The Experts below are selected from a list of 134037 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Rui Wu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
A Regulatory Policy to promote renewable energy consumption in China: Review and future evolutionary path
Renewable Energy, 2016Co-Authors: Yongxiu He, Yuexia Pang, Huiying Tian, Yang Xu, Rui WuAbstract:Renewable energy has become the world's strategic choice to solve environmental pollution, address the energy crisis and achieve social sustainable development. The establishment of a Regulatory system coincides with the development stage of renewable energy and electricity market operation is significant in standardizing the market competition and guaranteeing healthy development of renewable energy in China. This paper analyses the current situation of renewable energy development and the existing renewable energy regulation system in China, pointing out that the main problems restricting renewable energy development are institutional mechanisms and market factors. The existing Regulatory mechanisms also have deficiencies, such as the inclination towards economic regulation and the lack of a market adjustment mechanism. This paper proposes that China should comprehensively consider the renewable energy development stage, electricity market trading mechanisms and other factors in electricity Regulatory requirements when Policy making, actively exploring a new renewable energy regulation model adapted to different development phases. In addition, this paper suggests China's Regulatory Policy path based on the forecasting of renewable energy developing models.
Cary Coglianese - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
seeking truth for power informational strategy and Regulatory Policy making
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Cary Coglianese, Richard J Zeckhauser, Edward A ParsonAbstract:Whether regulating mutual funds or chemical manufacturers, government's Policy decisions depend on information possessed by industry. Yet it is not in any industry's interests to share information that will lead to costly regulations. So how do government regulators secure needed information from industry? Since information disclosed by any firm cannot be retrieved and can be used to regulate the entire sector, industry faces a collective action problem in maintaining silence. While collective silence is easy to maintain if all firms' interests are aligned, individual firms' payoffs for disclosure can vary due to heterogeneous effects of regulation and differing expectations about the regulator's expected actions with or without any given information. This leads to regulators' first strategy: exploit asymmetries in firms' interests in disclosure. Regulators' second strategy comes from their ability to create asymmetries of interest, namely by selectively rewarding or punishing individual firms. Both of these strategies work best when pursued informally, in less visible ways, since other firms can be expected to inflict retribution on a squealer. Although informal relationships have been long deplored due to the risk of Regulatory bias or capture, our analysis shows how they can be beneficial to government in playing the information game. This has important implications for Regulatory procedure. Since total transparency would detract from government's ability to secure valuable information, administrative law needs to balance between the competing needs of transparency to prevent abuse and opacity to facilitate information exchange. Posted paper, uploaded January 2010, is the published version of the working paper originally posted May 2004.
-
information technology and Regulatory Policy new directions for digital government research
Social Science Computer Review, 2004Co-Authors: Cary CoglianeseAbstract:Information technology holds the potential for improving the process by which government makes Regulatory decisions affecting vital aspects of society and the economy. This article charts new directions for research on the application of information technology to Regulatory Policy making. Drawing on the deliberations from two recent workshops organized by Harvard University's Regulatory Policy Program, the article highlights avenues for expanding the objectives of digital government research, as well as contributing knowledge to decision makers who seek to improve the responsiveness, efficiency, and manageability of Regulatory Policy making. Effective innovations in applying information technology to Regulatory Policy will need to take into account both the capabilities of new information technologies and the institutional design of the federal Regulatory process. By integrating perspectives from both the information and social sciences, digital government research can help shape the future of information technology and the making of Regulatory Policy.
-
information technology and Regulatory Policy new directions for digital government research
Social Science Computer Review, 2004Co-Authors: Cary CoglianeseAbstract:Information technology holds the potential for improving the process by which government makes Regulatory decisions affecting vital aspects of society and the economy. This article charts new directions for research on the application of information technology to Regulatory Policy making. Drawing on the deliberations from two recent workshops organized by Harvard University's Regulatory Policy Program, the article highlights avenues for expanding the objectives of digital government research, as well as contributing knowledge to decision makers who seek to improve the responsiveness, efficiency, and manageability of Regulatory Policy making. Effective innovations in applying information technology to Regulatory Policy will need to take into account both the capabilities of new information technologies and the institutional design of the federal Regulatory process. By integrating perspectives from both the information and social sciences, digital government research can help shape the future of information technology and the making of Regulatory Policy.
-
seeking truth for power informational strategy and Regulatory Policy making
bepress Legal Series, 2004Co-Authors: Cary Coglianese, Richard J Zeckhauser, Edward A ParsonAbstract:Information is the lifeblood of Regulatory Policy. The effective use of governmental power depends on information about conditions in the world, strategies for improving those conditions, and the consequences associated with deploying different strategies.1 Indeed, this need for information has led legislatures to create specialized committee structures, delegate Policy authority to expert agencies, and develop administrative procedures that encourage analysis.2 Although legal scholars have extensively debated procedures and reforms designed to improve the analytic and scientific basis of Regulatory Policymaking,3 they have paid relatively little attention to how regulators
Marcus Head - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
multistate outbreak of listeriosis linked to turkey deli meat and subsequent changes in us Regulatory Policy
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2006Co-Authors: Sami L Gottlieb, Claire E Newbern, Patricia M Griffin, Lewis M Graves, Michael R Hoekstra, Nicole L Baker, Susan B Hunter, Kristin G Holt, Fred Ramsey, Marcus HeadAbstract:Background Listeriosis, a life-threatening foodborne illness caused by Listeria monocytogenes, affects approximately 2500 Americans annually. Between July and October 2002, an uncommon strain of L. monocytogenes caused an outbreak of listeriosis in 9 states. Methods We conducted case finding, a case-control study, and traceback and microbiological investigations to determine the extent and source of the outbreak and to propose control measures. Case patients were infected with the outbreak strain of L. monocytogenes between July and November 2002 in 9 states, and control patients were infected with different L. monocytogenes strains. Outcome measures included food exposure associated with outbreak strain infection and source of the implicated food. Results Fifty-four case patients were identified; 8 died, and 3 pregnant women had fetal deaths. The case-control study included 38 case patients and 53 control patients. Case patients consumed turkey deli meat much more frequently than did control patients (P = .008, by Wilcoxon rank-sum test). In the 4 weeks before illness, 55% of case patients had eaten deli turkey breast more than 1-2 times, compared with 28% of control patients (odds ratio, 4.5; 95% confidence interval, 1.3-17.1). Investigation of turkey deli meat eaten by case patients led to several turkey processing plants. The outbreak strain was found in the environment of 1 processing plant and in turkey products from a second. Together, the processing plants recalled > 30 million pounds of products. Following the outbreak, the US Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service issued new regulations outlining a L. monocytogenes control and testing program for ready-to-eat meat and poultry processing plants. Conclusions Turkey deli meat was the source of a large multistate outbreak of listeriosis. Investigation of this outbreak helped guide Policy changes designed to prevent future L. monocytogenes contamination of ready-to-eat meat and poultry products.
Edward A Parson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
seeking truth for power informational strategy and Regulatory Policy making
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Cary Coglianese, Richard J Zeckhauser, Edward A ParsonAbstract:Whether regulating mutual funds or chemical manufacturers, government's Policy decisions depend on information possessed by industry. Yet it is not in any industry's interests to share information that will lead to costly regulations. So how do government regulators secure needed information from industry? Since information disclosed by any firm cannot be retrieved and can be used to regulate the entire sector, industry faces a collective action problem in maintaining silence. While collective silence is easy to maintain if all firms' interests are aligned, individual firms' payoffs for disclosure can vary due to heterogeneous effects of regulation and differing expectations about the regulator's expected actions with or without any given information. This leads to regulators' first strategy: exploit asymmetries in firms' interests in disclosure. Regulators' second strategy comes from their ability to create asymmetries of interest, namely by selectively rewarding or punishing individual firms. Both of these strategies work best when pursued informally, in less visible ways, since other firms can be expected to inflict retribution on a squealer. Although informal relationships have been long deplored due to the risk of Regulatory bias or capture, our analysis shows how they can be beneficial to government in playing the information game. This has important implications for Regulatory procedure. Since total transparency would detract from government's ability to secure valuable information, administrative law needs to balance between the competing needs of transparency to prevent abuse and opacity to facilitate information exchange. Posted paper, uploaded January 2010, is the published version of the working paper originally posted May 2004.
-
seeking truth for power informational strategy and Regulatory Policy making
bepress Legal Series, 2004Co-Authors: Cary Coglianese, Richard J Zeckhauser, Edward A ParsonAbstract:Information is the lifeblood of Regulatory Policy. The effective use of governmental power depends on information about conditions in the world, strategies for improving those conditions, and the consequences associated with deploying different strategies.1 Indeed, this need for information has led legislatures to create specialized committee structures, delegate Policy authority to expert agencies, and develop administrative procedures that encourage analysis.2 Although legal scholars have extensively debated procedures and reforms designed to improve the analytic and scientific basis of Regulatory Policymaking,3 they have paid relatively little attention to how regulators
Yongxiu He - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
A Regulatory Policy to promote renewable energy consumption in China: Review and future evolutionary path
Renewable Energy, 2016Co-Authors: Yongxiu He, Yuexia Pang, Huiying Tian, Yang Xu, Rui WuAbstract:Renewable energy has become the world's strategic choice to solve environmental pollution, address the energy crisis and achieve social sustainable development. The establishment of a Regulatory system coincides with the development stage of renewable energy and electricity market operation is significant in standardizing the market competition and guaranteeing healthy development of renewable energy in China. This paper analyses the current situation of renewable energy development and the existing renewable energy regulation system in China, pointing out that the main problems restricting renewable energy development are institutional mechanisms and market factors. The existing Regulatory mechanisms also have deficiencies, such as the inclination towards economic regulation and the lack of a market adjustment mechanism. This paper proposes that China should comprehensively consider the renewable energy development stage, electricity market trading mechanisms and other factors in electricity Regulatory requirements when Policy making, actively exploring a new renewable energy regulation model adapted to different development phases. In addition, this paper suggests China's Regulatory Policy path based on the forecasting of renewable energy developing models.
