The Experts below are selected from a list of 6522 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Christian Bjørnskov - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Hayek–Friedman hypothesis on the press: is there an association between economic freedom and press freedom?
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Christian Bjørnskov
    Abstract:

    The Hayek–Friedman hypothesis states that economic freedom is causally associated with Stable Democracy. I test a particular element of the hypothesis focusing on press freedom, which is arguably a necessary component of any democratic polity. Combining the Freedom House index of press freedom and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom yields a large annual panel dataset between 1993 and 2011. Estimates show that improvements in economic freedom are associated with subsequent improvements of press freedom. The overall association is mainly driven by changes in market openness.

  • Hayek-Friedman in the Press: Is There an Association between Economic Freedom and Press Freedom?
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
    Co-Authors: Christian Bjørnskov
    Abstract:

    The Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis states that economic freedom is a prerequisite for Stable Democracy. I test a variant of the hypothesis focusing on press freedom, which is arguably an important component of any democratic polity. Combining the Freedom House index of press freedom and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom yields a large annual panel dataset between 1993 and 2011. Estimates show that improvements of economic freedom are associated with subsequent improvements of press freedom. The overall association is mainly driven by changes in market openness.

  • Social Diversity, Institutions and Trust: A Cross-National Analysis
    Social Indicators Research, 2011
    Co-Authors: Ming-chang Tsai, Leslie Laczko, Christian Bjørnskov
    Abstract:

    This cross-national investigation examines hypotheses derived from two major alternative perspectives on the determinants of trust in contemporary societies. Is a society’s level of generalized trust a function of its ethnic composition, or of its type of governance and political system? The argument that social diversity (ethnic, linguistic, and religious) leads to lower levels of trust, at least in the short run, is assessed with cross-national data ( N  = 98). Two hypotheses derived from this perspective are not confirmed. The alternative rational governance argument, which holds that trust is a function of rational governance, Stable Democracy, and civil rights is also assessed. Three hypotheses derived from this political perspective reveal mixed results. The findings highlight the complex interplay of multiple factors in shaping a society’s overall level of generalized trust.

Gregorios Siourounis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization
    2008
    Co-Authors: Elias Papaioannou, Gregorios Siourounis
    Abstract:

    We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960-2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively Stable Democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to Stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the dataset to test theories on the prerequisites for Democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (Democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth, for example). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions.

  • economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization
    Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008
    Co-Authors: Elias Papaioannou, Gregorios Siourounis
    Abstract:

    We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960–2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively Stable Democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to Stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the data set to test theories on the prerequisites for Democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (Democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth, for example). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (3) (2008) 365–387.

Scott Mainwaring - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Peter C. Ordeshook - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other than the Countries they Serve?
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2002
    Co-Authors: Peter C. Ordeshook
    Abstract:

    This essay argues the universal relevance of the Western constitutional experience. It does so, however, not with reference to the commonalities of historical circumstance or the experience of specific states. Instead, we argue that just as events in the natural world must follow universal laws, the same it true about Stable Democracy, whether we are concerned with parliamentary or presidential systems, economically developed or undeveloped states, or whatever. We take as given that there necessarily exists universal principles of democratic constitutional design, even if those principles remain largely undiscovered. We argue further that discovery is more likely if we conceptualize constitutions as equilibrium selection devices and if we take as our starting point whatever understanding we possess about coordination and equilibrium selection in complex social processes, including the evolution and character of social norms and conventions.

Elias Papaioannou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization
    2008
    Co-Authors: Elias Papaioannou, Gregorios Siourounis
    Abstract:

    We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960-2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively Stable Democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to Stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the dataset to test theories on the prerequisites for Democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (Democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth, for example). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions.

  • economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization
    Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008
    Co-Authors: Elias Papaioannou, Gregorios Siourounis
    Abstract:

    We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960–2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively Stable Democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to Stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the data set to test theories on the prerequisites for Democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (Democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth, for example). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (3) (2008) 365–387.