The Experts below are selected from a list of 66 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Vitaly Shmatikov - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
    IEEE security & privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencerts is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

  • Using frankencerts for automated adversarial testing of Certificate validation in SSL/TLS implementations
    Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Baishakhi Ray, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencert- is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

Chad Brubaker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
    IEEE security & privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencerts is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

  • Using frankencerts for automated adversarial testing of Certificate validation in SSL/TLS implementations
    Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Baishakhi Ray, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencert- is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

Sunghoon Shim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ICCE - SS-DPKI: Self-Signed Certificate Based Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure for Secure Communication
    2020 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE), 2020
    Co-Authors: Sunghoon Shim
    Abstract:

    Currently, the most commonly used scheme for identity authentication on the Internet is based on asymmetric cryptography and the use of a centralized model. The centralized model needs a Certificate Authority (CA) as a trusted third party and a trust chain of CA. However, CA-based PKI is weak in the single point of failure and Certificate transparency. Our system, called SS-DPKI, propose a public and decentralized PKI system model. We describe a detailed scheme as well as application to use decentralized PKI based secure communication. Our proposal prevents storage overhead on the data size of transactions and provide reasonable Certificate verification time.

  • ss dpki self signed Certificate based decentralized public key infrastructure for secure communication
    International Conference on Consumer Electronics, 2020
    Co-Authors: Sunghoon Shim
    Abstract:

    Currently, the most commonly used scheme for identity authentication on the Internet is based on asymmetric cryptography and the use of a centralized model. The centralized model needs a Certificate Authority (CA) as a trusted third party and a trust chain of CA. However, CA-based PKI is weak in the single point of failure and Certificate transparency. Our system, called SS-DPKI, propose a public and decentralized PKI system model. We describe a detailed scheme as well as application to use decentralized PKI based secure communication. Our proposal prevents storage overhead on the data size of transactions and provide reasonable Certificate verification time.

Sarfraz Khurshid - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
    IEEE security & privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencerts is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

  • Using frankencerts for automated adversarial testing of Certificate validation in SSL/TLS implementations
    Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Baishakhi Ray, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencert- is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

Suman Jana - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
    IEEE security & privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencerts is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.

  • Using frankencerts for automated adversarial testing of Certificate validation in SSL/TLS implementations
    Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Chad Brubaker, Baishakhi Ray, Sarfraz Khurshid, Suman Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov
    Abstract:

    Modern network security rests on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection against network attacks. This protection critically depends on whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 Certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for large-scale testing of Certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. Our first ingredient is "frankencerts," synthetic Certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real Certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a Certificate while another rejects the same Certificate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle for finding flaws in individual implementations. Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 discrepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc. Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For example, any server with a valid X.509 version1 Certificate can act as a rogue Certificate authority and issue fake Certificates for any domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL and GnuTLS. Several implementations also accept Certificate authorities created by unauthorized issuers, as well as Certificates not intended for server authentication. We also found serious vulnerabilities in how users are warned about Certificate validation errors. When presented with an expired, Self-Signed Certificate, NSS, Safari, and Chrome (on Linux) report that the Certificate has expired - a low-risk, often ignored error - but not that the connection is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. These results demonstrate that automated adversarial testing with frankencert- is a powerful methodology for discovering security flaws in SSL/TLS implementations.