The Experts below are selected from a list of 66111 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Robert P. Rebelein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Strategic Behavior, Debt Neutrality, and Crowding Out:
Public Finance Review, 2006Co-Authors: Robert P. RebeleinAbstract:This article presents an overlapping generations model in which children seek to manipulate the size of the end-of-life bequest they receive from the parent. The author first uses numerical simulations to showthis intergenerational Strategic Behavior does not negate the debt neutrality assertions of Ricardian equivalence. Then, by introducing capital gains and inheritance taxes, the author shows the crowding out effect of government debt is notably smaller in models with Strategic Behavior; manipulation by children increases the importance of bequests, which forces parents to save (and bequeath) a larger portion of a debt-financed tax cut. In spite of the neutrality of debt under lump sum taxes, including intergenerational Strategic Behavior can significantly influence the outcome of government tax policies.
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Intergenerational Strategic Behavior and crowding out in a general equilibrium model
Research Papers in Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Robert P. RebeleinAbstract:The return of large government budget deficits should encourage us to resume analysis of their effects. Two topics deserving further attention are the importance of correctly modeling the form of intergenerational relationships and clarification of the extent to which deficits crowd out private investment. This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which children seek to manipulate the size of the end-of-life bequest they receive from the parent – similar to the manipulation observed in the Samaritan’s dilemma. I first use numerical simulations to show this intergenerational Strategic Behavior does not negate the debt neutrality assertions of Ricardian equivalence. Then, by introducing capital gains and inheritance taxes, I show the crowding out effect of government debt is notably smaller in models with Strategic Behavior; manipulation by children increases the importance of bequests, which forces parents to save (and bequeath) a larger portion of a debt-financed tax cut. In spite of the neutrality of debt under lump sum taxes, including intergenerational Strategic Behavior can significantly influence the outcome of government tax policies. Given the restrictive nature of the conditions required for Ricardian equivalence to hold, it may be more useful to measure how near to or far from Ricardian equivalence a particular policy or economy comes rather than simply determining whether or not it holds in that environment.
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Ricardian equivalence survives Strategic Behavior
Research Papers in Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Robert P. RebeleinAbstract:Robert Barro (1974) showed government debt has no real effects when generations are linked by altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers, a result now known widely as the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. An important condition for debt neutrality is believed to be the absence of Strategic interactions between members of different generations. I use a simple two-period, parent and child model in which the parent is altruistic, to show Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of intergenerational Strategic Behavior for a broad class of utility functions. The intuition for this result derives from the fact that the child’s utility is a public good.
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Ricardian Equivalence Survives Strategic Behavior
1998Co-Authors: Robert P. RebeleinAbstract:Robert Barro (1974) showed government debt has no real effects when generations are linked by altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers, a result now known widely as the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. An important condition for debt neutrality is believed to be the absence of Strategic interactions between members of different generations. I use a simple two-period, parent and child model in which the parent is altruistic, to show Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of intergenerational Strategic Behavior for a broad class of utility functions. The intuition for this result derives from the fact that the child’s utility is a public good.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Xavier Vives - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Strategic Behavior and Price Discovery
Social Science Research Network, 2001Co-Authors: Luis Angel Medrano, Xavier VivesAbstract:We analyze the effects of Strategic Behavior by a large informed trader in a price discovery process used in opening auctions in continuous trading systems. It is found that the large informed trader manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistent with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price approaches but does not converge to the fundamental value, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern.
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Strategic Behavior and price discovery
Research Papers in Economics, 1997Co-Authors: Luis Angel Medrano, Xavier VivesAbstract:The paper analyzes the effects of Strategic Behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.
Laura Langer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts
Perspectives on Politics, 2004Co-Authors: Laura LangerAbstract:Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts. By Scott A. Comparato. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 192p. $64.95. There is a plethora of studies examining whether or not judges engage in Strategic Behavior, yet many important questions remain about the motivations that encourage judges to behave Strategically and how institutional rules shape these motivations. In his book, Scott A. Comparato asks whether institutional rules encourage Strategic Behavior by state supreme courts, litigants, and amici participants. His work is motivated by the idea that information provided by interest groups in amicus briefs is an important reference point for state supreme court justices.
Masakazu Nara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Crowded Rosselia ichnofabric in the Early Devonian of Brazil: An example of Strategic Behavior
Palaeogeography Palaeoclimatology Palaeoecology, 2014Co-Authors: Renata Guimarães Netto, Francisco Manoel Wohnrath Tognoli, Mario Luis Assine, Masakazu NaraAbstract:Abstract The occurrence of crowded Rosselia ichnofabric in Early Devonian deposits of ‘Transition Beds’ (Western Gondwana Parana Basin, southern Brazil) and the paleobiology and paleoecology of its potential tracemakers are discussed in this paper. Crowded Rosselia ichnofabric has been recorded chiefly in Cenozoic storm beds associated with high sedimentation rates on the inner shelf, and is usually interpreted as resulting from opportunistic Behavior of terebellid polychaetes. Rosselia is a common ichnotaxon in the archetypical Cruziana ichnofacies, developed preferentially in fair-weather deposits formed in inner shelf settings. During storm surges, however, this endobenthic community is strongly affected, decimating those that are unable to escape. New records presented herein reinforce the conclusion that short-term colonization represented by crowded Rosselia ichnofabric occurs essentially in erosive storm deposits of high sedimentation rates. Rather than being opportunistic, the crowded Rosselia ichnofabric appears to be the result of a Strategic Behavior developed by stress-tolerant terebellid polychaetes in inner shelf zones during or just after storm surges. This Strategic Behavior appeared during the early Paleozoic and was adopted by terebellids from their earliest appearance.
Luis Angel Medrano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Strategic Behavior and Price Discovery
Social Science Research Network, 2001Co-Authors: Luis Angel Medrano, Xavier VivesAbstract:We analyze the effects of Strategic Behavior by a large informed trader in a price discovery process used in opening auctions in continuous trading systems. It is found that the large informed trader manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistent with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price approaches but does not converge to the fundamental value, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern.
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Strategic Behavior and price discovery
Research Papers in Economics, 1997Co-Authors: Luis Angel Medrano, Xavier VivesAbstract:The paper analyzes the effects of Strategic Behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.
