The Experts below are selected from a list of 39354 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Xiaobo Zheng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers fluctuating willingness to pay
International Journal of Production Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Vera Tilson, Xiaobo ZhengAbstract:Abstract Demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made-to-stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities. Manufacturers of finitely durable goods face an additional complication—in making production decisions, they must consider not only the uncertainty in demand for new goods, but also how the future Sales will be affected by the older goods that will become available via a secondhand market. Using a model of an infinite-horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer of durable goods and strategic consumers, we investigate how demand volatility affects producers’ production and pricing decisions. We formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete-time Markov Decision Process and prove certain structural properties of the Sales and production Policy. These structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm, which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer׳s strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis. We show that a simple myopic Policy is optimal when each period׳s demand is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). When demand is correlated across periods, the producer׳s optimal production and Sales Policy is not myopic, and in some states, when the economy is poor, the producer withholds some of the new goods inventory. Our numerical results suggest that in equilibrium, the producer who is dealing with myopic rather than with forward-looking consumers is more likely to sell some of these held-back goods later, as vintage goods.
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monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers fluctuating willingness to pay
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Vera Tilson, Xiaobo ZhengAbstract:Demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made-to-stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities. Manufacturers of finitely durable goods face an additional complication -- in making production decisions, they must consider not only the uncertainty in demand for new goods, but also how the future Sales will be affected by the older goods that will become available via a secondhand market. Using a model of an infinite-horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer of durable goods and strategic consumers, we investigate how demand volatility affects producers' production and pricing decisions. We formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete-time Markov Decision Process and prove certain structural properties of the Sales and production Policy. These structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm, which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer’s strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis. We show that a simple myopic Policy is optimal when each period’s demand is i.i.d. When demand is correlated across periods, the producer’s optimal production and Sales Policy is not myopic, and in some states, when the economy is poor, the producer withholds some of the new goods inventory. Our numerical results suggest that in equilibrium, the producer who is dealing with myopic rather than with forward-looking consumers is more likely to sell some of these held-back goods later, as vintage goods.
Vera Tilson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers fluctuating willingness to pay
International Journal of Production Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Vera Tilson, Xiaobo ZhengAbstract:Abstract Demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made-to-stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities. Manufacturers of finitely durable goods face an additional complication—in making production decisions, they must consider not only the uncertainty in demand for new goods, but also how the future Sales will be affected by the older goods that will become available via a secondhand market. Using a model of an infinite-horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer of durable goods and strategic consumers, we investigate how demand volatility affects producers’ production and pricing decisions. We formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete-time Markov Decision Process and prove certain structural properties of the Sales and production Policy. These structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm, which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer׳s strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis. We show that a simple myopic Policy is optimal when each period׳s demand is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). When demand is correlated across periods, the producer׳s optimal production and Sales Policy is not myopic, and in some states, when the economy is poor, the producer withholds some of the new goods inventory. Our numerical results suggest that in equilibrium, the producer who is dealing with myopic rather than with forward-looking consumers is more likely to sell some of these held-back goods later, as vintage goods.
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monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers fluctuating willingness to pay
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Vera Tilson, Xiaobo ZhengAbstract:Demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made-to-stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities. Manufacturers of finitely durable goods face an additional complication -- in making production decisions, they must consider not only the uncertainty in demand for new goods, but also how the future Sales will be affected by the older goods that will become available via a secondhand market. Using a model of an infinite-horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer of durable goods and strategic consumers, we investigate how demand volatility affects producers' production and pricing decisions. We formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete-time Markov Decision Process and prove certain structural properties of the Sales and production Policy. These structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm, which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer’s strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis. We show that a simple myopic Policy is optimal when each period’s demand is i.i.d. When demand is correlated across periods, the producer’s optimal production and Sales Policy is not myopic, and in some states, when the economy is poor, the producer withholds some of the new goods inventory. Our numerical results suggest that in equilibrium, the producer who is dealing with myopic rather than with forward-looking consumers is more likely to sell some of these held-back goods later, as vintage goods.
Joseph G L Lee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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raising the legal age of tobacco Sales Policy support and trust in government 2014 2015 u s
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 2016Co-Authors: Joseph G L Lee, Marcella H Boynton, Amanda Richardson, Kristen L Jarman, Leah M Ranney, Adam O GoldsteinAbstract:Introduction The National Academy of Medicine has called for an increase in the minimum age of tobacco product Sales. It is not clear what age increase would garner the greatest public support, or whether trust in the U.S. government predicts Policy support. Methods The data for these analyses are from a nationally representative telephone sample of U.S. adults (N=4,880) conducted from September 2014 to May 2015. The authors assessed whether support varied by the proposed minimum age of tobacco Sales using a survey experiment (i.e., random assignment to the 19-, 20-, or 21-year age minimum condition) and, in cross-sectional analyses, whether smoking status, individual demographics, state-level politics, and general trust in the government predicted Policy support. Analyses were conducted from May to December 2015. Results Odds of support for raising the minimum Sales age to 21 years trended higher than support for raising to age 20 or 19 years (AOR=1.22, 95% CI=0.97, 1.53, p =0.09). There was majority support for raising the age of Sales for cigarettes in all regions of the U.S. (66.3%, 95% CI=64.0, 68.6). Race, age, and trust in government were significant predictors of support. Conclusions Raising the age of tobacco Sales is broadly supported by the public. An age 21 years tobacco Sales Policy trends toward garnering more support than a Policy at age 19 or 20 years. Trust in government may be an important consideration in understanding Policy support beyond demographics.
Adam O Goldstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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raising the legal age of tobacco Sales Policy support and trust in government 2014 2015 u s
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 2016Co-Authors: Joseph G L Lee, Marcella H Boynton, Amanda Richardson, Kristen L Jarman, Leah M Ranney, Adam O GoldsteinAbstract:Introduction The National Academy of Medicine has called for an increase in the minimum age of tobacco product Sales. It is not clear what age increase would garner the greatest public support, or whether trust in the U.S. government predicts Policy support. Methods The data for these analyses are from a nationally representative telephone sample of U.S. adults (N=4,880) conducted from September 2014 to May 2015. The authors assessed whether support varied by the proposed minimum age of tobacco Sales using a survey experiment (i.e., random assignment to the 19-, 20-, or 21-year age minimum condition) and, in cross-sectional analyses, whether smoking status, individual demographics, state-level politics, and general trust in the government predicted Policy support. Analyses were conducted from May to December 2015. Results Odds of support for raising the minimum Sales age to 21 years trended higher than support for raising to age 20 or 19 years (AOR=1.22, 95% CI=0.97, 1.53, p =0.09). There was majority support for raising the age of Sales for cigarettes in all regions of the U.S. (66.3%, 95% CI=64.0, 68.6). Race, age, and trust in government were significant predictors of support. Conclusions Raising the age of tobacco Sales is broadly supported by the public. An age 21 years tobacco Sales Policy trends toward garnering more support than a Policy at age 19 or 20 years. Trust in government may be an important consideration in understanding Policy support beyond demographics.
John M Light - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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legalization of recreational marijuana and community Sales Policy in oregon impact on adolescent willingness and intent to use parent use and adolescent use
Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 2017Co-Authors: Julie C Rusby, Erika Westling, Ryann Crowley, John M LightAbstract:Studies investigating the impact of medical marijuana legalization have found no significant changes in adolescent use. In one of the few studies focused on recreational marijuana, we investigated how recreational marijuana legalization and community Sales Policy influenced factors that likely impact youth use (youth willingness and intent to use, parent use) as well as youth use. Legalization of recreational marijuana in Oregon coincided with our study on adolescent substance use. Cohort 1 transitioned from 8th to 9th grade prior to legalization and Cohort 2 made this transition during legalization (N = 444; 53% female). Communities were allowed to opt out of Sales. Multivariate linear regression models estimated the impact of legalization and community Sales Policy on changes in attitudes and parent use (2 time points 1 year apart). Zero-inflated Poisson growth curve models estimated the effects on initial levels and rate of change from 8th through 9th grade (4 time points). In communities opting out of Sales, the prior-to-legalization cohort was less likely to increase their willingness and intent to use marijuana, and the legalization cohort was more likely to increase intent to use. For youth who used marijuana, legalization was associated with increased use, and those in communities opting out of Sales had greater growth in marijuana use. Community Policy appears to impact youth attitudes toward, and use of, marijuana. Results suggest that legalization of recreational marijuana did not increase marijuana use for youth who did not use marijuana but did increase use in youth who were already using. (PsycINFO Database Record
