The Experts below are selected from a list of 12168 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Suleiman A. Mourad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period - Ibn ʿAsākir and the Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Twelfth Century
The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period, 2013Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
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The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period - The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period
2013Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
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The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period - Ibn ʿAsākir’s Forty Hadiths and the Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in Thirteenth-Century Damascus
The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period, 2013Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
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the intensification and reorientation of Sunni jihad ideology in the crusader period
2012Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
Anna Hanson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the theory of legal cynicism and Sunni insurgent violence in post invasion iraq
American Sociological Review, 2016Co-Authors: John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser, Anna HansonAbstract:We elaborate a cultural framing theory of legal cynicism—previously used to account for neighborhood variation in Chicago homicides—to explain Arab Sunni victimization and insurgent attacks during the U.S. post-invasion occupation of Iraq. Legal cynicism theory has an unrecognized power to explain collective and interpersonal violence in international as well as U.S. settings. We expand on how “double and linked” roles of state and non-state actors can be used to analyze violence against Arab Sunni civilians. Arab Sunnis responded to reports of unnecessary violent attacks by U.S./Coalition soldiers with a legally cynical framing of the U.S./Coalition-led invasion and occupation, the new Shia-dominated Iraqi state, and its military and police. A post-invasion frame amplification of beliefs about state-based illegitimacy, unresponsiveness, and insecurity made it not only possible but predictable that Arab Sunni insurgent attacks would continue against U.S./Coalition forces and transfer to Shia-dominated Ira...
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The Theory of Legal Cynicism and Sunni Insurgency in Post-Invasion Iraq
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser, Anna HansonAbstract:Arab Sunni attacks and casualties in post-invasion Iraq are poorly explained by static ethnic, religious, or sectarian values involving the acceptability of violence. Alternatively, we elaborate a cultural framing theory of legal cynicism previously used to account for neighborhood variation in Chicago homicides: legal cynicism theory has an unrecognized power to explain collective and interpersonal violence in international as well as American settings. We expand on how “double and linked” roles of state and non-state actors can be used with this theory to analyze the consequences of unnecessary attacks on Arab Sunni civilians by U.S.-led forces and by Iraq military and police forces. Arab Sunnis responded to attacks with a legally cynical cultural framing of the U.S./Coalition invasion and occupation, the new Shia-dominated Iraq state, and its military and police. This post-invasion frame amplification of beliefs about state-based illegitimacy, unresponsiveness, and insecurity made it not only possible but predictable that Arab Sunni insurgent attacks would continue against U.S./Coalition forces and transfer to Shia-dominated Iraq government forces. Thus, violence in Iraq persisted during and despite Surge and Awakening efforts to end the Arab Sunni insurgency.
James E. Lindsay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period - Ibn ʿAsākir and the Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Twelfth Century
The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period, 2013Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
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The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period - The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period
2013Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
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The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period - Ibn ʿAsākir’s Forty Hadiths and the Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in Thirteenth-Century Damascus
The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period, 2013Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
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the intensification and reorientation of Sunni jihad ideology in the crusader period
2012Co-Authors: James E. Lindsay, Suleiman A. MouradAbstract:The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology provides an account of the preaching of a revitalized vision of jihad in Crusader-era Syria by Sunni scholars, including Ibn ʿAsākir, as a major propaganda tool of the Counter-Crusade and Sunni revival.
John Hagan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the theory of legal cynicism and Sunni insurgent violence in post invasion iraq
American Sociological Review, 2016Co-Authors: John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser, Anna HansonAbstract:We elaborate a cultural framing theory of legal cynicism—previously used to account for neighborhood variation in Chicago homicides—to explain Arab Sunni victimization and insurgent attacks during the U.S. post-invasion occupation of Iraq. Legal cynicism theory has an unrecognized power to explain collective and interpersonal violence in international as well as U.S. settings. We expand on how “double and linked” roles of state and non-state actors can be used to analyze violence against Arab Sunni civilians. Arab Sunnis responded to reports of unnecessary violent attacks by U.S./Coalition soldiers with a legally cynical framing of the U.S./Coalition-led invasion and occupation, the new Shia-dominated Iraqi state, and its military and police. A post-invasion frame amplification of beliefs about state-based illegitimacy, unresponsiveness, and insecurity made it not only possible but predictable that Arab Sunni insurgent attacks would continue against U.S./Coalition forces and transfer to Shia-dominated Ira...
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The Theory of Legal Cynicism and Sunni Insurgency in Post-Invasion Iraq
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser, Anna HansonAbstract:Arab Sunni attacks and casualties in post-invasion Iraq are poorly explained by static ethnic, religious, or sectarian values involving the acceptability of violence. Alternatively, we elaborate a cultural framing theory of legal cynicism previously used to account for neighborhood variation in Chicago homicides: legal cynicism theory has an unrecognized power to explain collective and interpersonal violence in international as well as American settings. We expand on how “double and linked” roles of state and non-state actors can be used with this theory to analyze the consequences of unnecessary attacks on Arab Sunni civilians by U.S.-led forces and by Iraq military and police forces. Arab Sunnis responded to attacks with a legally cynical cultural framing of the U.S./Coalition invasion and occupation, the new Shia-dominated Iraq state, and its military and police. This post-invasion frame amplification of beliefs about state-based illegitimacy, unresponsiveness, and insecurity made it not only possible but predictable that Arab Sunni insurgent attacks would continue against U.S./Coalition forces and transfer to Shia-dominated Iraq government forces. Thus, violence in Iraq persisted during and despite Surge and Awakening efforts to end the Arab Sunni insurgency.
Mohammed Nuruzzaman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Contemporary Shia–Sunni Sectarian Violence
International Relations, 2019Co-Authors: Mohammed NuruzzamanAbstract:Religious violence, primarily stemming from Shia–Sunni conflicts, has occupied the center stage in contemporary Middle East. It’s most recent brutal expression, which is viewed as a symptom rather than the cause, is the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS; also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; ISIL) in the summer of 2014 and the violence it unleashed against the Shias, the anti-ISIS Sunnis and other non-Muslim groups across and beyond the Middle East. The violence did not erupt suddenly, however: it is an outcome of a myriad of complex historical, religious, political, economic, and geopolitical factors. Historically, tensions between Islam’s two rival sects, the Shias and the Sunnis, have existed, especially after the Battle of Karbala in 680 (which saw the defeat of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad and the younger son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth caliph of Islam, at the hand of Damascus-based Umayyad Caliph Yazid I), mostly in abeyance but occasionally resulting in encounters. In the contemporary context, a host of factors, most notably external interventions including the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the minority Sunni-led Saddam Hussein government, the sectarianization of politics by the Gulf Arab monarchs, Iran, and other dictatorial regimes in the region to consolidate regime survival, and the geopolitical competitions for power and influence between the region’s two archrivals: the Shia powerhouse Iran and the self-proclaimed defender of the Sunnis, Saudi Arabia, have greatly abetted violence between Islam’s two rival sects. Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria are the battleground states where the two regional heavyweights, being aided by two extra-regional powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, are jostling and jockeying to edge each other out to claim regional preeminence. The malaise of sectarian violence took a more serious toll on the peoples and societies in the region after the outbreak of Arab movements for democracy, what is dubbed the Arab Spring, in December 2010 and what is continuing today. This article partially originates from the author’s research project “Shia – Sunni Sectarian Violence and Middle East Regional Security” funded by the European Union and tenable at Durham University, U.K.
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Conflicts in Sunni Political Islam and Their Implications
Strategic Analysis, 2017Co-Authors: Mohammed NuruzzamanAbstract:Traditionally, the Shi’a–Sunni divide and the associated dynamics of the geopolitical struggle for power and dominance, between the minority Shi’as and the majority Sunnis, have defined intra-Islamic relations. Often sidelined were the political differences between and among groups and movements within Shi’a as well as Sunni Islam. This paper seeks to examine the ideological and political conflicts between the two dominant brands of Sunni political Islam – the conservative Islamists led by Saudi Arabia and the militant Islamists who grouped first under the banner of al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State. It briefly traces the origins of both brands of Sunni political Islam, maps out their goals and strategies, and highlights their implications for the Middle East region and the West at large. The paper concludes that militant Sunni political Islam has emerged as a dominant entity and it poses the most dreadful challenge to contemporary Middle East region and the West.
