The Experts below are selected from a list of 1260 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Daniel P Kessler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • vertical integration and optimal Reimbursement policy
    International Journal of Health Care Finance & Economics, 2011
    Co-Authors: Christopher C Afendulis, Daniel P Kessler
    Abstract:

    Health care providers may vertically integrate not only to facilitate coordination of care, but also for strategic reasons that may not be in patients’ best interests. Optimal Medicare Reimbursement policy depends upon the extent to which each of these explanations is correct. To investigate, we compare the consequences of the 1997 adoption of prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF PPS) in geographic areas with high versus low levels of hospital/SNF integration. We find that SNF PPS decreased spending more in high integration areas, with no measurable consequences for patient health outcomes. Our findings suggest that integrated providers should face higher-powered Reimbursement incentives, i.e., less cost-sharing. More generally, we conclude that purchasers of health services (and other services subject to agency problems) should consider the organizational form of their suppliers when choosing a Reimbursement Mechanism.

  • vertical integration and optimal Reimbursement policy
    2011
    Co-Authors: Christopher C Afendulis, Daniel P Kessler
    Abstract:

    Health care providers may vertically integrate not only to facilitate coordination of care, but also for strategic reasons that may not be in patients' best interests. Optimal Medicare Reimbursement policy depends upon the extent to which each of these explanations is correct. To investigate, we compare the consequences of the 1997 adoption of prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF PPS) in geographic areas with high versus low levels of hospital/SNF integration. We find that SNF PPS decreased spending more in high integration areas, with no measurable consequences for patient health outcomes. Our findings suggest that subjecting integrated providers to higher-powered Reimbursement incentives, i.e., less cost-sharing, may enhance medical productivity. More generally, we conclude that it may be efficient for purchasers of health services (and other services subject to agency problems) to consider the organizational form of their suppliers when choosing a Reimbursement Mechanism.

Li Ling - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Zeng Yanbing - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the distorted Reimbursement Mechanism faced by medical institution all along during the developing process in 30 years
    Chinese Health Resources, 2011
    Co-Authors: Zeng Yanbing
    Abstract:

    Data from the statistical reports of health administration institutions were used to construct Reimbursement Mechanism of medical institution,combined with qualitative and quantitative methds concering vicious circle model of health system.The analyzing result suggests that the government subsidies dropped year after year since 1978.There was a 76.93～89.40 billion yuan fiscal gap totaled from 1978 to 1991,and 17.85 billion yuan in 2008. Under the distorted standard of prices,the medical institutions depended on more prescription drugs and more medical examinations to compensate for deficit of health investment,which lead to an over - increase of medical expenditure of 71.93～172.22 billion yuan and a waste of medical resources during 54.08～159.38 billion yuan.In general, the study confirmed that medical institutions had been plagued by the distorted Reimbursement Mechanism that affecting their survival and development.

  • the distorted Reimbursement Mechanism of the medical institutions in central china area still exists
    Chinese Health Resources, 2011
    Co-Authors: Zeng Yanbing
    Abstract:

    The article takes one province in central China area as an example.The article utilizes regular statistical data such as the financial annual report materials of national hygiene to make a quantitative simulation demonstration, and finds that the shrinking of government subsidies of the province still exists.There is a big gap of 4.05 billion yuan in financial investment in the past 18 years.In order to remedy the shortfall of the net income under the severely controlling of the medical price,the operating revenue increases 16.32～36.17 billion yuan and health resources waste 12.27～32.12 billion yuan.More than half of the expenditure cannot be reasonably explained.The finance and commodity prices takes 66.8%～149.4%of the responsibility for the growth of the medical expenditure. Overall,the Reimbursement Mechanism still exists in the province of central China area.

Christopher C Afendulis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • vertical integration and optimal Reimbursement policy
    International Journal of Health Care Finance & Economics, 2011
    Co-Authors: Christopher C Afendulis, Daniel P Kessler
    Abstract:

    Health care providers may vertically integrate not only to facilitate coordination of care, but also for strategic reasons that may not be in patients’ best interests. Optimal Medicare Reimbursement policy depends upon the extent to which each of these explanations is correct. To investigate, we compare the consequences of the 1997 adoption of prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF PPS) in geographic areas with high versus low levels of hospital/SNF integration. We find that SNF PPS decreased spending more in high integration areas, with no measurable consequences for patient health outcomes. Our findings suggest that integrated providers should face higher-powered Reimbursement incentives, i.e., less cost-sharing. More generally, we conclude that purchasers of health services (and other services subject to agency problems) should consider the organizational form of their suppliers when choosing a Reimbursement Mechanism.

  • vertical integration and optimal Reimbursement policy
    2011
    Co-Authors: Christopher C Afendulis, Daniel P Kessler
    Abstract:

    Health care providers may vertically integrate not only to facilitate coordination of care, but also for strategic reasons that may not be in patients' best interests. Optimal Medicare Reimbursement policy depends upon the extent to which each of these explanations is correct. To investigate, we compare the consequences of the 1997 adoption of prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF PPS) in geographic areas with high versus low levels of hospital/SNF integration. We find that SNF PPS decreased spending more in high integration areas, with no measurable consequences for patient health outcomes. Our findings suggest that subjecting integrated providers to higher-powered Reimbursement incentives, i.e., less cost-sharing, may enhance medical productivity. More generally, we conclude that it may be efficient for purchasers of health services (and other services subject to agency problems) to consider the organizational form of their suppliers when choosing a Reimbursement Mechanism.

L I Xiaoxuan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.