Quality Certification

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Stephan Marette - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can Quality Certification lead to stable cartels
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2003
    Co-Authors: Stephan Marette, John M Crespi
    Abstract:

    Cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection whereconsumers are imperfectly informed about product Quality. Producer collusionmay be necessary to signal Quality via third-party Certification. Whileexamining different cost structures for third-party Certification, we showthat a stable cartel that provides information about product Quality mayimprove overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce competition.

  • Can Quality Certification lead to stable cartels ?
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2003
    Co-Authors: Stephan Marette, J. Crespi
    Abstract:

    La stabilité d'un cartel est étudiée dans un contexte d'antisélection, où les consommateurs sont imparfaitement informés sur la qualité des produits. La collusion entre producteurs peut être indispensable pour certifier la qualité des produits. Différentes structures de coûts de Certification sont considérées. Les auteurs montrent qu'un cartel stable qui procure de l'information via la Certification améliore le bien-être de l'économie, même si les producteurs du cartel réduisent les quantités produites.

John M Crespi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can Quality Certification lead to stable cartels
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2003
    Co-Authors: Stephan Marette, John M Crespi
    Abstract:

    Cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection whereconsumers are imperfectly informed about product Quality. Producer collusionmay be necessary to signal Quality via third-party Certification. Whileexamining different cost structures for third-party Certification, we showthat a stable cartel that provides information about product Quality mayimprove overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce competition.

Mariechristine Renard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Quality Certification regulation and power in fair trade
    Journal of Rural Studies, 2005
    Co-Authors: Mariechristine Renard
    Abstract:

    Abstract This article examines governance changes and shifting power relations within the fair-labelling network. These shifts are framed analytically by reference to broader changes in the agrofoods sector tied to the increasingly key role played by Quality relations and standards in the production and marketing of food. The author argues that evident trends such as a growing complexity of fair-labelling markets, the centralization of its regulating bodies, and the normalization of Certification processes have altered power relations to the detriment of small producers. In addition, and at the same time, this ‘fair’ market niche has become more desirable to dominant market actors leading to a combination of factors that has triggered a broad debate within fair trade with respect to the definition and mission of the fair-trade network.

J. Crespi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Can Quality Certification lead to stable cartels ?
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2003
    Co-Authors: Stephan Marette, J. Crespi
    Abstract:

    La stabilité d'un cartel est étudiée dans un contexte d'antisélection, où les consommateurs sont imparfaitement informés sur la qualité des produits. La collusion entre producteurs peut être indispensable pour certifier la qualité des produits. Différentes structures de coûts de Certification sont considérées. Les auteurs montrent qu'un cartel stable qui procure de l'information via la Certification améliore le bien-être de l'économie, même si les producteurs du cartel réduisent les quantités produites.

Lia Hasenclever - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Quality Certification and performance of Brazilian firms: An empirical study
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2000
    Co-Authors: Marcos A. M. Lima, Marcelo Resende, Lia Hasenclever
    Abstract:

    Abstract The paper studies the relationship between Quality Certification, as indicated by the ISO 9001 and 9002 certificates, and the performance of Brazilian firms since 1992. The comparison between the group of certified firms and an especially constructed control group indicated that, as a rule, one cannot discern differential levels of performance across the two groups for different indicators.