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Costas J Spanos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a cooperative demand response scheme using punishment mechanism and application to industrial refrigerated warehouses
    IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Costas J Spanos
    Abstract:

    This paper proposes a cooperative demand response (CDR) scheme for load management in smart grid. The CDR scheme is formulated as a constrained optimization problem that generates a Pareto-optimal response Strategy Profile for consumers. Comparing with the noncooperative response Strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) obtained from the one-shot demand management game, the Pareto-optimal response Strategy reduces the electricity costs to the consumers. We further develop an incentive-compatible trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behaviors of the selfish consumers. Furthermore, the CDR scheme is applied to achieve load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses. To implement the CDR scheme in large-scale systems, we group the refrigerated warehouses into clusters and utilize the CDR scheme within each cluster. Numerical results demonstrate that the CDR scheme can reduce the electricity costs, drop the electricity prices, and curtail the total energy consumption in comparison with the noncooperative demand response scheme.

  • a cooperative demand response scheme using punishment mechanism and application to industrial refrigerated warehouses
    Industrial Electronics Society, 2014
    Co-Authors: Costas J Spanos
    Abstract:

    This paper proposes a cooperative demand response scheme for load management in smart grid. The cooperative demand response scheme is formulated as a constrained optimization problem that generates a Pareto-optimal response Strategy Profile for consumers. Comparing with the noncooperative response Strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) obtained from the oneshot demand management game, the Pareto-optimal response Strategy reduces the electricity costs to the consumers. We further develop an incentive-compatible trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behaviors of the selfish consumers. Furthermore, the cooperative demand response scheme is applied to load management of industrial refrigerated warehouses. To implement the cooperative demand response scheme in large-scale system, we divide the refrigerated warehouses into different clusters and implement the cooperative demand response scheme inside each cluster. Numerical results demonstrate that the cooperative demand response scheme can reduce the electricity costs, drop the electricity prices, and curtail the total energy consumption comparing with the noncooperative demand response scheme.

Jörgen W. Weibull - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018
    Co-Authors: Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton, Jörgen W. Weibull
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s Strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s Strategy set. A Strategy Profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of Strategy Profiles in which every player’s Strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.

  • Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2014
    Co-Authors: Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton, Jörgen W. Weibull
    Abstract:

    We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum Strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's Strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's Strategy set. We call a Strategy Profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of Strategy Profiles in which every player's Strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust Strategy Profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.

  • Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition
    2010
    Co-Authors: Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton, Jörgen W. Weibull
    Abstract:

    We model a player's uncertainty about other player's Strategy choices as probability distributions over their Strategy sets. We call a Strategy Profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of Strategy Profiles in each of which every player's Strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the pthers. We apply this definition to Bertrand games with a continuum of equilibrium prices and show that our robustness criterion selects a unique Nash equilibrium price. This selection agrees with available experimental findings.

Saswati Sarkar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • quality sensitive price competition in secondary market spectrum oligopoly single location game
    IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2016
    Co-Authors: Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar
    Abstract:

    We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell its channel to a secondary. Transmission rate of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary needs to select a price depending on the transmission rate of its channel. Each secondary selects a channel depending on the price and the transmission rate of the channel. We formulate the above problem as a noncooperative game. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) and explicitly compute it. Under the NE Strategy Profile, a primary prices its channel to render the channel that provides high transmission rate more preferable; this negates the perception that prices ought to be selected to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their transmission rates. We show the loss of revenue in the asymptotic limit due to the noncooperation of primaries. In the repeated version of the game, we characterize a subgame perfect NE where a primary can attain a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff it would obtain when primaries cooperate.

  • quality sensitive price competition in spectrum oligopoly
    International Symposium on Information Theory, 2013
    Co-Authors: Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar
    Abstract:

    We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primary users allow secondary access in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission qualities of the licensed bands fluctuate randomly. Each primary needs to select the price of its channel with the knowledge of its own channel state but not that of its competitors. Secondaries choose among the channels available on sale based on their states and prices. We formulate the price selection as a non-cooperative game and prove that a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) Strategy Profile exists uniquely. We explicitly compute this Strategy Profile and analytically and numerically evaluate its efficiency. Our structural results provide certain key insights about the unique symmetric NE.

Stephen Morris - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • purification in the infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma
    Review of Economic Dynamics, 2008
    Co-Authors: V Bhaskar, George J Mailath, Stephen Morris
    Abstract:

    This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed Strategy equilibria used by Ely and Valimaki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such Strategy Profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium Strategy Profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable. (Copyright: Elsevier)

  • purification in the infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma second version
    Levine's Bibliography, 2007
    Co-Authors: V Bhaskar, George J Mailath, Stephen Morris
    Abstract:

    This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed Strategy equilibria used by Ely and Valimaki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such Strategy Profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium Strategy Profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.

  • equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
    Staff General Research Papers Archive, 2003
    Co-Authors: David M Frankel, Stephen Morris, Ady Pauzner
    Abstract:

    We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique Strategy Profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. Te surviving Profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

  • equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, 2000
    Co-Authors: David M Frankel, Stephen Morris, Ady Pauzner
    Abstract:

    We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the incomplete information game has a unique Strategy Profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme for two player, two action games. The surviving Profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

Satoru Takahashi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
    Econometrica, 2011
    Co-Authors: Nicolas Vieille, Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi
    Abstract:

    We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to 1 for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of the initial state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain induced by any Markov Strategy Profile is irreducible. We then provide conditions under which a folk theorem obtains: if in each state the joint distribution over the public signal and next period's state satisfies some rank condition, every feasible payoff vector above the minmax payoff is sustained by a perfect public equilibrium with low discounting.

  • Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2005
    Co-Authors: Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Satoru Takahashi, Tetsuo Yamamori
    Abstract:

    In a finite game with strategic complementarities, every Strategy Profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path. If, additionally, the strategies are scalar, then every Strategy Profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual best response improvement path.