The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Wei Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a two Stage Game framework to secure transmission in two tier uav networks
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2020Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Wei WangAbstract:The multi-UAV network is promising to extend conventional networks by providing broader coverage, and better reliability. Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of wireless signals, and the broader coverage expose multi-UAV communications to the threats of passive eavesdroppers. Recent studies mainly focus on securing a single legitimate link, or communications between a UAV, and multiple ground users in one/two-UAV-aided networks, while the physical layer secrecy analysis for hierarchical multi-UAV networks is underexplored. In this paper, we investigate a general two-tier UAV network consisting of multiple UAV transmitters (UTs), and multiple UAV receivers (URs) in the presence of multiple UAV eavesdroppers (UEs). To protect all legitimate UT-UR links against UEs at the physical layer, we design a two-Stage framework consisting of a UT-UR association Stage, and a cooperative transmission Stage. Specifically, we formulate the secure transmission problem into a many-to-one matching Game followed by an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) Game, taking into account the limited capabilities, and the throughput requirements of URs, as well as the transmission power constraints of UTs. A matching algorithm, and an OCF algorithm are proposed to solve these two sequential Games whose convergences, and stabilities are guaranteed theoretically. Simulation results show the superiority of our algorithms, and the effectiveness of our two-Stage Game framework in the terms of secrecy performance.
Yanjiao Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a two Stage Game framework to secure transmission in two tier uav networks
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2020Co-Authors: Yanjiao Chen, Wei WangAbstract:The multi-UAV network is promising to extend conventional networks by providing broader coverage, and better reliability. Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of wireless signals, and the broader coverage expose multi-UAV communications to the threats of passive eavesdroppers. Recent studies mainly focus on securing a single legitimate link, or communications between a UAV, and multiple ground users in one/two-UAV-aided networks, while the physical layer secrecy analysis for hierarchical multi-UAV networks is underexplored. In this paper, we investigate a general two-tier UAV network consisting of multiple UAV transmitters (UTs), and multiple UAV receivers (URs) in the presence of multiple UAV eavesdroppers (UEs). To protect all legitimate UT-UR links against UEs at the physical layer, we design a two-Stage framework consisting of a UT-UR association Stage, and a cooperative transmission Stage. Specifically, we formulate the secure transmission problem into a many-to-one matching Game followed by an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) Game, taking into account the limited capabilities, and the throughput requirements of URs, as well as the transmission power constraints of UTs. A matching algorithm, and an OCF algorithm are proposed to solve these two sequential Games whose convergences, and stabilities are guaranteed theoretically. Simulation results show the superiority of our algorithms, and the effectiveness of our two-Stage Game framework in the terms of secrecy performance.
Joseph Sarkis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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greening transportation fleets insights from a two Stage Game theoretic model
Transportation Research Part E-logistics and Transportation Review, 2011Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Joseph Sarkis, Chung Sik YooAbstract:The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-Stage Game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.
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outsourcing with quality competition insights from a three Stage Game theoretic model
International Journal of Production Research, 2010Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Chung Sik Yoo, Joseph SarkisAbstract:Outsourcing decisions by organisations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognise this concern and model the situation where an organisation with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-Stage Game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on the differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.
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outsourcing with quality competition insights from a three Stage Game theoretic model
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Chung Sik Yoo, Joseph SarkisAbstract:Outsourcing decisions by organizations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognize this concern and model the situation where an organization with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-Stage Game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.
Chung Sik Yoo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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greening transportation fleets insights from a two Stage Game theoretic model
Transportation Research Part E-logistics and Transportation Review, 2011Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Joseph Sarkis, Chung Sik YooAbstract:The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-Stage Game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.
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outsourcing with quality competition insights from a three Stage Game theoretic model
International Journal of Production Research, 2010Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Chung Sik Yoo, Joseph SarkisAbstract:Outsourcing decisions by organisations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognise this concern and model the situation where an organisation with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-Stage Game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on the differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.
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outsourcing with quality competition insights from a three Stage Game theoretic model
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Chung Sik Yoo, Joseph SarkisAbstract:Outsourcing decisions by organizations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognize this concern and model the situation where an organization with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-Stage Game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.
Sang Hoo Bae - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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greening transportation fleets insights from a two Stage Game theoretic model
Transportation Research Part E-logistics and Transportation Review, 2011Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Joseph Sarkis, Chung Sik YooAbstract:The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-Stage Game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.
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outsourcing with quality competition insights from a three Stage Game theoretic model
International Journal of Production Research, 2010Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Chung Sik Yoo, Joseph SarkisAbstract:Outsourcing decisions by organisations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognise this concern and model the situation where an organisation with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-Stage Game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on the differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.
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outsourcing with quality competition insights from a three Stage Game theoretic model
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Sang Hoo Bae, Chung Sik Yoo, Joseph SarkisAbstract:Outsourcing decisions by organizations have strategic and operational implications. Strategically, understanding the market and competition is necessary to make effective outsourcing decisions. In this paper we recognize this concern and model the situation where an organization with quality and cost pressures and operational strategies may arrive at different outsourcing solutions based on competitor quality strategy traits. We develop a three-Stage Game-theoretic oligopolistic model based on differentiated product strategy and integrating quality expectations of the market. The model is solved for equilibrium points on price, outsourcing activity, and investments in quality. The results show that these decision factors are sensitive to market expectations and quality performance of competitors. Performance measures based on profitability and market share results are also presented within this model. Observations and insights are also presented.
