The Experts below are selected from a list of 34578 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Steven A Sharpe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Rents and Quasi Rents in the Wage Structure: Evidence from Hostile Takeovers
Industrial Relations, 1996Co-Authors: David Neumark, Steven A SharpeAbstract:We test whether industry-related variation in wage premium and slopes of wage profiles reflects payments of rents or quasi rents, taking our cue from the wealth-transfer hypothesis, which argues that hostile Takeovers target such rents. If these wage structure characteristics reflect extramarginal payments, then hostile Takeover attempts that sought to transfer wealth from workers to shareholders should have targeted firms with the highest wage premia or the steepest wage profiles. We find that the likelihood of being a hostile Takeover target between 1979 and 1989 was generally unrelated to these industry-related characteristics of the wage structure.
David Neumark - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Rents and Quasi Rents in the Wage Structure: Evidence from Hostile Takeovers
Industrial Relations, 1996Co-Authors: David Neumark, Steven A SharpeAbstract:We test whether industry-related variation in wage premium and slopes of wage profiles reflects payments of rents or quasi rents, taking our cue from the wealth-transfer hypothesis, which argues that hostile Takeovers target such rents. If these wage structure characteristics reflect extramarginal payments, then hostile Takeover attempts that sought to transfer wealth from workers to shareholders should have targeted firms with the highest wage premia or the steepest wage profiles. We find that the likelihood of being a hostile Takeover target between 1979 and 1989 was generally unrelated to these industry-related characteristics of the wage structure.
Serguey Braguinsky - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers
The American Economic Review, 2004Co-Authors: Boyan Jovanovic, Serguey BraguinskyAbstract:When a Takeover is announced, the sum of the stock-market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that Takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of Takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet, upon news of a Takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.
Boyan Jovanovic - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers
The American Economic Review, 2004Co-Authors: Boyan Jovanovic, Serguey BraguinskyAbstract:When a Takeover is announced, the sum of the stock-market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that Takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of Takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet, upon news of a Takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.
Harold J Mulherin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
do auctions induce a winner s curse new evidence from the corporate Takeover market
Journal of Financial Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Audra L Boone, Harold J MulherinAbstract:We contrast the winner's curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate Takeovers. The winner's curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the Takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target. Our measure of Takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a Takeover. In our empirical estimation, we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in Takeover deals. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to Takeover competition. We also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns. Related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding. Analysis of post-Takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of Takeover competition. As a whole, the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate Takeovers stem not from the winner's curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids.
-
the impact of industry shocks on Takeover and restructuring activity
Journal of Financial Economics, 1996Co-Authors: Mark L Mitchell, Harold J MulherinAbstract:Abstract We study industry-level patterns in Takeover and restructuring activity during the 1982–1989 period. Across 51 industries, we find significant differences in both the rate and time-series clustering of these activities. The interindustry patterns in the rate of Takeovers and restructurings are directly related to the economic shocks borne by the sample industries. These results support the argument that much of the Takeover activity during the 1980s was driven by broad fundamental factors and have general implications for the stock price spillover effects of Takeover announcements, corporate performance following Takeovers, and the timing of Takeover waves.
