The Experts below are selected from a list of 222 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Claudio Soriente - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
CIS - Modified Original Smart Cards and Smart Card Clone Countermeasures
2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2007), 2007Co-Authors: Alfredo De De Santis, Claudio SorienteAbstract:Conditional Access Systems are used in Pay-Tv Sys- tems to ensure conditional access to broadcasted data and charge subscribers a Subscription Fee. Smart cards are end- user security devices to store subscribers entitlements, re- quired to access data. On the other hand, pirates clone or modify smart cards to gain access to broadcasted data with- out paying any Fees. This paper presents new countermea- sures, based on fingerprints, to avoid smart cards cloning or modifying in Conditional Access Systems for digital Tv broadcasting.
-
Modified Original Smart Cards and Smart Card Clone Countermeasures
2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2007), 2007Co-Authors: Alfredo De De Santis, Claudio SorienteAbstract:Conditional Access Systems are used in Pay-Tv Sys- tems to ensure conditional access to broadcasted data and charge subscribers a Subscription Fee. Smart cards are end- user security devices to store subscribers entitlements, re- quired to access data. On the other hand, pirates clone or modify smart cards to gain access to broadcasted data with- out paying any Fees. This paper presents new countermea- sures, based on fingerprints, to avoid smart cards cloning or modifying in Conditional Access Systems for digital Tv broadcasting.
Jianwei Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach
IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2018Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community network enables the individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence it can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model, each user’s best choice depends not only on his private information but also on other user’s choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that guarantees the user’s truthful information disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of the user choice, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields a maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi access price and Subscription Fee, regardless of the user mobility pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access prices and Subscription Fees for users.
-
Technical Report for "Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach".
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community network enables individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model each user's best choice depends not only on his private information but also on other users' choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that guarantees the users' truthful information disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of user choice, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields the maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi access price and Subscription Fee, regardless of the user mobility pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access prices and Subscription Fees for users.
-
Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach
2018Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community network enables individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model each user's best choice depends not only on his private information but also on other users' choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that guarantees the users' truthful information disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of user choice, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields the maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi access price and Subscription Fee, regardless of the user mobility pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access prices and Subscription Fees for users.
-
WiOpt - A contract-based incentive mechanism for crowdsourced wireless community networks
2016 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2016Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community networks enable individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a low deployment cost. This paper presents the first Wi-Fi sharing mechanism design for the community network operator under incomplete information, where the quality of each user-provided Wi-Fi access is his private information. Specifically, we propose a contract-based incentive mechanism, where the operator offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others who access his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator). Different from prior contract mechanisms for wireless networks, here each user's best contract choice depends not only on his private information, but also on other users' choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We derive the feasible contract that guarantees the user participation and truthful information disclosure under the equilibrium. Our analysis shows that a higher type user (who provides a higher quality access) is more likely to choose a higher price and Subscription Fee. Simulation results further show that when increasing the ratio of higher type users in the system, the operator can gain more profit, while counter-intuitively, offering lower prices and Subscription Fees for all users.
Nicola Blefari-melazzi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
ITNAC - Optimal pricing strategy for 5G in rural areas with unmanned aerial vehicles and large cells
2017 27th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC), 2017Co-Authors: Luca Chiaraviglio, Jairo A. Gutierrez, Nicola Blefari-melazziAbstract:We propose a business model to compute the monthly Subscription Fee for users served by an innovative 5G network architecture that is designed to serve rural zones. We consider two possible options to deploy the 5G cells. In the first case, the connectivity is provided by means of small cells mounted on top of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In the second case, large cells, covering wider portions of territory, are used. In both cases, we assume that the electricity can be sourced also from solar panels and batteries, which are installed on each cell site. We then propose an economic framework that, given the considered scenario and the equipment costs, is able to: i) compute the number of batteries and the solar panels power for each site, ii) estimate the number of cells to ensure coverage and to guarantee the service to the users, and iii) compute the monthly Subscription Fee to be charged to users, as well as the Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) and Operating Expenditures (OPEX) costs. Our results, obtained over the sampling areas of Frascati (Italy), Benevides (Brazil) and Rotorua (New Zealand), show that the proposed 5G architecture is feasible, i.e., the monthly Subscription Fee per user can be set less than 10 [€/month] for Frascati and Rotorua, and less than 2 [€/month] for Benevides.
-
An economic analysis of 5G Superfluid networks
IEEE International Conference on High Performance Switching and Routing HPSR, 2017Co-Authors: Luca Chiaraviglio, Bogdan Iatco, Nicola Blefari-melazzi, Carla-fabiana Chiasserini, Francesco Malandrino, Stefano SalsanoAbstract:© 2017 IEEE. We target the evaluation of a Superfluid 5G network from an economic point of view. The considered 5G architecture has notably features, such as flexibility, agility, portability and high performance, as shown by the H2020 SUPERFLUIDITY project. The proposed economic model, tailored to the Superfluid network architecture, allows to compute the CAPEX, the OPEX, the Net Present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Specifically, we apply our model to estimate the impact for the operator of migrating from a legacy 4G to a 5G network. Our preliminary results, obtained over two realistic case studies located in Bologna (Italy) and San Francisco (CA), show that the monthly Subscription Fee for the subscribers can be kept sufficiently low, i.e., typically around 5 [USD] per user, while allowing a profit for the operator.
-
Optimal pricing strategy for 5G in rural areas with unmanned aerial vehicles and large cells
2017 27th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC), 2017Co-Authors: Luca Chiaraviglio, Jairo A. Gutierrez, William Liu, Nicola Blefari-melazziAbstract:We propose a business model to compute the monthly Subscription Fee for users served by an innovative 5G network architecture that is designed to serve rural zones. We consider two possible options to deploy the 5G cells. In the first case, the connectivity is provided by means of small cells mounted on top of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In the second case, large cells, covering wider portions of territory, are used. In both cases, we assume that the electricity can be sourced also from solar panels and batteries, which are installed on each cell site. We then propose an economic framework that, given the considered scenario and the equipment costs, is able to: i) compute the number of batteries and the solar panels power for each site, ii) estimate the number of cells to ensure coverage and to guarantee the service to the users, and iii) compute the monthly Subscription Fee to be charged to users, as well as the Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) and Operating Expenditures (OPEX) costs. Our results, obtained over the sampling areas of Frascati (Italy), Benevides (Brazil) and Rotorua (New Zealand), show that the proposed 5G architecture is feasible, i.e., the monthly Subscription Fee per user can be set less than 10 [€/month] for Frascati and Rotorua, and less than 2 [€/month] for Benevides.
Alfredo De De Santis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
CIS - Modified Original Smart Cards and Smart Card Clone Countermeasures
2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2007), 2007Co-Authors: Alfredo De De Santis, Claudio SorienteAbstract:Conditional Access Systems are used in Pay-Tv Sys- tems to ensure conditional access to broadcasted data and charge subscribers a Subscription Fee. Smart cards are end- user security devices to store subscribers entitlements, re- quired to access data. On the other hand, pirates clone or modify smart cards to gain access to broadcasted data with- out paying any Fees. This paper presents new countermea- sures, based on fingerprints, to avoid smart cards cloning or modifying in Conditional Access Systems for digital Tv broadcasting.
-
Modified Original Smart Cards and Smart Card Clone Countermeasures
2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2007), 2007Co-Authors: Alfredo De De Santis, Claudio SorienteAbstract:Conditional Access Systems are used in Pay-Tv Sys- tems to ensure conditional access to broadcasted data and charge subscribers a Subscription Fee. Smart cards are end- user security devices to store subscribers entitlements, re- quired to access data. On the other hand, pirates clone or modify smart cards to gain access to broadcasted data with- out paying any Fees. This paper presents new countermea- sures, based on fingerprints, to avoid smart cards cloning or modifying in Conditional Access Systems for digital Tv broadcasting.
Qian Ma - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach
IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2018Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community network enables the individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence it can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model, each user’s best choice depends not only on his private information but also on other user’s choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that guarantees the user’s truthful information disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of the user choice, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields a maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi access price and Subscription Fee, regardless of the user mobility pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access prices and Subscription Fees for users.
-
Technical Report for "Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach".
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community network enables individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model each user's best choice depends not only on his private information but also on other users' choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that guarantees the users' truthful information disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of user choice, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields the maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi access price and Subscription Fee, regardless of the user mobility pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access prices and Subscription Fees for users.
-
Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach
2018Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community network enables individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model each user's best choice depends not only on his private information but also on other users' choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that guarantees the users' truthful information disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of user choice, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields the maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi access price and Subscription Fee, regardless of the user mobility pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access prices and Subscription Fees for users.
-
WiOpt - A contract-based incentive mechanism for crowdsourced wireless community networks
2016 14th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2016Co-Authors: Qian Ma, Jianwei HuangAbstract:Crowdsourced wireless community networks enable individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a low deployment cost. This paper presents the first Wi-Fi sharing mechanism design for the community network operator under incomplete information, where the quality of each user-provided Wi-Fi access is his private information. Specifically, we propose a contract-based incentive mechanism, where the operator offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others who access his AP) and a Subscription Fee (that a user needs to pay the operator). Different from prior contract mechanisms for wireless networks, here each user's best contract choice depends not only on his private information, but also on other users' choices. This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice of each single user. We derive the feasible contract that guarantees the user participation and truthful information disclosure under the equilibrium. Our analysis shows that a higher type user (who provides a higher quality access) is more likely to choose a higher price and Subscription Fee. Simulation results further show that when increasing the ratio of higher type users in the system, the operator can gain more profit, while counter-intuitively, offering lower prices and Subscription Fees for all users.
