The Experts below are selected from a list of 3216 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Yanjiao Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
armor a secure combinatorial Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2019Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Xin Tian, Qian WangAbstract:Dynamic Spectrum allocation via Auction is an effective solution to Spectrum shortage. Combinatorial Spectrum Auction enables buyers to express diversified preferences towards different combinations of channels. Despite the effort to ensure truthfulness and maximize social welfare, Spectrum Auction also faces potential security risks. The leakage of sensitive information such as true valuation and location of bidders may incur severe economic damage. However, there is a lack of works that can provide sufficient protection against such security risks in combinatorial Spectrum Auction. In this paper, we propose ARMOR, to enable combinatorial Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum with privacy, which can preserve bidders’ privacy while guaranteeing the economic-robustness of the combinatorial Auction. We leverage the cryptographic methods, including homomorphic encryption, order-preserving encryption, and garbled circuits, to shield the bid and location information of buyers from the Auctioneer. We design a novel location protection algorithm, which allows the Auctioneer to exploit Spectrum reuse opportunities without knowing the exact locations of buyers. Furthermore, we propose a verifiable payment scheme based on digital signature to prevent the Auctioneer from forging the payment. The extensive experiments confirm that ARMOR maintains the good performance of the combinatorial Spectrum Auction, in terms of buyer satisfactory ratio and social welfare, and achieves privacy preservation with acceptable computation and communication costs.
-
privacy preserving Spectrum Auction design challenges solutions and research directions
IEEE Wireless Communications, 2019Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Xin Tian, Qian ZhangAbstract:Spectrum Auction is deemed as an efficient approach for redistributing Spectrum and realizing dynamic Spectrum access. Though there have been extensive research endeavors in designing Spectrum Auctions that are truthful with desirable social welfare, security and privacy concerns give rise to new challenges and calls for the design of privacy- preserving Spectrum Auction mechanisms. In this article, we begin with an overview of conventional Spectrum Auction mechanisms, then discuss the potential security threats in them. In particular, bidders' private information, for example, bid values and geo-locations, are submitted to the non-trustworthy Auctioneer and can be observed by rival bidders who may leverage this information to rig the Auction. To address this problem, we outline the framework for privacy-preserving Auction mechanism design, which applies cryptographic tools to the original Auction and ensures that the private information of bidders is protected, while the basic functionalities of the Auction are maintained. Based on the proposed framework, we further construct a privacy-preserving heterogeneous Spectrum double Auction, which is shown to uphold the closely similar allocation efficiency with the original Auction, and realizes privacy preservation with moderate communication and computation overheads.
-
privacy preserving and truthful double Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum
IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2019Co-Authors: Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Yanjiao Chen, Xin Tian, Qian ZhangAbstract:Over the past decades, there have been extensive research endeavors in Spectrum Auction design. However, most solutions only focus on the allocation efficiency while ignoring the privacy leakage inherent in the process of Spectrum Auction. So far, the very few existing works on secure Spectrum Auctions either provide inadequate privacy protection or incur performance loss in terms of Spectrum reusability. In this paper, for the first time, we propose PS-TAHES, a privacy-preserving and truthful double Auction mechanism for heterogeneous Spectrum. PS-TAHES is constructed based on our carefully designed security primitives, which can support various arithmetics over encrypted data, including multiplication, bid comparison, and sorting matrix, and they are well applicable in other contexts. We theoretically analyze the security and efficiency of PS-TAHES, which is proved to ensure a full and strong privacy protection for bidders while preserving the allocation efficiency of the original Auction mechanism. Experimental results, consistent with the theoretical analysis, further validate the practical use of PS-TAHES in real-world applications.
-
prost privacy preserving and truthful online double Auction for Spectrum allocation
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2019Co-Authors: Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Yanjiao Chen, Cong Wang, Fu XiaoAbstract:Spectrum Auction is an effective way to redistribute scarce Spectrum resources. However, most Spectrum Auction designs only target at economic robustness, while neglecting the inherent privacy leakage problem. Existing secure Spectrum Auction mechanisms fail to provide adequate security, and they all neglect the online fashion of Spectrum request arrival. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a Privacy-pReserving and truthful Online double Auction mechanism for Spectrum allocaTion in wireless networks, PROST . Compared with the state-of-the-art solutions, PROST provides a comprehensive and strong protection for users’ sensitive information, especially for location privacy and time dynamics. PROST is constructed based on our carefully designed security building blocks, which support various arithmetics over encrypted real numbers, and they are also well applicable in other Spectrum Auctions. Besides, we improve on the existing online Spectrum Auction mechanisms by designing a novel privacy-preserving buyer grouping protocol for Spectrum reuse. We not only theoretically prove that PROST can realize an all-round security against semi-honest adversaries but also extensively evaluate its performance. Experimental results validate that PROST achieves nice Spectrum allocation efficiency with light computation and communication costs.
-
multi seller combinatorial Spectrum Auction with reserve prices
International Conference on Conceptual Structures, 2016Co-Authors: Haofan Cai, Yanjiao Chen, Linshan Jiang, Jin ZhangAbstract:Efficient Spectrum allocation is becoming more and more important in wireless networking. Auction is believed to be an effective way to address the problem of Spectrum shortage, by dynamically redistributing spare channels among service providers. Combinatorial Auction gives buyers the freedom to place bids on combinations of channels rather than individual channels. For example, continuous channels are easier to operate on and more valuable to buyers. Unlike conventional commodities, Spectrum features spatial reusability, which depends on various transmission ranges of heterogeneous channels, making combinatorial Spectrum Auction more challenging. Existing works on combinatorial Spectrum Auction only consider a single seller who tries to minimize her cost. However, in multi-seller markets, each seller has a reserve price, below which the seller is reluctant to sell her channel. In this paper, we propose a combinatorial Auction mechanism for multiple sellers with specified reserve prices. We design an efficient greedy algorithm to determine Auction winners by the average virtual bids, which is decided by buyers' real bids and the reserve prices of channels. Simulation results show that our proposed Auction mechanism can achieve higher social welfare than existing Auction mechanisms without reserve prices.
Qian Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
armor a secure combinatorial Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2019Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Xin Tian, Qian WangAbstract:Dynamic Spectrum allocation via Auction is an effective solution to Spectrum shortage. Combinatorial Spectrum Auction enables buyers to express diversified preferences towards different combinations of channels. Despite the effort to ensure truthfulness and maximize social welfare, Spectrum Auction also faces potential security risks. The leakage of sensitive information such as true valuation and location of bidders may incur severe economic damage. However, there is a lack of works that can provide sufficient protection against such security risks in combinatorial Spectrum Auction. In this paper, we propose ARMOR, to enable combinatorial Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum with privacy, which can preserve bidders’ privacy while guaranteeing the economic-robustness of the combinatorial Auction. We leverage the cryptographic methods, including homomorphic encryption, order-preserving encryption, and garbled circuits, to shield the bid and location information of buyers from the Auctioneer. We design a novel location protection algorithm, which allows the Auctioneer to exploit Spectrum reuse opportunities without knowing the exact locations of buyers. Furthermore, we propose a verifiable payment scheme based on digital signature to prevent the Auctioneer from forging the payment. The extensive experiments confirm that ARMOR maintains the good performance of the combinatorial Spectrum Auction, in terms of buyer satisfactory ratio and social welfare, and achieves privacy preservation with acceptable computation and communication costs.
-
privacy preserving Spectrum Auction design challenges solutions and research directions
IEEE Wireless Communications, 2019Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Xin Tian, Qian ZhangAbstract:Spectrum Auction is deemed as an efficient approach for redistributing Spectrum and realizing dynamic Spectrum access. Though there have been extensive research endeavors in designing Spectrum Auctions that are truthful with desirable social welfare, security and privacy concerns give rise to new challenges and calls for the design of privacy- preserving Spectrum Auction mechanisms. In this article, we begin with an overview of conventional Spectrum Auction mechanisms, then discuss the potential security threats in them. In particular, bidders' private information, for example, bid values and geo-locations, are submitted to the non-trustworthy Auctioneer and can be observed by rival bidders who may leverage this information to rig the Auction. To address this problem, we outline the framework for privacy-preserving Auction mechanism design, which applies cryptographic tools to the original Auction and ensures that the private information of bidders is protected, while the basic functionalities of the Auction are maintained. Based on the proposed framework, we further construct a privacy-preserving heterogeneous Spectrum double Auction, which is shown to uphold the closely similar allocation efficiency with the original Auction, and realizes privacy preservation with moderate communication and computation overheads.
-
privacy preserving and truthful double Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum
IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2019Co-Authors: Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Yanjiao Chen, Xin Tian, Qian ZhangAbstract:Over the past decades, there have been extensive research endeavors in Spectrum Auction design. However, most solutions only focus on the allocation efficiency while ignoring the privacy leakage inherent in the process of Spectrum Auction. So far, the very few existing works on secure Spectrum Auctions either provide inadequate privacy protection or incur performance loss in terms of Spectrum reusability. In this paper, for the first time, we propose PS-TAHES, a privacy-preserving and truthful double Auction mechanism for heterogeneous Spectrum. PS-TAHES is constructed based on our carefully designed security primitives, which can support various arithmetics over encrypted data, including multiplication, bid comparison, and sorting matrix, and they are well applicable in other contexts. We theoretically analyze the security and efficiency of PS-TAHES, which is proved to ensure a full and strong privacy protection for bidders while preserving the allocation efficiency of the original Auction mechanism. Experimental results, consistent with the theoretical analysis, further validate the practical use of PS-TAHES in real-world applications.
-
prost privacy preserving and truthful online double Auction for Spectrum allocation
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2019Co-Authors: Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Yanjiao Chen, Cong Wang, Fu XiaoAbstract:Spectrum Auction is an effective way to redistribute scarce Spectrum resources. However, most Spectrum Auction designs only target at economic robustness, while neglecting the inherent privacy leakage problem. Existing secure Spectrum Auction mechanisms fail to provide adequate security, and they all neglect the online fashion of Spectrum request arrival. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a Privacy-pReserving and truthful Online double Auction mechanism for Spectrum allocaTion in wireless networks, PROST . Compared with the state-of-the-art solutions, PROST provides a comprehensive and strong protection for users’ sensitive information, especially for location privacy and time dynamics. PROST is constructed based on our carefully designed security building blocks, which support various arithmetics over encrypted real numbers, and they are also well applicable in other Spectrum Auctions. Besides, we improve on the existing online Spectrum Auction mechanisms by designing a novel privacy-preserving buyer grouping protocol for Spectrum reuse. We not only theoretically prove that PROST can realize an all-round security against semi-honest adversaries but also extensively evaluate its performance. Experimental results validate that PROST achieves nice Spectrum allocation efficiency with light computation and communication costs.
-
themis collusion resistant and fair pricing Spectrum Auction under dynamic supply
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2017Co-Authors: Qian Wang, Qihang Sun, Kui Ren, Xiaohua JiaAbstract:Spectrum Auctions allow a Spectrum owner to allocate scarce Spectrum resources quickly to the users that value them most. Previous solutions, while enabling reusability-driven and truthful Spectrum allocation, are also expected to provide collusion-resistance, price fairness for homogeneous channels, online Auction with unknown and dynamic Spectrum supply, and bounded system performance. Existing works, however, lack most of these desirable properties due to the inherent technically challenging nature in the Spectrum Auction design. In this paper, we focus on the problem of allocating idle channels to Spectrum users with homogeneous demands in a setting where available channels are arriving in a dynamic and random order. Taking Spectrum reusability into consideration, we first propose THEMIS-I: a novel and efficient Spectrum Auction algorithm that achieves fair pricing for homogeneous channels, online Spectrum Auction under dynamic Spectrum supply, and a $\log$ approximation to the optimal social welfare. To enhance the robustness of the system, we further propose THEMIS-II: a collusion-resistant design that can resist any number of coalition groups of small size while still possessing all the above desirable properties. We analytically show that THEMIS can achieve either truthfulness without collusion or $t$ -truthfulness tolerating a collusion group of size $t$ with high probability. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful Spectrum Auctions enabling collusion-resistance and fair payments for homogenous channels simultaneously under dynamic Spectrum supply. Experimental results show that THEMIS outperforms the existing benchmarks by providing perfect fairness of pricing for both the no-colluding case and the colluding case.
Liusheng Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Spectrum combinatorial double Auction for cognitive radio network with ubiquitous network resource providers
Iet Communications, 2015Co-Authors: Long Chen, Liusheng Huang, Hongli XuAbstract:Spectrum Auction is an emerging economic scheme to stimulate both primary Spectrum operators (POs) and secondary users (SUs) to be involved in Spectrum sharing. Previous Spectrum Auction works mostly assume each PO can only have one type Spectrum or each SU can only buy homogeneous Spectrum bands from the same PO. However, in a ubiquitous network scenario, each PO possesses heterogeneous Spectrum resources such as WiFi, 3G and each SU may request different types of Spectrum bands from the same PO. Existing Auction schemes cannot be used to effectively solve the problem. Therefore, the authors come out with a lightweight combinatorial double Auction to tackle this challenge. Since Spectrum combinatorial double Auction problem is NP-hard, the authors develop a general greedy algorithm G-Greedy to solve the problem. Inspired by the recent group-buying discounts, they also invent an enhanced scheme E-Greedy to further optimise total utility. They theoretically prove the economy properties of the proposed schemes such as individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness. Simulation results show that both of the two algorithms can yield higher utilities and are effective.
-
truthful Auction mechanisms with performance guarantee in secondary Spectrum markets
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2015Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Shigang Chen, Mingjun Xiao, Liusheng HuangAbstract:We study a Spectrum Auction problem where each request from new Spectrum users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. Our goal is to design truthful Auction mechanisms that maximize either the overall social efficiency of new users ( a.k.a buyers) or the revenue of the Spectrum owner ( a.k.a seller). Given that the optimal conflict-free Spectrum allocation problem is NP-hard, this paper proposes a series of near-optimal Auction mechanisms based on the following approximation techniques: linear programming (LP) relaxation, randomized rounding, derandomized rounding, monotone derandomization, and Lavi-Swamy method. Comparing with the prior art, we make two significant advances: First, our Auction mechanisms are not only truthful but also provide theoretically-provable performance guarantee, an important feature that existing work under the same Auction model does not have. Second, our Auction mechanisms support both spatial and temporal spectral reuse, which makes the problem more challenging than existing work that deals with only spatial or temporal reuse. We perform extensive simulations to study the performance of the proposed mechanisms, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.
-
pps privacy preserving strategyproof social efficient Spectrum Auction mechanisms
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2015Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Liusheng HuangAbstract:Many Spectrum Auction mechanisms have been proposed for Spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof Spectrum Auction framework. We design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the single-unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel will be sold in the Spectrum market; and 2) the multi-unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both Auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+\epsilon)$ and $32$ separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof Auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.
-
pps privacy preserving strategyproof social efficient Spectrum Auction mechanisms
arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture, 2013Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Liusheng HuangAbstract:Many Spectrum Auction mechanisms have been proposed for Spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof Spectrum Auction framework. Then, we design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the Single-Unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel to be sold in the Spectrum market; and 2) the Multi-Unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both Auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+\epsilon)$ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof Auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.
Qian Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
privacy preserving Spectrum Auction design challenges solutions and research directions
IEEE Wireless Communications, 2019Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Xin Tian, Qian ZhangAbstract:Spectrum Auction is deemed as an efficient approach for redistributing Spectrum and realizing dynamic Spectrum access. Though there have been extensive research endeavors in designing Spectrum Auctions that are truthful with desirable social welfare, security and privacy concerns give rise to new challenges and calls for the design of privacy- preserving Spectrum Auction mechanisms. In this article, we begin with an overview of conventional Spectrum Auction mechanisms, then discuss the potential security threats in them. In particular, bidders' private information, for example, bid values and geo-locations, are submitted to the non-trustworthy Auctioneer and can be observed by rival bidders who may leverage this information to rig the Auction. To address this problem, we outline the framework for privacy-preserving Auction mechanism design, which applies cryptographic tools to the original Auction and ensures that the private information of bidders is protected, while the basic functionalities of the Auction are maintained. Based on the proposed framework, we further construct a privacy-preserving heterogeneous Spectrum double Auction, which is shown to uphold the closely similar allocation efficiency with the original Auction, and realizes privacy preservation with moderate communication and computation overheads.
-
privacy preserving and truthful double Auction for heterogeneous Spectrum
IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2019Co-Authors: Qian Wang, Jing Huang, Yanjiao Chen, Xin Tian, Qian ZhangAbstract:Over the past decades, there have been extensive research endeavors in Spectrum Auction design. However, most solutions only focus on the allocation efficiency while ignoring the privacy leakage inherent in the process of Spectrum Auction. So far, the very few existing works on secure Spectrum Auctions either provide inadequate privacy protection or incur performance loss in terms of Spectrum reusability. In this paper, for the first time, we propose PS-TAHES, a privacy-preserving and truthful double Auction mechanism for heterogeneous Spectrum. PS-TAHES is constructed based on our carefully designed security primitives, which can support various arithmetics over encrypted data, including multiplication, bid comparison, and sorting matrix, and they are well applicable in other contexts. We theoretically analyze the security and efficiency of PS-TAHES, which is proved to ensure a full and strong privacy protection for bidders while preserving the allocation efficiency of the original Auction mechanism. Experimental results, consistent with the theoretical analysis, further validate the practical use of PS-TAHES in real-world applications.
-
lotus location aware online truthful double Auction for dynamic Spectrum access
IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2014Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Qian ZhangAbstract:In the Spectrum Auction, if a buyer locates in a “critical” place, interfering with a lot of other buyers, his occupancy of the Spectrum may deprive many other transmission opportunities. In this paper, we propose a Location-aware Online Truthful doUble Auction Scheme (LOTUS), which incorporates the buyers' location information into Auction mechanism design. In the online Auction, the biggest challenge is how to allocate the Spectrums based on the knowledge in the current time slot, without knowing the Spectrum requests that may come afterward. To solve this problem, we propose considering the opportunity cost of allocating the Spectrum to a buyer based on his local interference conditions. We introduce the “interference discount” to markdown a buyer's bid if he induces a wide range of interference. Furthermore, we take into account the Spectrum heterogeneity and design mechanisms that guarantee the economic robustness of the Auction. The simulation results show that LOTUS outperforms the existing online Auction mechanism, significantly improving buyers' and sellers' utility.
-
tames a truthful Auction mechanism for heterogeneous Spectrum allocation
International Conference on Computer Communications, 2013Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Jin Zhang, Qian ZhangAbstract:Spectrums are heterogeneous, especially from the aspect of their central frequency. According to signal propagation properties, low-frequency Spectrum generally has lower path loss, thus longer transmission range, compared with high-frequency Spectrum. Cellular operators with different targeted cell size will have different preferences for Spectrums with different frequencies. Furthermore, the transmission range also affects the interference relationships among transmitters. Transmitters who can reuse the same high-frequency Spectrum may interfere with each other when reusing the low-frequency Spectrum, so it is difficult to decide how to construct the interference graph to exploit Spectrum reusability among transmitters. Auction is considered as an efficient way for Spectrum allocation. However, most of the previous works only considered homogenous Spectrum Auction, failing to address the problem of Spectrum heterogeneity. In this paper, we propose TAMES, a Truthful Auction Mechanism for hEterogeneous Spectrum allocation, which allows buyers to freely express their different preferences towards different Spectrums. Frequency-specific interference graphs are constructed to determine buyer groups. The proposed heterogeneous Spectrum Auction is theoretically proved to be truthful and individual rational. The simulation results verifies that the proposed Auction mechanism outperforms other Auction mechanisms with homogenous bid or homogenous interference graph. The proposed Auction mechanism is able to yield higher buyers' satisfaction, seller's revenue and Spectrum utilization.
-
groupon in the air a three stage Auction framework for Spectrum group buying
International Conference on Computer Communications, 2013Co-Authors: Peng Lin, Qian Zhang, Xiaojun Feng, Mounir HamdiAbstract:Spectrum Auction is widely applied in Spectrum redistributions, especially under the dynamic Spectrum management context. However, due to the high price asked by the Spectrum holders, secondary users (SUs) with limited budget cannot benefit from such Auction directly. Motivated by the recent group-buying behaviors in the Internet based service, we advocate that SUs can be grouped together to take part in the Spectrum Auction as a whole to increase their chances to win the channel. The cost and benefit of the won Spectrum are then shared evenly among the SUs within the group. None of the existing Auction models can be applied in this scenario due to three unique challenges: how can a group leader select the winning SUs and charge them fairly and efficiently; how to guarantee truthfulness of users' bids; how to match the heterogeneous channels to groups when one group would like to buy at most one channel. In this paper, we propose TASG, a Three-stage Auction framework for Spectrum Group-buying to address the above challenges and enable group-buying behaviors among SUs. In the first stage, we propose an algorithm to decide the group members and bids for the channels. In the second stage, we conduct Auction between the group leaders and the Spectrum holder, with a novel winner determination algorithm. In the third stage, the group leaders further distribute Spectrum and bills to the SUs in the group. TASG possesses good properties such as truthfulness, individual rationality, improved system efficiency, and computational tractability.
He Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a variable bandwidth Spectrum Auction mechanism with performance guarantee
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2016Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Lina Zhang, Baowei WangAbstract:Spectrum resource is experiencing a rapid growth, which cannot meet the demand of the ever-increasing wireless communications technologies in recent years. Spectrum Auctions in the secondary market have been considered as a prominent way to solve this challenge due to its fairness and effectiveness. However, most of the existing studies mainly focus on allocating Spectrum in units of channels without considering allocate Spectrum with variable bandwidths to the secondary users, which has been supported by the software-defined radio technologies. Variable bandwidth trading can make the usage of Spectrum more flexible and efficient. Thus, we study the Spectrum Auction problem where the primary user wants to share a continuous Spectrum with the secondary users, and each secondary user has a fixed transmission demand. The target of this work is to design a truthful Auction mechanism, which can allocate Spectrum with variable bandwidths to the secondary users and maximize the social efficiency at the same time...
-
truthful Auction mechanisms with performance guarantee in secondary Spectrum markets
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2015Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Shigang Chen, Mingjun Xiao, Liusheng HuangAbstract:We study a Spectrum Auction problem where each request from new Spectrum users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. Our goal is to design truthful Auction mechanisms that maximize either the overall social efficiency of new users ( a.k.a buyers) or the revenue of the Spectrum owner ( a.k.a seller). Given that the optimal conflict-free Spectrum allocation problem is NP-hard, this paper proposes a series of near-optimal Auction mechanisms based on the following approximation techniques: linear programming (LP) relaxation, randomized rounding, derandomized rounding, monotone derandomization, and Lavi-Swamy method. Comparing with the prior art, we make two significant advances: First, our Auction mechanisms are not only truthful but also provide theoretically-provable performance guarantee, an important feature that existing work under the same Auction model does not have. Second, our Auction mechanisms support both spatial and temporal spectral reuse, which makes the problem more challenging than existing work that deals with only spatial or temporal reuse. We perform extensive simulations to study the performance of the proposed mechanisms, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.
-
pps privacy preserving strategyproof social efficient Spectrum Auction mechanisms
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2015Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Liusheng HuangAbstract:Many Spectrum Auction mechanisms have been proposed for Spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof Spectrum Auction framework. We design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the single-unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel will be sold in the Spectrum market; and 2) the multi-unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both Auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+\epsilon)$ and $32$ separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof Auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.
-
pps privacy preserving strategyproof social efficient Spectrum Auction mechanisms
arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture, 2013Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Liusheng HuangAbstract:Many Spectrum Auction mechanisms have been proposed for Spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof Spectrum Auction framework. Then, we design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the Single-Unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel to be sold in the Spectrum market; and 2) the Multi-Unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both Auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+\epsilon)$ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof Auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.
-
near optimal truthful Spectrum Auction mechanisms with spatial and temporal reuse in wireless networks
Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, 2013Co-Authors: He Huang, Yue Sun, Zhili Chen, Wei YangAbstract:In this work, we study Spectrum Auction problem where each Spectrum usage request has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. After receiving bid requests from secondary users, and possibly reserve price from primary users, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either optimize the social efficiency or optimize the revenue of the primary user. As computing an optimal conflict-free Spectrum allocation is an NP-hard problem, in this work, we design near optimal Spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, and its linear programming (LP) relaxation. We theoretically prove that 1) our derandomized allocation methods are monotone, thus, implying truthful Auction mechanisms; 2) our derandomized allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least $1-\frac{1}{e}$ times of the optimal respectively; Our extensive simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.