The Experts below are selected from a list of 303 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gonzalo Pastor - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the imf and the Ruble area 1991 93
Comparative Economic Studies, 2002Co-Authors: John Odlingsmee, Gonzalo PastorAbstract:This paper summarizes the IMF advice on the Ruble area as it was presented to the national authorities in Russia, the Baltic countries, and other states of the former Soviet Union in 1991-93. In the course of doing so, the paper corrects some misperceptions that have arisen about the IMF's role. The evidence presented in the paper suggests that (i) the balance of arguments on the Ruble area (and national currencies) changed over time, and hence so did the IMF's advice, and (ii) from the beginning, the IMF staff concentrated on pointing out the pros and cons of alternative monetary arrangements, without strongly advocating a particular one, emphasizing that it was the authorities' decision to stay in or leave the Ruble area. Fund advice on how to introduce national currencies was made readily available to the various national authorities as early as January 1992.
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The IMF and the Ruble Area, 1991–93
Comparative Economic Studies, 2002Co-Authors: John Odling-smee, Gonzalo PastorAbstract:This paper summarizes the IMF advice on the Ruble area as it was presented to the national authorities in Russia, the Baltic countries, and other states of the former Soviet Union in 1991-93. In the course of doing so, the paper corrects some misperceptions that have arisen about the IMF's role. The evidence presented in the paper suggests that (i) the balance of arguments on the Ruble area (and national currencies) changed over time, and hence so did the IMF's advice, and (ii) from the beginning, the IMF staff concentrated on pointing out the pros and cons of alternative monetary arrangements, without strongly advocating a particular one, emphasizing that it was the authorities' decision to stay in or leave the Ruble area. Fund advice on how to introduce national currencies was made readily available to the various national authorities as early as January 1992.
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The Imf and the Ruble Area, 1991-1993
IMF Working Papers, 2001Co-Authors: John Odling-smee, Gonzalo PastorAbstract:This paper summarizes the IMF advice on the Ruble area as it was presented to the national authorities in Russia, the Baltic countries, and other states of the former Soviet Union in 1991-93. In the course of doing so, the paper corrects some misperceptions that have arisen about the IMF's role. The evidence presented in the paper suggests that (i) the balance of arguments on the Ruble area (and national currencies) changed over time, and hence so did the IMF's advice, and (ii) from the beginning, the IMF staff concentrated on pointing out the pros and cons of alternative monetary arrangements, without strongly advocating a particular one, emphasizing that it was the authorities' decision to stay in or leave the Ruble area. Fund advice on how to introduce national currencies was made readily available to the various national authorities as early as January 1992.
Patrick Conway - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Rubles, Rubles, Everywhere.
Experiences with Financial Liberalization, 1997Co-Authors: Patrick ConwayAbstract:Cash shortages were a persistent and recurrent phenomenon in many of the economies of the former Soviet Union during the two-year period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. These were largely, but not exclusively, shortages of Ruble bank notes and were coincident with a period of rapid commodity price increases. The shortages exacerbated the difficulties of economic transition in the productive sectors, caused a decline in the faith of citizens in their governments’ ability to manage the economies, and greatly increased political tensions among these economies.
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Ruble overhang and Ruble shortage : were they the same thing?
Journal of Comparative Economics, 1997Co-Authors: Patrick ConwayAbstract:Abstract The Soviet Union was characterized in its last days by a Ruble overhang. Its successor states experienced Ruble shortages during their tenure within the Ruble currency area that contributed to the final demise of that financial system. I demonstrate that these two phenomena were manifestations of the same economic imbalance: an inability of households to convert financial wealth into purchasing power over commodities. J. Comp. Econom., February 1997, 24 (1), pp. 1–24. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3305.
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Ruble overhang and Ruble shortage: were they the same thing?
1994Co-Authors: Patrick ConwayAbstract:Economists and policymakers in the Soviet Union before its dissolution were concerned about the growth of the"Ruble overhang."The concern was that the rationing of consumer goods evident in prior years had led to an excess of purchasing power in households. Price liberalization was expected to lead to a jump in consumer prices as households tried to exercise their purchasing power. But after the Soviet Union dissolved, a new concern emerged: a Ruble shortage. Throughout the Ruble currency area, governments and state enterprises could not get enough Rubles to pay wages and pensions. As a result, households were unable to make the purchases they wanted to make. Ruble shortages contributed greatly to the progressive deterioration of the Ruble area, from its beginning with fifteen members to its present membership of two. The names given to these two episodes - the"Ruble overhang"and the"Ruble shortage"- are misleading, because they are both manifestations of the same phenomenon. In both cases, forced savings led to a reduction in purchasing power and downward pressure on inflation. The difference was in the mechanism that induced forced saving. For the Ruble overhang, the government maintained price rigidity; there was nonprice rationing of output that was insufficient to satisfy demand at those rigid prices. For the Ruble shortage, the government - through the de facto inconvertibility of deposits to currency. The result was the same: a rationed household sector unable to trade financial assets for commodities.
Dmitriy Kondratov - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Formation of the Russian Ruble as an International Currency
HSE Economic Journal, 2012Co-Authors: Dmitriy KondratovAbstract:Can the Russian Ruble become an international reserve currency? By identifying the key determinants of the international status of national currency this paper estimates possibilities of the Ruble. The significant factors include: the size of the home country, inflation rate, exchange rate volatility and the size of the relevant home financial market. The author believes that several determinants are in favor of the Russian currency, in particular the turnover and liquidity of foreign exchange market, the size of foreign trade, the development of international market of debt securities in Russian Ruble. The paper discusses some important policy implications of internationalization of the Ruble for the Bank of Russia and the Russian economy in general.
Padma Desai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Why Did the Ruble Collapse in August 1998
American Economic Review, 2000Co-Authors: Padma DesaiAbstract:The factors that led to the collapse of the Ruble are analyzed. It is argued that it resulted from exogenous factors (closely related to the unanticipated Asian financial crisis) interacting with inherited weaknesses in fundamentals (of fiscal policy) that made the Russian economy, while progressively being brought to macroeconomic stability, nonetheless vulnerable to a large external shock. It is contended that, instead of the policy mistake of August 1998 requiring a default of domestic debt and moratorium on payment of foreign commercial debt, a decision by Russian authorities to offer temporary exchange controls, sanctioned by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury as an emergency measure, would have been a better alternative, obviating the de facto partial and unilateral resort to controls that the moratorium and default implied.
Lucjan T. Orlowski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Disintegration of the Ruble Zone: Driving Forces and Proposals for Policy Change
2005Co-Authors: Lucjan T. OrlowskiAbstract:This paper examines the irreversible process of the Ruble zone disintegration. The theoretical fundamentals of a common currency area, with modifications incorporating a mechanism of transition from central planning, are discussed. The key reason for the Ruble zone break-up is the discontinuation of indirect transfers that were provided mainly by Russia via underpricing energy exports to other republics. Being cut-off from such transfers and unable to finance the rising trade deficits with Russia, the independent states wish to disconnect their economies from the Ruble zone. Among other economic arguments for leaving the Ruble zone presented by the former Soviet republics are: a desire to insulate their economies from the Ruble zone inflation, and a willingness to collect seigniorage revenues from printing their own crrencies. The paper critically evaluates these and several other arguments. The abrupt break-up of the Ruble zone causes interruptions in supplies of essential materials and consumer goods, and the income downfall among the republics. The foundation for a new inter-state payments mechanism is proposed in order to cushion these negative effects. A system of independently traded currencies with flexible exchange rate is viewed as a reasonable, yet distant solution.
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The disintegration of the Ruble zone: Driving forces and proposals for policy change
1993Co-Authors: Lucjan T. OrlowskiAbstract:This paper examines the irreversible process of the Ruble zone disintegration. Theoretical fundamentals of a common currency area, with modifications incorporating a mechanism of transition from central planning, are discussed. The key reason for the Ruble zone break-up is the discontinuation of indirect transfers that were provided mainly by Russia via underpricing energy exports to other republics. Being cut-off from such transfers and unable to finance rising trade deficits with Russia, the independent stales wish to disconnect their economies from the Ruble /.one. Among other economic arguments for leaving the Ruble zone presented by the former Soviet republics are: a desire to insulate their economies from the Ruble zone inflation, and a willingness to collect seigniorage revenues from printing their own currencies. The paper critically evaluates these and several other arguments. The abrupt break-up of the Ruble zone causes interruptions in supplies of essential materials and consumer goods, and an income downfall among the republics. The foundation for a new inter-state payments mechanism is proposed in order to cushion these negative effects. A system of independently traded currencies with flexible exchange rates is viewed as a reasonable, yet distant solution.
