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Eric H Weisbrod - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
Journal of The American Taxation Association, 2019Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These indivi...
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Joint Audit Engagements and Client Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Italian Statutory Audit Regime
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minutti-meza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These individuals can belong to the same or different accounting firms and through multiple and repeated collaborations they form a professional network. We use network measures of centrality to capture individuals' ability to acquire and apply tax expertise across clients. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for a number of client, individual, and accounting firm characteristics, as well as for alternative network connections between clients. We also use instrumental variables, individual fixed effects, and matching to mitigate the effect of endogenous pairing of clients and Auditors. Our findings demonstrate that in a joint Audit environment, individual Auditor professional networks have consequences for tax outcomes. Data Availability: Data are obtainable from the public sources cited in the text and are available upon request.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
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Professional Networks and Client Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Italian Statutory Audit Regime
2016Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minutti-meza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
Pietro A Bianchi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
Journal of The American Taxation Association, 2019Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These indivi...
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Joint Audit Engagements and Client Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Italian Statutory Audit Regime
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minutti-meza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These individuals can belong to the same or different accounting firms and through multiple and repeated collaborations they form a professional network. We use network measures of centrality to capture individuals' ability to acquire and apply tax expertise across clients. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for a number of client, individual, and accounting firm characteristics, as well as for alternative network connections between clients. We also use instrumental variables, individual fixed effects, and matching to mitigate the effect of endogenous pairing of clients and Auditors. Our findings demonstrate that in a joint Audit environment, individual Auditor professional networks have consequences for tax outcomes. Data Availability: Data are obtainable from the public sources cited in the text and are available upon request.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
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Professional Networks and Client Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Italian Statutory Audit Regime
2016Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minutti-meza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
Diana Falsetta - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
Journal of The American Taxation Association, 2019Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These indivi...
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Joint Audit Engagements and Client Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Italian Statutory Audit Regime
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minutti-meza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These individuals can belong to the same or different accounting firms and through multiple and repeated collaborations they form a professional network. We use network measures of centrality to capture individuals' ability to acquire and apply tax expertise across clients. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for a number of client, individual, and accounting firm characteristics, as well as for alternative network connections between clients. We also use instrumental variables, individual fixed effects, and matching to mitigate the effect of endogenous pairing of clients and Auditors. Our findings demonstrate that in a joint Audit environment, individual Auditor professional networks have consequences for tax outcomes. Data Availability: Data are obtainable from the public sources cited in the text and are available upon request.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
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Professional Networks and Client Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Italian Statutory Audit Regime
2016Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minutti-meza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
Miguel Minuttimeza - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
Journal of The American Taxation Association, 2019Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:ABSTRACT Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are jointly appointed to Audit each client's annual financial statements and sign off on the tax return. These indivi...
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joint Audit engagements and client tax avoidance evidence from the italian Statutory Audit regime
2018Co-Authors: Pietro A Bianchi, Diana Falsetta, Miguel Minuttimeza, Eric H WeisbrodAbstract:Under the Italian Statutory Audit regime, three individual accountants are appointed to jointly Audit each client. Working together on multiple engagements, individual Auditors form professional networks that can be conduits of knowledge spillover. We use network measures of centrality to capture Auditors’ ability to acquire and apply expertise across engagements. We demonstrate that clients engaging better-connected individual Auditors have comparatively lower effective tax rates. Our results are robust to controlling for characteristics of the client, individual Auditor, and Auditor’s firm, as well as Audit quality and fees. Moreover, we use individual Auditor fixed effects to examine the effect of time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics. Our fixed effects analyses indicate that both time-invariant individual Auditor characteristics and changes in Auditor centrality over time are associated with client tax outcomes. Our findings suggest that an environment encouraging individual cross-appointments over multiple engagements can facilitate the transfer of expertise between members of professional teams.
Geraldine Hottegindre - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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european reform of Statutory Audit and market structure the position of Audit firms
Management international, 2020Co-Authors: Marieclaire Loison, Loic Belze, Geraldine HottegindreAbstract:The European Commission recently reformed the Statutory Audit market in order to improve its competitiveness. We employ resource dependence theory to understand the position of Audit firms with regard to the policy options considered. By using content analysis to examine consultation responses, we show that, despite the existing market segmentation, all sizes of firm adopt similar positions, except on the topic of Audit consortia. The differences in firms’ access to resources, particularly with respect to human capital, help to explain these positions, which perpetuate supply concentration in the market.
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European Reform of Statutory Audit and Market Structure: The Position of Audit Firms
Management international, 2019Co-Authors: Marieclaire Loison, Loic Belze, Geraldine HottegindreAbstract:The European Commission recently reformed the Statutory Audit market in order to improve its competitiveness. We employ resource dependence theory to understand the position of Audit firms with regard to the policy options considered. By using content analysis to examine consultation responses, we show that, despite the existing market segmentation, all sizes of firm adopt similar positions, except on the topic of Audit consortia. The differences in firms’ access to resources, particularly with respect to human capital, help to explain these positions, which perpetuate supply concentration in the market. La Commission européenne a récemment mené une réforme de l’Audit légal afin d’améliorer la compétitivité du marché. Nous mobilisons la théorie de la dépendance vis-à-vis des ressources afin de comprendre la position des cabinets d’Audit au regard des options politiques envisagées. A partir d’une analyse de contenu des réponses à une consultation, les résultats montrent qu’en dépit d’une segmentation de marché existante, toutes les tailles de cabinet adoptent des positions similaires, excepté sur les consortiums d’Audit. Les différences d’accès aux ressources entre types de cabinet, notamment en capital humain, permettent de comprendre ces positions qui pérennisent la concentration de l’offre. La Comisión Europea a realizado recientemente una reforma en materia de Auditoría legal con el fin de mejorar la competencia de este mercado. Movilizamos la teoría de dependencia de recursos con el fin de entender la posición de las firmas de Auditoría en relación a las opciones políticas consideradas. A partir de un análisis de contenido de respuestas a una consulta, los resultados muestran que, a pesar de una segmentación de mercado existente, los distintos tamaños de firmas adoptan posiciones similares, con excepción de la Auditoría de consorcio. Las diferencias de acceso a los recursos entre las diferentes firmas, sobre todo en capital humano, permiten de entender esas posiciones que sostienen la concentración de la oferta.