The Experts below are selected from a list of 989463 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Yu Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ours optimal unicast routing systems in non cooperative wireless networks
ACM IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, 2006Co-Authors: Weizhao Wang, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu WangAbstract:We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strate-gyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service Requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS).Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service Requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to cooperate in forwarding packets for others. Our mechanism substantially reduces the overpayment by using Nash equilibrium solutions as opposed to strategyproof solutions. We then study a more realistic case where the service Requestor can act selfishly. (2) We first show that if we insist on the requirement of strategyproofness for the relay terminals, then no system can guarantee that the central authority can retrieve at least 1overn of the total payment. (3) We then present a strategyproof unicast system that collects 1over2n of the total payment, which is thus asymptotically optimum. (4) By only requiring Nash Equilibrium solutions, we propose a system that creates incentives for the service Requestor and intermediate terminals to correctly follow the prescribed protocol. More importantly, the central authority can retrieve at least half the total payment. We verify the economic efficiency of our systems through simulations that are based on very realistic terminal distributions.
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MobiCom - OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking - MobiCom '06, 2006Co-Authors: Weizhao Wang, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu WangAbstract:We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strate-gyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service Requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS).Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service Requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to cooperate in forwarding packets for others. Our mechanism substantially reduces the overpayment by using Nash equilibrium solutions as opposed to strategyproof solutions. We then study a more realistic case where the service Requestor can act selfishly. (2) We first show that if we insist on the requirement of strategyproofness for the relay terminals, then no system can guarantee that the central authority can retrieve at least 1overn of the total payment. (3) We then present a strategyproof unicast system that collects 1over2n of the total payment, which is thus asymptotically optimum. (4) By only requiring Nash Equilibrium solutions, we propose a system that creates incentives for the service Requestor and intermediate terminals to correctly follow the prescribed protocol. More importantly, the central authority can retrieve at least half the total payment. We verify the economic efficiency of our systems through simulations that are based on very realistic terminal distributions.
Sanghyun Ahn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal service provisioning for the scalable fog edge computing environment
Sensors, 2021Co-Authors: Jonghwa Choi, Sanghyun AhnAbstract:In recent years, we observed the proliferation of cloud data centers (CDCs) and the Internet of Things (IoT). Cloud computing based on CDCs has the drawback of unpredictable response times due to variant delays between service Requestors (IoT devices and end devices) and CDCs. This deficiency of cloud computing is especially problematic in providing IoT services with strict timing requirements and as a result, gives birth to fog/edge computing (FEC) whose responsiveness is achieved by placing service images near service Requestors. In FEC, the computing nodes located close to service Requestors are called fog/edge nodes (FENs). In addition, for an FEN to execute a specific service, it has to be provisioned with the corresponding service image. Most of the previous work on the service provisioning in the FEC environment deals with determining an appropriate FEN satisfying the requirements like delay, CPU and storage from the perspective of one or more service requests. In this paper, we determined how to optimally place service images in consideration of the pre-obtained service demands which may be collected during the prior time interval. The proposed FEC environment is scalable in the sense that the resources of FENs are effectively utilized thanks to the optimal provisioning of services on FENs. We propose two approaches to provision service images on FENs. In order to validate the performance of the proposed mechanisms, intensive simulations were carried out for various service demand scenarios.
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Optimal Service Provisioning for the Scalable Fog/Edge Computing Environment
Sensors, 2021Co-Authors: Jonghwa Choi, Sanghyun AhnAbstract:In recent years, we observed the proliferation of cloud data centers (CDCs) and the Internet of Things (IoT). Cloud computing based on CDCs has the drawback of unpredictable response times due to variant delays between service Requestors (IoT devices and end devices) and CDCs. This deficiency of cloud computing is especially problematic in providing IoT services with strict timing requirements and as a result, gives birth to fog/edge computing (FEC) whose responsiveness is achieved by placing service images near service Requestors. In FEC, the computing nodes located close to service Requestors are called fog/edge nodes (FENs). In addition, for an FEN to execute a specific service, it has to be provisioned with the corresponding service image. Most of the previous work on the service provisioning in the FEC environment deals with determining an appropriate FEN satisfying the requirements like delay, CPU and storage from the perspective of one or more service requests. In this paper, we determined how to optimally place service images in consideration of the pre-obtained service demands which may be collected during the prior time interval. The proposed FEC environment is scalable in the sense that the resources of FENs are effectively utilized thanks to the optimal provisioning of services on FENs. We propose two approaches to provision service images on FENs. In order to validate the performance of the proposed mechanisms, intensive simulations were carried out for various service demand scenarios.
Weizhao Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ours optimal unicast routing systems in non cooperative wireless networks
ACM IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, 2006Co-Authors: Weizhao Wang, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu WangAbstract:We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strate-gyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service Requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS).Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service Requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to cooperate in forwarding packets for others. Our mechanism substantially reduces the overpayment by using Nash equilibrium solutions as opposed to strategyproof solutions. We then study a more realistic case where the service Requestor can act selfishly. (2) We first show that if we insist on the requirement of strategyproofness for the relay terminals, then no system can guarantee that the central authority can retrieve at least 1overn of the total payment. (3) We then present a strategyproof unicast system that collects 1over2n of the total payment, which is thus asymptotically optimum. (4) By only requiring Nash Equilibrium solutions, we propose a system that creates incentives for the service Requestor and intermediate terminals to correctly follow the prescribed protocol. More importantly, the central authority can retrieve at least half the total payment. We verify the economic efficiency of our systems through simulations that are based on very realistic terminal distributions.
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MobiCom - OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking - MobiCom '06, 2006Co-Authors: Weizhao Wang, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu WangAbstract:We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strate-gyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service Requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS).Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service Requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to cooperate in forwarding packets for others. Our mechanism substantially reduces the overpayment by using Nash equilibrium solutions as opposed to strategyproof solutions. We then study a more realistic case where the service Requestor can act selfishly. (2) We first show that if we insist on the requirement of strategyproofness for the relay terminals, then no system can guarantee that the central authority can retrieve at least 1overn of the total payment. (3) We then present a strategyproof unicast system that collects 1over2n of the total payment, which is thus asymptotically optimum. (4) By only requiring Nash Equilibrium solutions, we propose a system that creates incentives for the service Requestor and intermediate terminals to correctly follow the prescribed protocol. More importantly, the central authority can retrieve at least half the total payment. We verify the economic efficiency of our systems through simulations that are based on very realistic terminal distributions.
Jonghwa Choi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal service provisioning for the scalable fog edge computing environment
Sensors, 2021Co-Authors: Jonghwa Choi, Sanghyun AhnAbstract:In recent years, we observed the proliferation of cloud data centers (CDCs) and the Internet of Things (IoT). Cloud computing based on CDCs has the drawback of unpredictable response times due to variant delays between service Requestors (IoT devices and end devices) and CDCs. This deficiency of cloud computing is especially problematic in providing IoT services with strict timing requirements and as a result, gives birth to fog/edge computing (FEC) whose responsiveness is achieved by placing service images near service Requestors. In FEC, the computing nodes located close to service Requestors are called fog/edge nodes (FENs). In addition, for an FEN to execute a specific service, it has to be provisioned with the corresponding service image. Most of the previous work on the service provisioning in the FEC environment deals with determining an appropriate FEN satisfying the requirements like delay, CPU and storage from the perspective of one or more service requests. In this paper, we determined how to optimally place service images in consideration of the pre-obtained service demands which may be collected during the prior time interval. The proposed FEC environment is scalable in the sense that the resources of FENs are effectively utilized thanks to the optimal provisioning of services on FENs. We propose two approaches to provision service images on FENs. In order to validate the performance of the proposed mechanisms, intensive simulations were carried out for various service demand scenarios.
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Optimal Service Provisioning for the Scalable Fog/Edge Computing Environment
Sensors, 2021Co-Authors: Jonghwa Choi, Sanghyun AhnAbstract:In recent years, we observed the proliferation of cloud data centers (CDCs) and the Internet of Things (IoT). Cloud computing based on CDCs has the drawback of unpredictable response times due to variant delays between service Requestors (IoT devices and end devices) and CDCs. This deficiency of cloud computing is especially problematic in providing IoT services with strict timing requirements and as a result, gives birth to fog/edge computing (FEC) whose responsiveness is achieved by placing service images near service Requestors. In FEC, the computing nodes located close to service Requestors are called fog/edge nodes (FENs). In addition, for an FEN to execute a specific service, it has to be provisioned with the corresponding service image. Most of the previous work on the service provisioning in the FEC environment deals with determining an appropriate FEN satisfying the requirements like delay, CPU and storage from the perspective of one or more service requests. In this paper, we determined how to optimally place service images in consideration of the pre-obtained service demands which may be collected during the prior time interval. The proposed FEC environment is scalable in the sense that the resources of FENs are effectively utilized thanks to the optimal provisioning of services on FENs. We propose two approaches to provision service images on FENs. In order to validate the performance of the proposed mechanisms, intensive simulations were carried out for various service demand scenarios.
Stephan Eidenbenz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ours optimal unicast routing systems in non cooperative wireless networks
ACM IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, 2006Co-Authors: Weizhao Wang, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu WangAbstract:We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strate-gyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service Requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS).Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service Requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to cooperate in forwarding packets for others. Our mechanism substantially reduces the overpayment by using Nash equilibrium solutions as opposed to strategyproof solutions. We then study a more realistic case where the service Requestor can act selfishly. (2) We first show that if we insist on the requirement of strategyproofness for the relay terminals, then no system can guarantee that the central authority can retrieve at least 1overn of the total payment. (3) We then present a strategyproof unicast system that collects 1over2n of the total payment, which is thus asymptotically optimum. (4) By only requiring Nash Equilibrium solutions, we propose a system that creates incentives for the service Requestor and intermediate terminals to correctly follow the prescribed protocol. More importantly, the central authority can retrieve at least half the total payment. We verify the economic efficiency of our systems through simulations that are based on very realistic terminal distributions.
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MobiCom - OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking - MobiCom '06, 2006Co-Authors: Weizhao Wang, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu WangAbstract:We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic inefficiency) of the VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strate-gyproofness (using weakly dominant strategy). In addition, we systematically study the unicast routing system in which both the relay terminals and the service Requestor (either the source or the destination nodes or both) could be selfish. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents social efficient unicast routing systems with proved performance guarantee. Thus, we call the proposed systems: Optimal Unicast Routing Systems (OURS).Our main contributions of OURS are as follows. (1) For the principal model where the service Requestor is not selfish, we propose a mechanism that provably creates incentives for intermediate terminals to cooperate in forwarding packets for others. Our mechanism substantially reduces the overpayment by using Nash equilibrium solutions as opposed to strategyproof solutions. We then study a more realistic case where the service Requestor can act selfishly. (2) We first show that if we insist on the requirement of strategyproofness for the relay terminals, then no system can guarantee that the central authority can retrieve at least 1overn of the total payment. (3) We then present a strategyproof unicast system that collects 1over2n of the total payment, which is thus asymptotically optimum. (4) By only requiring Nash Equilibrium solutions, we propose a system that creates incentives for the service Requestor and intermediate terminals to correctly follow the prescribed protocol. More importantly, the central authority can retrieve at least half the total payment. We verify the economic efficiency of our systems through simulations that are based on very realistic terminal distributions.
