The Experts below are selected from a list of 45 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Georg Carle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Abandoned Side of the Internet: Hijacking Internet Resources When Domain Names Expire
    Traffic Monitoring and Analysis, 2015
    Co-Authors: Johann Schlamp, Josef Gustafsson, Matthias Wählisch, Thomas C. Schmidt, Georg Carle
    Abstract:

    The vulnerability of the Internet has been demonstrated by prominent IP prefix hijacking events. Major outages such as the China Telecom incident in 2010 stimulate speculations about malicious intentions behind such anomalies. Surprisingly, almost all discussions in the current literature assume that hijacking incidents are enabled by the lack of security mechanisms in the inter-domain routing protocol BGP. In this paper, we discuss an attacker model that accounts for the hijacking of network ownership information stored in Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases. We show that such threats emerge from abandoned Internet resources (e.g., IP address blocks, AS numbers). When DNS names expire, attackers gain the opportunity to take resource ownership by re-registering domain names that are referenced by corresponding RIR database objects. We argue that this kind of attack is more attractive than conventional hijacking, since the attacker can act in full anonymity on behalf of a victim. Despite corresponding incidents have been observed in the past, current detection techniques are not qualified to deal with these attacks. We show that they are feasible with very little effort, and analyze the risk potential of abandoned Internet resources for the European service region: our findings reveal that currently 73 /24 IP prefixes and 7 ASes are vulnerable to be stealthily abused. We discuss countermeasures and outline research directions towards preventive solutions.

Carle Georg - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Abandoned Side of the Internet: Hijacking Internet Resources When Domain Names Expire
    'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2015
    Co-Authors: Schlamp Johann, Gustafsson Josef, Wählisch Matthias, Schmidt, Thomas C., Carle Georg
    Abstract:

    The vulnerability of the Internet has been demonstrated by prominent IP prefix hijacking events. Major outages such as the China Telecom incident in 2010 stimulate speculations about malicious intentions behind such anomalies. Surprisingly, almost all discussions in the current literature assume that hijacking incidents are enabled by the lack of security mechanisms in the inter-domain routing protocol BGP. In this paper, we discuss an attacker model that accounts for the hijacking of network ownership information stored in Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases. We show that such threats emerge from abandoned Internet resources (e.g., IP address blocks, AS numbers). When DNS names expire, attackers gain the opportunity to take resource ownership by re-registering domain names that are referenced by corresponding RIR database objects. We argue that this kind of attack is more attractive than conventional hijacking, since the attacker can act in full anonymity on behalf of a victim. Despite corresponding incidents have been observed in the past, current detection techniques are not qualified to deal with these attacks. We show that they are feasible with very little effort, and analyze the risk potential of abandoned Internet resources for the European service region: our findings reveal that currently 73 /24 IP prefixes and 7 ASes are vulnerable to be stealthily abused. We discuss countermeasures and outline research directions towards preventive solutions.Comment: Final version for TMA 201

Alain Aina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A survey of anti-spam mechanisms and their usage from a Regional Internet Registry's perspective
    2016 IST-Africa Week Conference, 2016
    Co-Authors: Amreesh Phokeer, Alain Aina
    Abstract:

    This paper specifically deals with the different policies and technical frameworks at a Regional Internet Registry (RIR) level in terms of anti-spam measures. It also exposes the issue of spam from an Internet Registry perspective, as an important element of the Internet technical infrastructure. We found out that, an RIR itself is not mandated to fight spam but it maintains a Registry that is of paramount importance for traceability of Internet Number Resources ownership information. The paper starts with describing the challenges faced by operators followed by the different sources of spam. It then exposes the different mechanisms deployed by RIRs but importantly, this paper shows how those mechanisms either technical or policy-oriented are mostly underutilised, although they are operational. The latter is achieved by taking AFRINIC, the African RIR as case study.

Johann Schlamp - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Abandoned Side of the Internet: Hijacking Internet Resources When Domain Names Expire
    Traffic Monitoring and Analysis, 2015
    Co-Authors: Johann Schlamp, Josef Gustafsson, Matthias Wählisch, Thomas C. Schmidt, Georg Carle
    Abstract:

    The vulnerability of the Internet has been demonstrated by prominent IP prefix hijacking events. Major outages such as the China Telecom incident in 2010 stimulate speculations about malicious intentions behind such anomalies. Surprisingly, almost all discussions in the current literature assume that hijacking incidents are enabled by the lack of security mechanisms in the inter-domain routing protocol BGP. In this paper, we discuss an attacker model that accounts for the hijacking of network ownership information stored in Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases. We show that such threats emerge from abandoned Internet resources (e.g., IP address blocks, AS numbers). When DNS names expire, attackers gain the opportunity to take resource ownership by re-registering domain names that are referenced by corresponding RIR database objects. We argue that this kind of attack is more attractive than conventional hijacking, since the attacker can act in full anonymity on behalf of a victim. Despite corresponding incidents have been observed in the past, current detection techniques are not qualified to deal with these attacks. We show that they are feasible with very little effort, and analyze the risk potential of abandoned Internet resources for the European service region: our findings reveal that currently 73 /24 IP prefixes and 7 ASes are vulnerable to be stealthily abused. We discuss countermeasures and outline research directions towards preventive solutions.

Schlamp Johann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Abandoned Side of the Internet: Hijacking Internet Resources When Domain Names Expire
    'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2015
    Co-Authors: Schlamp Johann, Gustafsson Josef, Wählisch Matthias, Schmidt, Thomas C., Carle Georg
    Abstract:

    The vulnerability of the Internet has been demonstrated by prominent IP prefix hijacking events. Major outages such as the China Telecom incident in 2010 stimulate speculations about malicious intentions behind such anomalies. Surprisingly, almost all discussions in the current literature assume that hijacking incidents are enabled by the lack of security mechanisms in the inter-domain routing protocol BGP. In this paper, we discuss an attacker model that accounts for the hijacking of network ownership information stored in Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases. We show that such threats emerge from abandoned Internet resources (e.g., IP address blocks, AS numbers). When DNS names expire, attackers gain the opportunity to take resource ownership by re-registering domain names that are referenced by corresponding RIR database objects. We argue that this kind of attack is more attractive than conventional hijacking, since the attacker can act in full anonymity on behalf of a victim. Despite corresponding incidents have been observed in the past, current detection techniques are not qualified to deal with these attacks. We show that they are feasible with very little effort, and analyze the risk potential of abandoned Internet resources for the European service region: our findings reveal that currently 73 /24 IP prefixes and 7 ASes are vulnerable to be stealthily abused. We discuss countermeasures and outline research directions towards preventive solutions.Comment: Final version for TMA 201