Social Community

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 728499 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Yung Bok Kim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A ubiquitous Social Community portal service for Social networking with convenient accessibility
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006
    Co-Authors: Yung Bok Kim
    Abstract:

    A ubiquitous Social Community portal service for Social networking was studied with short International Domain Names (IDN) as a convenient mobile user interface (UI) for the disabled and elderly. Single-character multilingual domain-names are easy for the disabled and elderly people to memorize and type in to access Social information. Multi-lingual single-character domain names with text-based Social information are more convenient than long URL strings to retrieve information and to give short notice of information for Social networking. We introduce a ubiquitous Social Community portal 'ktrip.net', that has real-time Text to Speech (TTS) functionality with text-based contents in Social networking service, using a tiny 'hand-board' for alumni, relatives and any special groups.

  • ICCHP - A ubiquitous Social Community portal service for Social networking with convenient accessibility
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006
    Co-Authors: Yung Bok Kim
    Abstract:

    A ubiquitous Social Community portal service for Social networking was studied with short International Domain Names (IDN) as a convenient mobile user interface (UI) for the disabled and elderly. Single-character multilingual domain-names are easy for the disabled and elderly people to memorize and type in to access Social information. Multi-lingual single-character domain names with text-based Social information are more convenient than long URL strings to retrieve information and to give short notice of information for Social networking. We introduce a ubiquitous Social Community portal ‘ktrip.net', that has real-time Text to Speech (TTS) functionality with text-based contents in Social networking service, using a tiny ‘hand-board' for alumni, relatives and any special groups

Mohammad Hossein Manshaei - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Social Community-Aware Content Placement in Wireless Device-to-Device Communication Networks
    IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2019
    Co-Authors: Mehdi Naderi Soorki, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Walid Saad, Hossein Saidi
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a novel framework for optimizing the caching of popular user content at the level of wireless user equipments (UEs) is proposed. The goal is to improve content offloading over wireless device-to-device (D2D) communication links. In the considered network, users belong to different Social communities while their UEs form a single multi-hop D2D network. The proposed framework allows us to exploit the multi-Community Social context of users for improving the local offloading of cached content in a multi-hop D2D network. To model the collaborative effect of a set of UEs on content offloading, a cooperative game between the UEs is formulated. For this game, it is shown that the Shapley value (SV) of each UE effectively captures the impact of this UE on the overall content offloading process. To capture the presence of multiple Social communities that connect the UEs, a hypergraph model is proposed. Two line graphs, an influence-weighted graph, and a connectivity-weighted graph, are developed for analyzing the proposed hypergaph model. Using the developed line graphs along with the SV of the cooperative game, a precise offloading power metric is derived for each UE within a multi-Community, multi-hop D2D network. Then, UEs with high offloading power are chosen as the optimal locations for caching the popular content. Simulation results show that, on the average, the proposed cache placement framework achieves 12, 19, and 21 percent improvements in terms of the number of UEs that received offloaded popular content compared to the schemes based on betweenness, degree, and closeness centrality, respectively.

  • Social Community aware content placement in wireless device to device communication networks
    arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2018
    Co-Authors: Mehdi Naderi Soorki, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Walid Saad, Hossei Saidi
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a novel framework for optimizing the caching of popular user content at the level of wireless user equipments (UEs) is proposed. The goal is to improve content offloading over wireless device-to-device (D2D) communication links. In the considered network, users belong to different Social communities while their UEs form a single multi-hop D2D network. The proposed framework allows to exploit the multi-Community Social context of users for improving the local offloading of cached content in a multihop D2D network. To model the collaborative effect of a set of UEs on content offloading, a cooperative game between the UEs is formulated. For this game, it is shown that the Shapley value (SV) of each UE effectively captures the impact of this UE on the overall content offloading process. To capture the presence of multiple Social communities that connect the UEs, a hypergraph model is proposed. Two line graphs, an influence-weighted graph, and a connectivity-weighted graph, are developed for analyzing the proposed hypergaph model. Using the developed line graphs along with the SV of the cooperative game, a precise offloading power metric is derived for each UE within a multi-Community, multi-hop D2D network. Then, UEs with high offloading power are chosen as the optimal locations for caching the popular content. Simulation results show that, on the average, the proposed cache placement framework achieves 12%, 19%, and 21% improvements in terms of the number of UEs that received offloaded popular content compared to the schemes based on betweenness, degree, and closeness centrality, respectively.

  • on wireless Social Community networks
    International Conference on Computer Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless Community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of Social Community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless Social Community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a Social Community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

  • INFOCOM - On Wireless Social Community Networks
    IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless Community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of Social Community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless Social Community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a Social Community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

  • Wireless Social Community Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    2008 IEEE International Zurich Seminar on Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks formed by users with a WiFi access point have been created as an alternative to traditional wireless networks that operate in the licensed spectrum. By relying on access points owned by users for access, wireless Community networks provide a wireless infrastructure in an inexpensive way. However, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of users who open their access points to the Social Community. Currently, it is not clear to what degree this paradigm can serve as a replacement, or a complimentary service, of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks using, as well as the situation where a wireless Social Community networks co-exists with a traditional wireless network operating in the licensed spectrum.

Jean-pierre Hubaux - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • on wireless Social Community networks
    International Conference on Computer Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless Community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of Social Community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless Social Community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a Social Community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

  • INFOCOM - On Wireless Social Community Networks
    IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless Community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of Social Community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless Social Community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a Social Community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

  • Wireless Social Community Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    2008 IEEE International Zurich Seminar on Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks formed by users with a WiFi access point have been created as an alternative to traditional wireless networks that operate in the licensed spectrum. By relying on access points owned by users for access, wireless Community networks provide a wireless infrastructure in an inexpensive way. However, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of users who open their access points to the Social Community. Currently, it is not clear to what degree this paradigm can serve as a replacement, or a complimentary service, of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks using, as well as the situation where a wireless Social Community networks co-exists with a traditional wireless network operating in the licensed spectrum.

  • NetEcon - Optimal pricing strategy for wireless Social Community networks
    Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems - NetEcon '08, 2008
    Co-Authors: Amin Mazloumian, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Mark Felegyhazi, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community operators rely on subscribers who constitute a Community of users. The pricing strategy of the provided wireless access is an open problem for this new generation of wireless access providers. In this paper, using both analytical and simulation approaches, we study the problem comprised of modeling user subscription and mobility behavior and of coverage evolution with the objective of finding optimal subscription fees. We compute optimal prices with both static and semi-dynamic pricing. Coping with an incomplete knowledge about users, we calculate the best static price and prove that optimal fair pricing is the optimal semi-dynamic pricing. Moreover, we have developed a simulator to verify optimal prices of Social Community operators with complete and incomplete knowledge. Our results show that the optimal fair pricing strategy significantly improves the cumulative payoff of Social Community operators.

Manish Parashar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Modelling and Implementing Social Community Clouds
    IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 2017
    Co-Authors: Ioan Petri, Javier Diaz-montes, Omer F. Rana, Magdalena Punceva, Ivan Rodero, Manish Parashar
    Abstract:

    As the number of people who interact on Social networks increases, and coupled with the greater capability made available within our computational devices, there is the potential to establish “Social Clouds”—a resource sharing infrastructure that enable people who have trust relationships to come together to share computational/ data services within a Community. Social clouds can also provide the means to enhance multi-user collaboration and greatly stimulate the exchange of resources among participants. Recent research in the establishment and use of Social Clouds has raised significant interest by proposing an environment where users are able to trade resources mediated by a Social networking mechanism. In such a cloud environment the incentives for sharing can represent a solution for improving resource utilisation and for making available additional capacity to friends and collaborators. In this paper we demonstrate how revenue can be earned within a Social cloud Community, by executing internal (intra Community) and external (inter Community) tasks. A number of different scenarios are first investigated through simulation, using the PeerSim simulator, in order to validate our approach. We use two key metrics: revenue and reputation, to evaluate how the system dynamics change as new tasks are added to one or more communities for execution, along with additional behaviours, such as nodes migrating from one Community to another, or selectively reporting on the outcome of task execution. Subsequently, we develop a practical deployment using a federated cloud scenario using the CometCloud system—deployed over three sites: Cardiff (UK), Rutgers and Indiana. We show how approaches that have been simulated in PeerSim can be implemented in practice.

Mark Felegyhazi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • on wireless Social Community networks
    International Conference on Computer Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless Community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of Social Community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless Social Community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a Social Community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

  • INFOCOM - On Wireless Social Community Networks
    IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless Community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of Social Community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless Social Community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a Social Community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

  • Wireless Social Community Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    2008 IEEE International Zurich Seminar on Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Peter Marbach, Mark Felegyhazi, Julien Freudiger, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community networks formed by users with a WiFi access point have been created as an alternative to traditional wireless networks that operate in the licensed spectrum. By relying on access points owned by users for access, wireless Community networks provide a wireless infrastructure in an inexpensive way. However, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of users who open their access points to the Social Community. Currently, it is not clear to what degree this paradigm can serve as a replacement, or a complimentary service, of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless Social Community networks using, as well as the situation where a wireless Social Community networks co-exists with a traditional wireless network operating in the licensed spectrum.

  • NetEcon - Optimal pricing strategy for wireless Social Community networks
    Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems - NetEcon '08, 2008
    Co-Authors: Amin Mazloumian, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Mark Felegyhazi, Jean-pierre Hubaux
    Abstract:

    Wireless Social Community operators rely on subscribers who constitute a Community of users. The pricing strategy of the provided wireless access is an open problem for this new generation of wireless access providers. In this paper, using both analytical and simulation approaches, we study the problem comprised of modeling user subscription and mobility behavior and of coverage evolution with the objective of finding optimal subscription fees. We compute optimal prices with both static and semi-dynamic pricing. Coping with an incomplete knowledge about users, we calculate the best static price and prove that optimal fair pricing is the optimal semi-dynamic pricing. Moreover, we have developed a simulator to verify optimal prices of Social Community operators with complete and incomplete knowledge. Our results show that the optimal fair pricing strategy significantly improves the cumulative payoff of Social Community operators.