The Experts below are selected from a list of 4089 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bruce A. Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Qantas Empire Airways - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority
1999Co-Authors: Bruce A. SmithAbstract:Qantas Empire Airways - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority - The Guide to Australian Business Records is a biographical, bibliographical and archival database of Australian business entities with links to related articles and images.
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Government Savings Bank of Queensland - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority
1999Co-Authors: Bruce A. SmithAbstract:Government Savings Bank of Queensland - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority - The Guide to Australian Business Records is a biographical, bibliographical and archival database of Australian business entities with links to related articles and images.
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Post Office Savings Bank of Western Australia - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority
1999Co-Authors: Bruce A. SmithAbstract:Post Office Savings Bank of Western Australia - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority - The Guide to Australian Business Records is a biographical, bibliographical and archival database of Australian business entities with links to related articles and images.
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Government Savings Bank of New South Wales - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority
1999Co-Authors: Bruce A. SmithAbstract:Government Savings Bank of New South Wales - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority - The Guide to Australian Business Records is a biographical, bibliographical and archival database of Australian business entities with links to related articles and images.
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Rural Bank of New South Wales - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority
1999Co-Authors: Bruce A. SmithAbstract:Rural Bank of New South Wales - Guide to Australian Business Records Statutory Authority - The Guide to Australian Business Records is a biographical, bibliographical and archival database of Australian business entities with links to related articles and images.
Jennifer L Pomeranz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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television food marketing to children revisited the federal trade commission has the constitutional and Statutory Authority to regulate
Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics, 2010Co-Authors: Jennifer L PomeranzAbstract:The evidence reveals that young children are targeted by food and beverage advertisers but are unable to comprehend the commercial context and persuasive intent of marketing. Although the First Amendment protects commercial speech, it does not protect deceptive and misleading speech for profit. Marketing directed at children may fall into this category of unprotected speech. Further, children do not have the same First Amendment right to receive speech as adults. For the first time since the Federal Trade Commission's original attempt to regulate marketing to children in the 1970s (termed KidVid), the political, scientific, and legal climate coalesce to make the time well-suited to reevaluate the FTC's Authority for action. This paper analyzes the constitutional Authority for the FTC to regulate television food marketing directed at children as deceptive in light of the most robust public health evidence on the subject.
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television food marketing to children revisited the federal trade commission has the constitutional and Statutory Authority to regulate
2010Co-Authors: Jennifer L PomeranzAbstract:In response to the obesity epidemic, much discussion in the public health and child advocacy communities has centered on restricting food and beverage marketing practices directed at children. This paper provides a brief overview of the science on the influence of marketing over children, and a background of relevant FTC action and the commercial speech doctrine. The paper examines First Amendment jurisprudence, which holds that deceptive and misleading speech about commercial products is not protected by the First Amendment. It explores the theory that because young children do not and cannot comprehend that they are being advertised to, this form of communication is inherently conducive to deception and coercion. The specific marketing techniques employed by the food and beverage industry to advertise to children further demonstrate that this form of communication should not be considered protected by the First Amendment. FTC rulemaking in this area would thus be consistent with the First Amendment’s lack of protection for such speech. Although the argument may apply to marketing for all products, this paper relies on the science relevant to children and food marketing so the current analysis is limited to the FTC’s Authority to restrict food marketing directed at youth.
Rob Frieden - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention in internet service provider interconnection disputes lessons from broadcast signal retransmission consent negotiations
2014Co-Authors: Rob FriedenAbstract:This paper considers what limited roles the FCC may lawfully assume to ensure timely and fair interconnection and compensation agreements in the Internet ecosystem. The paper examines the FCC’s limited role in broadcaster-cable television retransmission consent negotiations with an eye toward assessing the applicability of this model. The FCC explicitly states that it lacks jurisdiction to prescribe terms, or to mandate binding arbitration. However, it recently interpreted its Statutory Authority to ensure “good faith” negotiations as allowing it to constrain broadcaster negotiating leverage by prohibiting multiple operators, having the largest market share, from joining in collective negotiations with cable operators. References to the Internet as a network of networks, or cloud recognize the numerous interconnections and compensation arrangements necessary to achieve a complete routing of traffic from content source to end user. Free from a public utility, common carrier regulatory regime, Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) regularly engage in commercial negotiations to reach agreements on contractual terms and conditions. As the Internet has evolved, interconnection and compensation agreements have diversified from a general baseline dichotomy of using barter (peering), or a transfer payment (transiting). In particular, the downstream delivery of bandwidth intensive video content has triggered new arrangements that accommodate the interests of content providers and distributors in speedy, high quality delivery of traffic and ISPs’ interest in profiting from their substantial investment in switching and routing capacity needed to handle a massive increase in volume. Content providers and downstream ISPs may have such conflicting views on who should pay, or incur delivery costs that a timely interconnection and compensation agreement may not occur. The proliferation of “mission critical” bit streams containing “must see” video has raised the stakes in such negotiations. The combination of consumer intolerance for service degradation and the need to negotiate with specific ISPs serving retail subscribers, who rely exclusively on one such carrier for service, may place upstream ISPs and content ventures at a negotiation disadvantage. Retail ISPs may perceive an advantage in stalling, perhaps with an eye toward enlisting broadband subscribers as their advocates. On the other hand, retail ISPs risk subscriber push back and churn if they overplay their hand. Several high profile interconnection and compensation disputes have raised the issue whether and how the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) should get involved. To the Commission’s credit, it has refrained, but the issue of interconnection and compensation between ISPs has the potential to become a part of the broader debate about what constitutes “commercially reasonable” deviations from best efforts traffic routing. The paper concludes that the FCC should not define or interpret what constitutes commercially reasonable interconnection and compensation agreements. However the Commission should use simple reporting requirements to assess the timeliness of negotiations and also provide a forum to identify and disclose instances where stalling tactics possibly evidence bad faith.
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Ancillary to What? The FCC’s Mixed Record in Expanding its Regulatory Reach Without Explicit Statutory Authority
2012Co-Authors: Rob FriedenAbstract:For Internet-based services, such as retail broadband, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has evidenced great ambivalence over the scope of its jurisdiction and the need for its regulatory intervention. On one hand, the Commission decided to apply the information service Statutory classification that triggers little if any regulatory Authority. Whether by credible empirical evidence, or flawed assumptions and projections about marketplace competition, the Commission initially expressed confidence that self-regulation could remedy most anticompetitive practices. The FCC subsequently regretted its broad sweeping deregulatory initiative in light of complaints about discriminatory practices of some Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and new found concerns about the viability of broadband access competition. Having exempted Internet access technologies from any of the requirements established in Title II of the Communications Act, the FCC subsequently attempted to invoke necessary Statutory Authority based on Title I of the Communications Act. This strategy of establishing “ancillary jurisdiction” uses an indirect method whereby the FCC extrapolates Statutory Authority when explicit Statutory Authority does not exist. The Commission has generated a mixed record in convincing courts that such indirect Authority exists.This paper will examine cases where the FCC has successfully convinced appellate courts that ancillary jurisdiction exists and cases where the Commission has failed. In the former the FCC lawfully extended its jurisdiction to include cable television, even in the absence of enabling legislation, based on an analogy. The Commission argued successfully in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), that because it had direct Statutory Authority to regulate broadcast television under Title III of the Act, and because cable television had the potential to impact the viability of “free” advertiser supported broadcast television, the Commission had ancillary jurisdiction to establish rules and regulations to curb the market fragmenting impact of cable television. Recently the FCC convinced an appellate court that it could and should apply duties to deal between information service providers of mobile wireless data services, so long as the requirements do not constitute common carriage. The FCC also has achieved success in applying ancillary jurisdiction to Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) companies and now imposes many regulatory requirements previously applied solely to telecommunications service providers. Having refrained from specifying whether VoIP providers offer telecommunications services or information services, the Commission nevertheless invoked ancillary jurisdiction Authority. Reviewing courts have affirmed the FCC’s jurisdictional claims largely based on the sense that VoIP competes with, and constitutes a technological alternative to, dial up telephone service.On the other hand, a reviewing court in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) refused to accept the FCC’s assertion that it could lawfully stretch ancillary jurisdiction to include ventures that it previously had classified as ISPs. In this instance the court did not accept that because the FCC has general Statutory Authority over “wire and radio” in Title I of the Communications Act, the Commission can extend its regulatory reach to include information services simply because ISPs use wire and radio to provide service. The FCC similarly failed in American Library Association v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005), to convince a reviewing court that broadcast television jurisdiction included authorization to require television set manufacturers to construct sets capable of processing copyright protection instructions. This paper will identify what circumstances favor and disfavor the FCC’s attempt to invoke ancillary jurisdiction. The paper concludes that the Commission will have greater difficulty in securing judicial approval of Title I ancillary jurisdiction for instances where it previously made a determination that it lacked direct Statutory Authority to act. Even though the perceived need to intervene shows that the FCC miscalculated the sufficiency of marketplace self-regulation, the Commission cannot easily convince courts that Statutory definitions are so pliable that the FCC can toggle between two categories. However consumers increasingly rely on Internet access as the primary or exclusive medium for access to both telecommunications and information services. Disputes over what ISPs must do to serve the public interest likely will increase and the FCC will not abandon efforts to provide solutions. The paper will consider what direct or ancillary Authority the Commission can muster in light of Verizon v. FCC, __ F.3d __, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014) which validated the lawfulness of some oversight derived from Section 706 of the Communications Act that authorizes the FCC to promote broadband access.
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ancillary to what the fcc s mixed record in expanding its regulatory reach without explicit Statutory Authority
2012Co-Authors: Rob FriedenAbstract:For Internet-based services, such as retail broadband, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has evidenced great ambivalence over the scope of its jurisdiction and the need for its regulatory intervention. On one hand, the Commission decided to apply the information service Statutory classification that triggers little if any regulatory Authority. Whether by credible empirical evidence, or flawed assumptions and projections about marketplace competition, the Commission initially expressed confidence that self-regulation could remedy most anticompetitive practices. The FCC subsequently regretted its broad sweeping deregulatory initiative in light of complaints about discriminatory practices of some Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and new found concerns about the viability of broadband access competition. Having exempted Internet access technologies from any of the requirements established in Title II of the Communications Act, the FCC subsequently attempted to invoke necessary Statutory Authority based on Title I of the Communications Act. This strategy of establishing “ancillary jurisdiction” uses an indirect method whereby the FCC extrapolates Statutory Authority when explicit Statutory Authority does not exist. The Commission has generated a mixed record in convincing courts that such indirect Authority exists.This paper will examine cases where the FCC has successfully convinced appellate courts that ancillary jurisdiction exists and cases where the Commission has failed. In the former the FCC lawfully extended its jurisdiction to include cable television, even in the absence of enabling legislation, based on an analogy. The Commission argued successfully in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), that because it had direct Statutory Authority to regulate broadcast television under Title III of the Act, and because cable television had the potential to impact the viability of “free” advertiser supported broadcast television, the Commission had ancillary jurisdiction to establish rules and regulations to curb the market fragmenting impact of cable television. Recently the FCC convinced an appellate court that it could and should apply duties to deal between information service providers of mobile wireless data services, so long as the requirements do not constitute common carriage. The FCC also has achieved success in applying ancillary jurisdiction to Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) companies and now imposes many regulatory requirements previously applied solely to telecommunications service providers. Having refrained from specifying whether VoIP providers offer telecommunications services or information services, the Commission nevertheless invoked ancillary jurisdiction Authority. Reviewing courts have affirmed the FCC’s jurisdictional claims largely based on the sense that VoIP competes with, and constitutes a technological alternative to, dial up telephone service.On the other hand, a reviewing court in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) refused to accept the FCC’s assertion that it could lawfully stretch ancillary jurisdiction to include ventures that it previously had classified as ISPs. In this instance the court did not accept that because the FCC has general Statutory Authority over “wire and radio” in Title I of the Communications Act, the Commission can extend its regulatory reach to include information services simply because ISPs use wire and radio to provide service. The FCC similarly failed in American Library Association v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005), to convince a reviewing court that broadcast television jurisdiction included authorization to require television set manufacturers to construct sets capable of processing copyright protection instructions. This paper will identify what circumstances favor and disfavor the FCC’s attempt to invoke ancillary jurisdiction. The paper concludes that the Commission will have greater difficulty in securing judicial approval of Title I ancillary jurisdiction for instances where it previously made a determination that it lacked direct Statutory Authority to act. Even though the perceived need to intervene shows that the FCC miscalculated the sufficiency of marketplace self-regulation, the Commission cannot easily convince courts that Statutory definitions are so pliable that the FCC can toggle between two categories. However consumers increasingly rely on Internet access as the primary or exclusive medium for access to both telecommunications and information services. Disputes over what ISPs must do to serve the public interest likely will increase and the FCC will not abandon efforts to provide solutions. The paper will consider what direct or ancillary Authority the Commission can muster in light of Verizon v. FCC, __ F.3d __, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014) which validated the lawfulness of some oversight derived from Section 706 of the Communications Act that authorizes the FCC to promote broadband access.
Clare M. Ryan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Leadership in collaborative policy-making: An analysis of agency roles in regulatory negotiations
Policy Sciences, 2001Co-Authors: Clare M. RyanAbstract:Regulatory negotiation is a process by which representatives of affected interests, along with the regulatory agency, attempt to negotiate a consensus agreement on the content of a regulation. This study represents an empirical effort to begin to identify and sort out the roles that an agency plays in a collaborative policy-making process such as regulatory negotiation. Three regulatory negotiation cases were examined to determine the perceived roles of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials and other participants, and the study suggests a number of findings. First, that EPA fulfills a number of different roles (Expert, Analyst, Stakeholder, Facilitator and Leader) in a negotiation process; second, that EPA is expected to be an active participant in the negotiations, not simply an overseer or facilitator of interests; and finally, EPA interprets its primary role much more narrowly – as that of an expert – than do other participants. Non-agency participants view EPA's primary role as a leader, which combines technical and substantive components as well as process components. Where previously and in the theoretical literature, agencies exercise leadership through Statutory Authority or technical expertise, this study suggests that there are additional dimensions to that leadership role. In a collaborative process such as regulatory negotiation, the agency finds itself in a realm that demands that they effectively merge the roles of expert, analyst, and stakeholder into a more complex leadership role than has been suggested in the past.
Cynthia A. Williams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency
Harvard Law Review, 1999Co-Authors: Cynthia A. WilliamsAbstract:The financial transparency for which U.S. capital markets are renowned derives primarily from mandatory disclosure of operating results under the federal securities laws. In this Article, Professor Williams defends the view that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can and should require expanded social disclosure by public reporting companies to promote corporate social transparency comparable to the financial transparency that now exists. As used in this Article, "social disclosure" refers to disclosure of specific information about a reporting company?s products, the countries in which a company does business, and the labor and environmental effects of a company?s operations in the United States and around the world. Professor Williams shows that the SEC has the Statutory Authority in fashioning proxy disclosure under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require disclosure either to promote the public interest or to protect investors. To construe the SEC?s public interest disclosure power, she examines the intellectual derivation of the securities laws and their legislative history, demonstrating that increasing corporate accountability to shareholders and to the public was a central goal of Congress in 1933 and 1934, as was constraining the exercise of corporate power and inculcating a greater sense of public responsibility in corporate managers. The legislative history of Section 14(a) indicates that Congress?s purpose in enacting that section was to strengthen the power of shareholders in the corporate governance relationship, and in particular to require companies to provide shareholders with information about management policies and practices. Thus, she argues that it is fully consistent with the language, purpose, and legislative history of the securities laws for the SEC to use its Authority under Section 14(a) to require expanded disclosure about management?s policies and practices with respect to social and environmental issues. A close examination of the SEC?s rejection of expanded social disclosure in the 1970s buttresses this conclusion. Professor Williams concludes by making the affirmative case for expanded corporate social transparency and for the SEC?s legitimate role in promoting such transparency, both from the perspective of the "economic" investor, who is assumed to be interested primarily in the financial returns from an investment, and from the perspective of the "social" investor, who is concerned more broadly with the social and environmental effects of corporate conduct.
