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Jonathan Gruber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • future social security entitlements and the Retirement Decision
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007
    Co-Authors: Courtney Coile, Jonathan Gruber
    Abstract:

    Abstract A critical question for Social Security policy is how program incentives affect Retirement behavior. We use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the impact of Social Security incentives on male Retirement. We implement forward-looking models whereby individuals consider the incentives to work in all future years. We find that forward-looking incentive measures for Social Security are significant determinants of Retirement. We also find that private pension incentives have roughly similar effects. Our findings suggest that Social Security policies that increase the incentives to work at older ages can significantly reduce the labor force exit rate of older workers.

  • Health-Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision
    The American Economic Review, 1995
    Co-Authors: Jonathan Gruber, Brigitte C. Madrian
    Abstract:

    Because individuals aged 55-64 face large and uncertain medical expenditures without the guarantee of public insurance coverage provided by Medicare, the availability of post-Retirement health insurance could be an important determinant in the Retirement Decisions of this group. We investigate the effect of health insurance on Retirement by focusing on state and federal "continuation of coverage" mandates which grant the retiree the right to continue purchasing health insurance through a previous employer for a specified number of months after leaving the firm. We exploit variation in the timing and generosity of these laws to identify the effect of the availability of continuation coverage on Retirement Decisions, using data on 55-64 year-old males from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find a sizeable and significant effect of continuation coverage on Retirement; one year of mandated continuation benefits raises Retirement rates by 20%. The effect appears to be uniform at all ages rather that larger near the age of Medicare eligibility. There is also a large increase in the insurance coverage of individuals who would have retired in the absence of continuation benefits. Our findings have important implications for policies which change the insurance coverage of early retirees, such as national health insurance. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was b (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

  • Health Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision
    1993
    Co-Authors: Jonathan Gruber, Brigitte C. Madrian
    Abstract:

    Because individuals aged 55-64 face large and uncertain medical expenditures without the guarantee of public insurance coverage provided by Medicare, the availability of post-Retirement health insurance could be an important determinant in the Retirement Decisions of this group. We investigate the effect of health insurance on Retirement by focusing on state and federal "continuation of coverage" mandates which grant the retiree the right to continue purchasing health insurance through a previous employer for a specified number of months after leaving the firm. We exploit variation in the timing and generosity of these laws to identify the effect of the availability of continuation coverage on Retirement Decisions, using data on 55-64 year-old males from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find a sizeable and significant effect of continuation coverage on Retirement; one year of mandated continuation benefits raises Retirement rates by 20%. The effect appears to be uniform at all ages rather that larger near the age of Medicare eligibility. There is also a large increase in the insurance coverage of individuals who would have retired in the absence of continuation benefits. Our findings have important implications for policies which change the insurance coverage of early retirees, such as national health insurance.

Håkan Selin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • What happens to the husband’s Retirement Decision when the wife’s Retirement incentives change?
    International Tax and Public Finance, 2017
    Co-Authors: Håkan Selin
    Abstract:

    In this paper, I exploit population-wide administrative data and a Swedish occupational pension reform, which primarily affected a subgroup of female workers, to recover the effect of the wife’s Retirement incentive on the husband’s Retirement behavior. I estimate a sharp relative decrease in the Retirement probability of 63-year-old wives who were treated by the reform. However, there was no significant response of their husbands, and this finding is surprisingly robust. This suggests that cross-effects (from the wife to the husband) are substantially smaller than the direct effects of the wife’s own incentive on the wife’s Retirement.

  • what happens to the husband s Retirement Decision when the wife s Retirement incentives change
    International Tax and Public Finance, 2017
    Co-Authors: Håkan Selin
    Abstract:

    In this paper, I exploit population-wide administrative data and a Swedish occupational pension reform, which primarily affected a subgroup of female workers, to recover the effect of the wife’s Retirement incentive on the husband’s Retirement behavior. I estimate a sharp relative decrease in the Retirement probability of 63-year-old wives who were treated by the reform. However, there was no significant response of their husbands, and this finding is surprisingly robust. This suggests that cross-effects (from the wife to the husband) are substantially smaller than the direct effects of the wife’s own incentive on the wife’s Retirement.

  • What Happens to the Husband's Retirement Decision When the Wife's Retirement Incentives Change?
    2012
    Co-Authors: Håkan Selin
    Abstract:

    Several studies have documented a strong correlation in the timing of spouses’ Retirement Decisions. However, considerably less is known about the causal impact of one spouse’s Retirement incentives on the Retirement Decision of the other spouse. Before, but not after, 2001 broad categories of Swedish local government workers in female dominated occupations were entitled to retire with full pension benefits already at the age of 63. In this paper, I utilize this reform – together with a micro data set covering the total Swedish population – to estimate the effect of a change in the wife’s incentive on the husband’s Retirement behavior. I document a sharp decrease in pension benefit withdrawals among 63 year old wives in the local government sector in the years following the reform. However, I do not find any evidence of a response among husbands. This finding is at odds with most earlier results in the literature.

  • What happens to the husband’s Retirement Decision when the wife’s Retirement incentives change?
    2011
    Co-Authors: Håkan Selin
    Abstract:

    Several studies have documented a strong correlation in the timing of spouses’ Retirement Decisions. However, considerably less is known about the causal impact of one spouse’s Retirement incentives on the Retirement Decision of the other spouse. Before, but not after, 2001 broad categories of Swedish local government workers in female dominated occupations were entitled to retire with full pension benefits already at the age of 63. In this paper, we utilize this reform – together with a micro data set covering the total Swedish population – to estimate the effect of a change in the wife’s incentive on the husband’s Retirement behavior. We document a sharp decrease in pension benefit withdrawals among 63 year old wives in the local government sector in the years following the reform. However, we do not find any evidence of a response among husbands. This finding is at odds with some earlier results in the literature.

  • what happens to the husband s Retirement Decision when the wife s Retirement incentives change
    2011
    Co-Authors: Håkan Selin
    Abstract:

    Several studies have documented a strong correlation in the timing of spouses’ Retirement Decisions. However, considerably less is known about the causal impact of one spouse’s Retirement incentives on the Retirement Decision of the other spouse. Before, but not after, 2001 broad categories of Swedish local government workers in female dominated occupations were entitled to retire with full pension benefits already at the age of 63. In this paper, we utilize this reform – together with a micro data set covering the total Swedish population – to estimate the effect of a change in the wife’s incentive on the husband’s Retirement behavior. We document a sharp decrease in pension benefit withdrawals among 63 year old wives in the local government sector in the years following the reform. However, we do not find any evidence of a response among husbands. This finding is at odds with some earlier results in the literature.

Brigitte C. Madrian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Health-Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision
    The American Economic Review, 1995
    Co-Authors: Jonathan Gruber, Brigitte C. Madrian
    Abstract:

    Because individuals aged 55-64 face large and uncertain medical expenditures without the guarantee of public insurance coverage provided by Medicare, the availability of post-Retirement health insurance could be an important determinant in the Retirement Decisions of this group. We investigate the effect of health insurance on Retirement by focusing on state and federal "continuation of coverage" mandates which grant the retiree the right to continue purchasing health insurance through a previous employer for a specified number of months after leaving the firm. We exploit variation in the timing and generosity of these laws to identify the effect of the availability of continuation coverage on Retirement Decisions, using data on 55-64 year-old males from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find a sizeable and significant effect of continuation coverage on Retirement; one year of mandated continuation benefits raises Retirement rates by 20%. The effect appears to be uniform at all ages rather that larger near the age of Medicare eligibility. There is also a large increase in the insurance coverage of individuals who would have retired in the absence of continuation benefits. Our findings have important implications for policies which change the insurance coverage of early retirees, such as national health insurance. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was b (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

  • Health Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision
    1993
    Co-Authors: Jonathan Gruber, Brigitte C. Madrian
    Abstract:

    Because individuals aged 55-64 face large and uncertain medical expenditures without the guarantee of public insurance coverage provided by Medicare, the availability of post-Retirement health insurance could be an important determinant in the Retirement Decisions of this group. We investigate the effect of health insurance on Retirement by focusing on state and federal "continuation of coverage" mandates which grant the retiree the right to continue purchasing health insurance through a previous employer for a specified number of months after leaving the firm. We exploit variation in the timing and generosity of these laws to identify the effect of the availability of continuation coverage on Retirement Decisions, using data on 55-64 year-old males from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find a sizeable and significant effect of continuation coverage on Retirement; one year of mandated continuation benefits raises Retirement rates by 20%. The effect appears to be uniform at all ages rather that larger near the age of Medicare eligibility. There is also a large increase in the insurance coverage of individuals who would have retired in the absence of continuation benefits. Our findings have important implications for policies which change the insurance coverage of early retirees, such as national health insurance.

Courtney Coile - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Disability Insurance Incentives and the Retirement Decision: Evidence from the U.S.
    NBER Working Paper Series, 2015
    Co-Authors: Courtney Coile
    Abstract:

    A rising share of older workers in the U.S. make use of the Disability Insurance (DI) program in their transition to Retirement, with about one in seven men and one in nine women ages 60 to 64 now enrolled in the program. This study explores how financial incentives from Social Security and DI affect Retirement Decisions, using an option value approach. We find that financial incentives have a significant effect on Retirement, particularly for those in poor health or with low education, who may be more actively considering Retirement at younger ages. Simulations suggest that increasing the stringency of the screening process for DI would increase the expected working life of DI applicants.

  • future social security entitlements and the Retirement Decision
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007
    Co-Authors: Courtney Coile, Jonathan Gruber
    Abstract:

    Abstract A critical question for Social Security policy is how program incentives affect Retirement behavior. We use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the impact of Social Security incentives on male Retirement. We implement forward-looking models whereby individuals consider the incentives to work in all future years. We find that forward-looking incentive measures for Social Security are significant determinants of Retirement. We also find that private pension incentives have roughly similar effects. Our findings suggest that Social Security policies that increase the incentives to work at older ages can significantly reduce the labor force exit rate of older workers.

Ann Huff Stevens - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • what you don t know can t help you pension knowledge and Retirement Decision making
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2008
    Co-Authors: Sewin Chan, Ann Huff Stevens
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the Retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, Retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the Retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives and document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining Retirement behavior. Well-informed individuals are far more responsive to pension incentives than the average individual. Ill-informed individuals seem to respond systematically to their own misperceptions of pension incentives.

  • what you don t know can t help you pension knowledge and Retirement Decision making
    2003
    Co-Authors: Sewin Chan, Ann Huff Stevens
    Abstract:

    This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the Retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, Retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the Retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. We find that well-informed individuals are five times more responsive to pension incentives than the average individual when knowledge is ignored. We further find that the ill-informed individuals do respond to their own misperception of the incentives, rather than being unresponsive to any incentives.