The Experts below are selected from a list of 6120 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jay Dial - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Strategic delegation a review theoretical integration and research agenda
Journal of Management, 2012Co-Authors: Metin Sengul, Javier Gimeno, Jay DialAbstract:This article reviews the Strategic delegation literature and provides a theoretical framework that integrates this perspective into management research. The Strategic delegation literature is built on the observation that, under Strategic Interdependence, delegation of decision making and accompanying actions can serve as commitments that influence competitive interactions with rivals and lead to beneficial outcomes. In this article, the authors first integrate diverse models and streams of research on Strategic delegation in an organizing framework and highlight points of agreement and departure. This is the first comprehensive review of formal game-theoretical research purporting to show the Strategic effects of delegation. The authors then integrate Strategic delegation into Strategic management and organization theory research in three main ways: They propose a common set of assumptions that would attune the Strategic delegation perspective with other views and make it more relevant for management res...
Curtis S. Signorino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict
American Political Science Review, 1999Co-Authors: Curtis S. SignorinoAbstract:Although Strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory, it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field. Typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the Strategic Interdependence implied by those theories. I demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized Strategic interaction. I show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use Monte Carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values. Finally, I reanalyze a well-known game-theoretic model of war, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) international interaction game. My results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model.
Metin Sengul - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Strategic delegation a review theoretical integration and research agenda
Journal of Management, 2012Co-Authors: Metin Sengul, Javier Gimeno, Jay DialAbstract:This article reviews the Strategic delegation literature and provides a theoretical framework that integrates this perspective into management research. The Strategic delegation literature is built on the observation that, under Strategic Interdependence, delegation of decision making and accompanying actions can serve as commitments that influence competitive interactions with rivals and lead to beneficial outcomes. In this article, the authors first integrate diverse models and streams of research on Strategic delegation in an organizing framework and highlight points of agreement and departure. This is the first comprehensive review of formal game-theoretical research purporting to show the Strategic effects of delegation. The authors then integrate Strategic delegation into Strategic management and organization theory research in three main ways: They propose a common set of assumptions that would attune the Strategic delegation perspective with other views and make it more relevant for management res...
Javier Gimeno - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Strategic delegation a review theoretical integration and research agenda
Journal of Management, 2012Co-Authors: Metin Sengul, Javier Gimeno, Jay DialAbstract:This article reviews the Strategic delegation literature and provides a theoretical framework that integrates this perspective into management research. The Strategic delegation literature is built on the observation that, under Strategic Interdependence, delegation of decision making and accompanying actions can serve as commitments that influence competitive interactions with rivals and lead to beneficial outcomes. In this article, the authors first integrate diverse models and streams of research on Strategic delegation in an organizing framework and highlight points of agreement and departure. This is the first comprehensive review of formal game-theoretical research purporting to show the Strategic effects of delegation. The authors then integrate Strategic delegation into Strategic management and organization theory research in three main ways: They propose a common set of assumptions that would attune the Strategic delegation perspective with other views and make it more relevant for management res...
Gary M Erickson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a differential game model of the marketing operations interface
European Journal of Operational Research, 2011Co-Authors: Gary M EricksonAbstract:In the development of their dynamic strategies, the marketing and operations functions within a firm have differing objectives, and conflict between the two functions is common. The Strategic Interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions is modeled as a noncooperative differential game. Demand is assumed to be a function of price and advertising goodwill, and marketing controls price and advertising to maximize its discounted stream of revenue net of advertising costs. Backlogging is allowed, and operations controls production to minimize its discounted stream of production and backlog costs. A feedback Nash equilibrium is derived for the game, which allows a solution of the system of differential equations for goodwill and backlog, and is analyzed to study the nature of the dynamic strategies for price, advertising, and production.