School Choice

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Peter Maier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • School Choice in Milwaukee: Privatization of a Different Breed
    Policy Studies Journal, 1996
    Co-Authors: Stephen L. Percy, Peter Maier
    Abstract:

    For decades educational reformers have identified School Choice programs as a strategy for restructuring public School systems. Practically every state has considered or adopted a School assignment program that qualifies as a “Choice” initiative, one in which students and parents have some Choice in School selection. Increasingly, School districts are contemplating plans that include a Choice of private, as well as public, Schools. One of the most far-reaching of these School Choice plans is the Milwaukee (Wisconsin) Parental Choice Program, which, as legislated, allows parents to use vouchers to enroll their children in both sectarian and nonsectarian Schools in the community. This paper explores the evolution of School Choice in Milwaukee and examines the extent to which School Choice is representative of other privatization efforts currently under way in the United States.

Kenneth R. Howe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • On the (In)Feasibility of School Choice for Social Justice
    Philosophy of Education Archive, 2006
    Co-Authors: Kenneth R. Howe
    Abstract:

    Harry Brighouse, for one, advanced a countervailing view. In the nuanced examination of School Choice policy he provided in his 2000 volume School Choice and Social Justice, Brighouse acknowledged that whether a policy of School Choice can serve to promote social justice depends on empirical contingencies. However, he found the critics’ claim that School Choice for social justice is infeasible to be unwarranted. He did not rule out this possibility, but required the critics to establish that the introduction of School Choice made things worse vis-a-vis social justice than they otherwise would have been. Subsequently, in his “A Modest Defense of School Choice,” Brighouse challenged critics to show how Choice could interfere with improving the education of disadvantaged students whose parents took advantage of it.

  • On School Choice and Test-Based Accountability.
    education policy analysis archives, 2005
    Co-Authors: Damian Betebenner, Kenneth R. Howe, Samara S. Foster
    Abstract:

    Among the two most prominent School reform measures currently being implemented in The United States are School Choice and test-based accountability. Until recently, the two policy initiatives remained relatively distinct from one another. With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), a mutualism between Choice and accountability emerged whereby School Choice complements test-based accountability. In the first portion of this study we present a conceptual overview of School Choice and test-based accountability and explicate connections between the two that are explicit in reform implementations like NCLB or implicit within the market-based reform literature in which School Choice and test-based accountability reside. In the second portion we scrutinize the connections, in particular, between School Choice and test-based accountability using a large western School district with a popular Choice system in place. Data from three sources are combined to explore the ways in which School Choice and test-based accountability draw on each other: state assessment data of children in the district, School Choice data for every participating student in the district Choice program, and a parental survey of both participants and non-participants of Choice asking their attitudes concerning the use of School report cards in the district. Results suggest that Choice is of benefit academically to only the lowest achieving students, Choice participation is not uniform across different ethnic groups in the district, and parents' primary motivations as reported on a survey for participation in Choice are not due to test scores, though this is not consistent with Choice preferences among parents in the district. As such, our results generally confirm the hypotheses of Choice critics more so than advocates. Keywords: School Choice; accountability; student testing.

Seth D. Zimmerman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms
    American Economic Review, 2020
    Co-Authors: Adam Kapor, Christopher Neilson, Seth D. Zimmerman
    Abstract:

    This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized School Choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of School Choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict Choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of School Choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households' belief accuracy. We find that a switch to truthful reporting in the DA mechanism offers welfare improvements over the baseline given the belief errors we observe in the data, but that an analyst who assumed families had accurate beliefs would have reached the opposite conclusion.

  • Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017
    Co-Authors: Adam Kapor, Christopher Neilson, Seth D. Zimmerman
    Abstract:

    This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized School Choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of School Choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict Choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of School Choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households' belief accuracy. Allowing for belief errors reverses the welfare comparison to favor the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Danny Cohen-zada - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Parag A. Pathak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice
    American Economic Review, 2021
    Co-Authors: Christopher Avery, Parag A. Pathak
    Abstract:

    School Choice systems aspire to delink residential location and School assignments by allowing children to apply to Schools outside of their neighborhood. However, Choice programs also affect incentives to live in certain neighborhoods, and this feedback may undermine the goals of Choice. We investigate this possibility by developing a model of public School and residential Choice. School Choice narrows the range between the highest and lowest quality Schools compared to neighborhood assignment rules, and these changes in School quality are capitalized into equilibrium housing prices. This compressed distribution generates an ends-against-the-middle trade-off with School Choice compared to neighborhood assignment. Paradoxically, even when Choice results in improvement in the lowest-performing Schools, the lowest type residents need not benefit.

  • the distributional consequences of public School Choice
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015
    Co-Authors: Christopher Avery, Parag A. Pathak
    Abstract:

    School Choice systems aspire to delink residential location and School assignments by allowing children to apply to Schools outside of their neighborhood. However, the introduction of Choice programs affect incentives to live in certain neighborhoods, which may undermine the goals of Choice programs. We investigate this possibility by developing a model of public School and residential Choice. We consider two variants, one with an exogenous outside option and one endogenizing the outside option by considering interactions between two adjacent towns. In both cases, School Choice rules narrow the range between the highest and lowest quality Schools compared to neighborhood assignment rules, and these changes in School quality are capitalized into equilibrium housing prices. This compressed distribution generates incentives for both the highest and lowest types to move out of cities with School Choice, typically producing worse outcomes for low types than neighborhood assignment rules. Paradoxically, even when Choice results in improvement in the worst performing Schools, the lowest type residents may not benefit.

  • the distributional consequences of public School Choice
    2015
    Co-Authors: Christopher Avery, Parag A. Pathak
    Abstract:

    School Choice systems aspire to delink residential location and School assignments by allowing children to apply to Schools outside of their neighborhood. However, the introduction of Choice programs affect incentives to live in certain neighborhoods, which may undermine the goals of Choice programs. We investigate this possibility by developing a model of public School and residential Choice. We consider two variants, one with an exogenous outside option and one endogenizing the outside option by considering interactions between two adjacent towns. In both cases, School Choice rules narrow the range between the highest and lowest quality Schools compared to neighborhood assignment rules, and these changes in School quality are capitalized into equilibrium housing prices. This compressed distribution generates incentives for both the highest and lowest types to move out of cities with School Choice, typically producing worse outcomes for low types than neighborhood assignment rules. Paradoxically, even when Choice results in improvement in the worst performing Schools, the lowest type residents may not benefit.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.