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Michael Tye - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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transparency Qualia realism and representationalism
Philosophical Studies, 2014Co-Authors: Michael TyeAbstract:In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to Qualia realism and representationalism. I don�t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10�15 years or so.
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Qualia ain t in the head
Noûs, 2006Co-Authors: Alex Byrne, Michael TyeAbstract:Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye D.M. Armstrong Department of Philosophy (TM Accepted: June 18, 1996; Published: June 22, 1996 PSYCHE, 2(31), June 1996 http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-31-armstrong.html
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absent Qualia and the mind body problem
The Philosophical Review, 2006Co-Authors: Michael TyeAbstract:At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular phenomenal consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no definition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative definition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the definition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specific examples and associated comments. The explanation typically proceeds along something like the fol lowing lines: there is something it is like to taste Green Chartreuse, to hear a chainsaw, to smell a skunk, to see the clear, blue sky. Each of these states has a distinctive subjective character or raw "feel" to it. These raw "feels"-Qualia, as they are often called-resemble and differ from one another to varying degrees. The subjective "feel" of the experience of red, for example, is more like the subjective "feel" of the experience of orange than it is like the subjective "feel" of the experience of green. Subjective "feels" or Qualia are what make the states possessing them phenomenally conscious. Further illumination is sometimes offered by noting that it is phe nomenal consciousness that gives rise to talk of an explanatory gap and
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Qualia content and the inverted spectrum
Noûs, 1994Co-Authors: Michael TyeAbstract:L'A. developpe un argument d'ordre intentionnaliste contre l'application de la notion de Qualia au domaine des experiences de la perception, et rejette a la fois la theorie du contenu de la perception et l'hypothese classique du spectre inverse dans un monde inverse
Andrew James Latham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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four meta methods for the study of Qualia
Erkenntnis, 2019Co-Authors: Lokchi Chan, Andrew James LathamAbstract:In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ (as we shall call them) employed in scientific and philosophical research of Qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of Qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of Qualia that we immediately observe through introspection (e.g., intrinsic, non-causal, ineffable); the argument-centred meta-method is interested in the role of Qualia in some arguments for non-physicalism; the event-centred metamethod is interested in the role of Qualia as some natural events whose nature is hidden and must be uncovered empirically. We will argue that the event-centred metamethod is the most promising route to a comprehensive scientific conception of Qualia because of the flexibility of ontological and methodological assumptions it can provide. We also reveal the hidden influences of the different meta-methods and in doing so show why consideration of meta-methods has value for the study of consciousness.
Lokchi Chan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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four meta methods for the study of Qualia
Erkenntnis, 2019Co-Authors: Lokchi Chan, Andrew James LathamAbstract:In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ (as we shall call them) employed in scientific and philosophical research of Qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of Qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of Qualia that we immediately observe through introspection (e.g., intrinsic, non-causal, ineffable); the argument-centred meta-method is interested in the role of Qualia in some arguments for non-physicalism; the event-centred metamethod is interested in the role of Qualia as some natural events whose nature is hidden and must be uncovered empirically. We will argue that the event-centred metamethod is the most promising route to a comprehensive scientific conception of Qualia because of the flexibility of ontological and methodological assumptions it can provide. We also reveal the hidden influences of the different meta-methods and in doing so show why consideration of meta-methods has value for the study of consciousness.
Sydney Shoemaker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Qualia and consciousness
Mind, 1991Co-Authors: Sydney ShoemakerAbstract:Qualia, if there are such, are properties of sensations and perceptual states, namely the properties that give them their qualitative or phenomenal characterthose that determine "what it is like" to have them. I combine the belief that there are Qualia with adherence to a materialist and functionalist view of mind, and thus hold a "compatibilist" view which puts me in a crossfire between two sorts of "incompatibilists"-those who believe in Qualia and think that this supports a rejection of functionalist or materialist views, and those who deny the existence of Qualia, or "quine" them (as Daniel Dennett puts it), as part of their defense of functionalist or materialist views. I My compatibilist position (see Shoemaker 1975a, 1975b, 1981 and 1982) can most conveniently be sketched by reference to the "inverted Qualia argument" and the "absent Qualia argument", both against functionalism, advanced some years ago by Ned Block and Jerry Fodor (1972). I agree with Block and Fodor that the inverted Qualia argument shows that individual Qualia are not functionally definable. This is my one concession to incompatibilism. But I maintain that there is a good sense in which the qualitative character of an experience can be accommodated in a functionalist account. A functionalist account can be given of what it is for a property to be a quale, of what it is for mental states to have qualitative character, and of what it is for mental states to be in greater or lesser degrees similar in qualitative character. In consequence of this, while there can be what Block and Fodor call cases of "inverted Qualia", there cannot be cases of what they call "absent Qualia". A creature functionally just like a creature having qualitative states would itself have to have qualitative states, for it would have to have states standing in relations of qualitative similarity and difference to one another that are isomorphic with the relations of qualitative similarity and difference holding between the states of the creature which is its functional duplicate. All that follows from the fact that individual Qualia are not functionally definable is that such a functional duplicate would not necessarily have states that are the same in qualitative character as the corresponding states of the creature of which it is the duplicate, not that it might lack qualitative states altogether.
Lawrence M Ward - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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corticothalamic necessity Qualia and consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007Co-Authors: Sam M Doesburg, Lawrence M WardAbstract:The centrencephalic theory of consciousness cannot yet account for some evidence from both brain damaged and normally functioning humans that strongly implicates thalamocortical activity as essential for consciousness. Moreover, the behavioral indexes used by Merker to implicate consciousness need more development, as, besides being somewhat vague, they lead to some apparent contradictions in the attribution of consciousness.
