The Experts below are selected from a list of 210 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
K C Sharma - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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repeated time allocation of national and private sector by Real Estate Agent
Journal of Graph Theory, 2013Co-Authors: Prakash Chandra, K C SharmaAbstract:This paper presents the time (Real Estate Agent (broker)'s service hours) - allocation of two types of firms ' product (national (leader)-firm and private (follower)-firm) repeatedly. Where the strategy of the national (leader) firm is to decide the product whole sale price and the private developer plays a role of the follower with respect to maximize its payoff. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg equilibriu m in terms of time allocation to these developers as well as price with the parameters. A Real Estate Agent controls the service hours which is taken in the normal form. In this game theoretic model, quality of the product is measured by baseline sales, brand substitution degree and price positioning. Future research through simu lating this model can show many more application results. Real Estate Agent (Broker) has crucial role in the production of the Real Estate product and their sale, for that he serves by serving in the allowed time period( Efficient hours of the service) which is limited resource that must be optimally d ivided among the different categories and their various Real Estate developer' product (Shops, Houses). Here, the issue of time-allocation and impact on Agent's performance has attracted the attention of game theorist for preparing the model to solve the problem. Nat ional developer of the Real Estate (Leader-firm) and Private developer of the Real Estate (fo llo wer-firm) are distinct due to having some basic economic ability to produce a wide range of outputs with reasonable profit marg in and their size. We can distinct the leader and fo llower by emerging in industries comprised of some well established firms with sound assets, and other newer, more fragile firm. The fo llo wer firms, being less resilient to business shocks, may hence adopt a follower role in the market, awaiting for the more established leader firms to stabilize before making decisions on their own production levels. Undoubtedly, obtained equilibriu m solution is a fixed point of the dynamic process in which the leader-and follower-firms readjust output levels according to the strategic market assumptions.
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repeated time allocation of national and private sector by Real Estate Agent
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Prakash Chandra Mittal, K C SharmaAbstract:This paper is presenting the time (Real Estate Agent (broker)’s service hours) - allocation of two types firms product (national (leader)-firm and private (follower)-firm) repeatedly. In which national (leader) firm’s strategy to decide the product price and private developer play a role of the follower with respect to maximizes its payoff. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of time allocation to these developers as well as price. Agent’s controls the service hours considering it’s a normalizing form is unity. In this game theoretic model, quality of the product is measured by baseline sales, brand substitution degree and price positioning.
Leonard Ztanpano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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buyer search duration in the residential Real Estate market the role of the Real Estate Agent
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995Co-Authors: Edward Baryla, Leonard ZtanpanoAbstract:This study examines buyer search duration using a national database consisting of transactions conducted with and without the assistance of Real Estate brokers. The results of this study indicate that information asymmetries are present in the residential Real Estate market. First-time buyers and out-of-town buyers search longer than more experienced and local, more knowledgeable homebuyers. On the other hand, buyers relocated by their employers spend less time looking for a home. More importantly, Real Estate brokers are able to reduce buyer search time for all classes of buyers, whether first-time, experienced, or an out-of-town buyer.
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buyer search duration in the residential Real Estate market the role of the Real Estate Agent
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995Co-Authors: Edward Baryla, Leonard ZtanpanoAbstract:This study examines buyer search duration using a national database consisting of transactions conducted with and without the assistance of Real Estate brokers. The results of this study indicate t...
Edward Baryla - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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buyer search duration in the residential Real Estate market the role of the Real Estate Agent
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995Co-Authors: Edward Baryla, Leonard ZtanpanoAbstract:This study examines buyer search duration using a national database consisting of transactions conducted with and without the assistance of Real Estate brokers. The results of this study indicate that information asymmetries are present in the residential Real Estate market. First-time buyers and out-of-town buyers search longer than more experienced and local, more knowledgeable homebuyers. On the other hand, buyers relocated by their employers spend less time looking for a home. More importantly, Real Estate brokers are able to reduce buyer search time for all classes of buyers, whether first-time, experienced, or an out-of-town buyer.
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buyer search duration in the residential Real Estate market the role of the Real Estate Agent
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995Co-Authors: Edward Baryla, Leonard ZtanpanoAbstract:This study examines buyer search duration using a national database consisting of transactions conducted with and without the assistance of Real Estate brokers. The results of this study indicate t...
Pieter A Gautier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Real Estate Agent commission structure and sales performance
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Pieter A Gautier, Arjen Siegmann, Aico Van VuurenAbstract:We estimate the effect of broker characteristics on sales performance on a large dataset of residential Real Estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011. Using house fixed-effects, we find that large brokers, brokers who are close by, and brokers on a fixed-price commission, sell faster. Experienced brokers sell slightly slower, but at marginally better prices. Brokers with a fixed-price commission structure sell faster, at better prices. With neighborhood fixed-effects instead of house fixed-effects, broker effects become more pronounced, suggesting that brokers' location is not random, but related to the intra-neighborhood housing market. The effects are robust to different econometric specifications and corrections for selection effects.
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Real Estate Agent commission structure and sales performance
Research Papers in Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Pieter A Gautier, Arjen Siegmann, Aico Van VuurenAbstract:Do higher Real-Estate Agent fees imply better performance? This study uses a nation-wide dataset of residential Real-Estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011 to provide evidence against this. Brokers with a flat-fee structure who charge an up-front fee (which is substantially lower than the average fee of traditional brokers) and leave the viewings to the seller sell faster and at - on average - 2.7 percent higher prices. We correct for fixed house- and time effects. We provide additional evidence that the price difference is not due to a seller-selection effect.
Prakash Chandra Mittal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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repeated time allocation of national and private sector by Real Estate Agent
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Prakash Chandra Mittal, K C SharmaAbstract:This paper is presenting the time (Real Estate Agent (broker)’s service hours) - allocation of two types firms product (national (leader)-firm and private (follower)-firm) repeatedly. In which national (leader) firm’s strategy to decide the product price and private developer play a role of the follower with respect to maximizes its payoff. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of time allocation to these developers as well as price. Agent’s controls the service hours considering it’s a normalizing form is unity. In this game theoretic model, quality of the product is measured by baseline sales, brand substitution degree and price positioning.
