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Curtis J Milhaupt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • reputational sanctions in china s Securities Market
    Columbia Law Review, 2007
    Co-Authors: Benjamin L Liebman, Curtis J Milhaupt
    Abstract:

    Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock Market development: an approach based on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on self-regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. This paper traces China's attempts to pursue both approaches, while focusing on the role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically, the paper examines a fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese Securities regulation, namely, public criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Based on both event study methodology and extensive interviews of Market actors, we find that the criticisms have significant effects on listed companies and their executives. We evaluate the role of public criticisms in China's evolving scheme of Securities regulation, contributing to several strands of research on the role of the media in corporate governance, the use of shaming sanctions in corporate governance, and the importance of informal mechanisms in supporting China's economic growth.

Guo Ying Luo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can earnings fixated investors survive in a competitive Securities Market implications for sustained price anomalies and mark to Market accounting
    Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2018
    Co-Authors: Jeffrey L Callen, Guo Ying Luo
    Abstract:

    We model the dynamic survival of earnings fixated investors in a competitive Securities Market that allows for learning and arbitrage and that is populated by heterogeneous investors. Our model is distinct from those based on aggressive trading by overconfident investors. We prove that in the absence of noise traders, rational investors will drive out earnings fixated investors from the Market in the long-run. More interestingly, we show that in a Market with noise traders, some proportion of earnings fixated investors survive in long-run equilibrium for all feasible model parameter values. Furthermore, under no circumstances can the earnings fixated investors be driven out of the Market completely. On the contrary, for some parameter values, the earnings fixated investors drive out the rational investors entirely. These results rationalize the long-run sustainability of common pricing anomalies. They also highlight potential benefits to society of mark-to-Market accounting.

  • on the survival of overconfident traders in a competitive Securities Market
    Journal of Financial Markets, 2001
    Co-Authors: David A Hirshleifer, Guo Ying Luo
    Abstract:

    Recent research has proposed several ways in which overconfident traders can persist in competition with rational traders. This paper offers an additional reason: overconfident traders do better than purely rational traders at exploiting mispricing caused by liquidity or noise traders. We examine both the static profitability of overconfident versus rational trading strategies, and the dynamic evolution of a population of overconfident, rational and noise traders. Replication of overconfident and rational types is assumed to be increasing in the recent profitability of their strategies. The main result is that the long-run steady-state equilibrium always involves overconfident traders as a substantial positive fraction of the population.

Chen Xingge - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Chen Xinggen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Benjamin L Liebman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • reputational sanctions in china s Securities Market
    Columbia Law Review, 2007
    Co-Authors: Benjamin L Liebman, Curtis J Milhaupt
    Abstract:

    Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock Market development: an approach based on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on self-regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. This paper traces China's attempts to pursue both approaches, while focusing on the role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically, the paper examines a fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese Securities regulation, namely, public criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Based on both event study methodology and extensive interviews of Market actors, we find that the criticisms have significant effects on listed companies and their executives. We evaluate the role of public criticisms in China's evolving scheme of Securities regulation, contributing to several strands of research on the role of the media in corporate governance, the use of shaming sanctions in corporate governance, and the importance of informal mechanisms in supporting China's economic growth.