentina and Mexico 6. A multilevel analysis of market reforms in Latin American Public Utilities 7. Conclusion.
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political competition and policy adoption market reforms in latin american Public Utilities
American Journal of Political Science, 2007Co-Authors: Maria Victoria Murillo, Cecilia MartinezgallardoAbstract:on y Docencia Econ ´ omicas This article shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence. Previous work shows the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking. Controlling for these effects, this article demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and ideological polarization even at a time when ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence. This article studies policy adoption using duration analysis for the 18 countries of Latin America during the 1985‐2000 period when most of the market reforms in Public Utilities were adopted. S tudies of market reforms in Latin America have typically emphasized the common financial and technological pressures that limited the ability of incumbents to impose their ideological preferences on policy adoption during the 1980s and 1990s. This article shows that, although it is true that the ideology of incumbents cannot fully explain policy adoption, political competition and the relative ideology of challengers did shape the incentives of policymakers and thus played a significant role in the adoption of market reforms. The article shows these effects on the market reforms of Latin American Public Utilities, which have been widely regarded as an example of policy convergence. Market-oriented reforms in telecoms and electricity—including the privatization of assets, the liberalization of markets, and the separation of regulatory authority from operations—spread rapidly around the globe, and especially through Latin America,
Cecilia Martinezgallardo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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political competition and policy adoption market reforms in latin american Public Utilities
American Journal of Political Science, 2007Co-Authors: Maria Victoria Murillo, Cecilia MartinezgallardoAbstract:on y Docencia Econ ´ omicas This article shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence. Previous work shows the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking. Controlling for these effects, this article demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and ideological polarization even at a time when ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence. This article studies policy adoption using duration analysis for the 18 countries of Latin America during the 1985‐2000 period when most of the market reforms in Public Utilities were adopted. S tudies of market reforms in Latin America have typically emphasized the common financial and technological pressures that limited the ability of incumbents to impose their ideological preferences on policy adoption during the 1980s and 1990s. This article shows that, although it is true that the ideology of incumbents cannot fully explain policy adoption, political competition and the relative ideology of challengers did shape the incentives of policymakers and thus played a significant role in the adoption of market reforms. The article shows these effects on the market reforms of Latin American Public Utilities, which have been widely regarded as an example of policy convergence. Market-oriented reforms in telecoms and electricity—including the privatization of assets, the liberalization of markets, and the separation of regulatory authority from operations—spread rapidly around the globe, and especially through Latin America,
Andrea Calabro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ownership and control in local Public Utilities the italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabro, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
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conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in italian local Public Utilities
International Journal of Public Administration, 2011Co-Authors: Andrea Calabro, Mariateresa TorchiaAbstract:Stemming from different theoretical perspectives the article examines the conflicts of interest arising among the actors (citizens, local governments, private shareholders, service providers) that at various levels are involved in local Public Utilities governance systems. The main results of a multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed local Public Utilities are summarized. Different and coexisting situations of conflicts of interest among multiple principals and agents are identified. In this context, governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts. However, our findings suggest that the ownership structure influences board composition and functioning and that higher numbers of independent directors do not necessarily mean “actual” board independence. The article contributes to the debate on conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in local Public Utilities.
Francesco Ranalli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ownership and control in local Public Utilities the italian case
Journal of Management & Governance, 2013Co-Authors: Andrea Calabro, Mariateresa Torchia, Francesco RanalliAbstract:The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of local Public Utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “Public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in local Public Utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
David Parker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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regulation of privatised Public Utilities in the uk performance and governance
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 1999Co-Authors: David ParkerAbstract:In many countries state ownership of Public Utilities is being abandoned in favour of private ownership with state regulation. To prevent monopoly abuse, regulatory structures are being created for the telecommunications, gas, electricity and water and sewerage sectors. From 1984 the UK privatised its major Utilities and introduced a form of regulation that is proving to be a model for other countries. This paper looks at the performance of UK privatised Utilities and the role of regulation in improving performance. It also considers the important subject of regulatory governance. The paper concludes that regulatory governance depends on the institutional context of regulation and that one country’s regulatory system cannot be successfully transferred to another country with a very different set of institutional constraints without appropriate adaptation.
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regulating Public Utilities
International Journal of Research, 1999Co-Authors: David ParkerAbstract:In many parts of the world governments are privatizing their telecommunications, gas, electricity and water and sewerage services. To prevent monopoly abuse regulatory systems are being introduced, many based on the UK model. Since 1984 the UK has privatized its major Utilities and established dedicated regulatory offices to police prices, investments and service quality. Privatization combined with regulation is premised on the view that by controlling the activities of private monopolies and by promoting competition wherever feasible, efficiency of service delivery can be improved and prices to consumers reduced. This article reviews the UK experience and outlines the lessons for other countries when designing or reforming their regulatory structures.
