The Experts below are selected from a list of 24264 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Matthias Sutter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the hidden costs of Tax Evasion collaborative Tax Evasion in markets for expert services
Journal of Public Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias SutterAbstract:Abstract We experimentally examine the impact of Tax Evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the goods. Our results suggest that Tax Evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover Taxable transactions, by imposing risk on uncertainty-averse Tax evaders and by distorting competition, but also by creating an additional efficiency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting possible gains from trade and by inducing insufficient quality provision. We call these the hidden costs of Tax Evasion.
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the hidden costs of Tax Evasion collaborative Tax Evasion in markets for expert services
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias SutterAbstract:We experimentally examine the impact of Tax Evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the good. Our results suggest that Tax Evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover Taxable transactions, by imposing risk on risk-averse Tax evaders and by distorting competition, but also by creating an additional efficiency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting possible gains from trade and by inducing insufficient quality provision. We call this the hidden costs of Tax Evasion.
Antung Anthony Liu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tax Evasion and optimal environmental Taxes
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013Co-Authors: Antung Anthony LiuAbstract:Abstract This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental Taxes in modern Tax systems. Some environmental Taxes, particularly Taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than Taxes on labor or income. When the Tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental Taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of Tax Evasion. Using a carbon Tax as a motivating example, the “Tax Evasion effect” is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering Tax Evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28% in the United States, by 89% in China, and by 97% in India. In countries with high levels of pre-existing Tax Evasion, a carbon Tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the Tax system.
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Tax Evasion and Optimal Environmental Taxes
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012Co-Authors: Antung Anthony LiuAbstract:This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental Taxes in modern Tax systems. Some environmental Taxes, particularly Taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than Taxes on labor or income. When the Tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental Taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of Tax Evasion. Using a carbon Tax as a motivating example, the "Tax Evasion effect" is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering Tax Evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28 percent in the United States, by 89 percent in China, and by 97 percent in India. In countries with high levels of preexisting Tax Evasion, a carbon Tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the Tax system.
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Tax Evasion and the Double Dividend
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010Co-Authors: Antung Anthony LiuAbstract:This paper examines the implications of a “Tax Evasion effect” when revenues from an environmental Tax are used to reduce other Taxes. Tax Evasion is modeled as a costly and unproductive firm activity. When the Tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward environmental Taxes, the corresponding shifts in the costs of Evasion are shown to sharply decrease the welfare cost reported in earlier work. Our key assumption is that the environmental Tax, such as a Tax on gasoline levied at the refinery, is less evadable than other Taxes such as those on labor income. Since Tax Evasion is typically higher in developing countries, the Tax Evasion effect should be particularly relevant to policymakers in those countries. A simple computable general equilibrium model focused on carbon dioxide emissions is used to illustrate the potential magnitude of the effect. For a 10% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, the welfare cost of using a price instrument such as a carbon Tax is 28% lower in the United States taking into account the Tax Evasion effect, 87% lower in China, and 111% lower in India. The broad implication of this paper is that shifting to environmental Taxes in the presence of substantial levels of pre-existing Tax Evasion may not be nearly so harmful to economic welfare as previously thought.
Dirk Niepelt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Timing Tax Evasion
Journal of Public Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Dirk NiepeltAbstract:Standard models of Tax Evasion implicitly assume that Evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior Evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior Tax Evasion rates: First, fines increasing in the duration of an Evasion spell, implying that the expected costs of Evasion increase convexly with the time spent non-reporting, while the benefits increase linearly. Second, different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between Evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to Tax Evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on Tax Evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of Tax Evasion dynamics.
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Timing Tax Evasion
Research Papers in Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Dirk NiepeltAbstract:Standard models of Tax Evasion implicitly assume that Evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior Evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior Tax Evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an Evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between Evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to Tax Evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on Tax Evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of Tax Evasion dynamics.
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Tax Evasion Dynamics
Research Papers in Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Dirk NiepeltAbstract:I study the dynamic Tax Evasion program of a household with many sources of income. Contrary to the previous literature, I assume that the detection risk of Tax Evasion is uncorrelated across these sources. If detection triggers the repayment of currently and previously evaded Taxes, the marginal cost of Evasion increases over time and the optimal duration of Evasion is positive but finite. With stochastic pre-Tax income, the fraction of aggregate Taxes evaded remains interior, even if detection triggers duration-independent penalties. The model helps to understand the recent European debate about the cross-border exchange of information about capital income as opposed to Taxation at the source. It yields a transparent representation of the revenue and efficiency losses due to Tax Evasion and highlights various effects of Tax policy on Evasion.
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Tax Evasion Dynamics
2003Co-Authors: Dirk NiepeltAbstract:I study the dynamic Tax Evasion program of a household with many sources of income. Contrary to the previous literature, I assume that the detection risk of Tax Evasion is uncorrelated across these ...
Rudolf Kerschbamer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the hidden costs of Tax Evasion collaborative Tax Evasion in markets for expert services
Journal of Public Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias SutterAbstract:Abstract We experimentally examine the impact of Tax Evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the goods. Our results suggest that Tax Evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover Taxable transactions, by imposing risk on uncertainty-averse Tax evaders and by distorting competition, but also by creating an additional efficiency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting possible gains from trade and by inducing insufficient quality provision. We call these the hidden costs of Tax Evasion.
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the hidden costs of Tax Evasion collaborative Tax Evasion in markets for expert services
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias SutterAbstract:We experimentally examine the impact of Tax Evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the good. Our results suggest that Tax Evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover Taxable transactions, by imposing risk on risk-averse Tax evaders and by distorting competition, but also by creating an additional efficiency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting possible gains from trade and by inducing insufficient quality provision. We call this the hidden costs of Tax Evasion.
Loukas Balafoutas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the hidden costs of Tax Evasion collaborative Tax Evasion in markets for expert services
Journal of Public Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias SutterAbstract:Abstract We experimentally examine the impact of Tax Evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the goods. Our results suggest that Tax Evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover Taxable transactions, by imposing risk on uncertainty-averse Tax evaders and by distorting competition, but also by creating an additional efficiency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting possible gains from trade and by inducing insufficient quality provision. We call these the hidden costs of Tax Evasion.
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the hidden costs of Tax Evasion collaborative Tax Evasion in markets for expert services
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias SutterAbstract:We experimentally examine the impact of Tax Evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the good. Our results suggest that Tax Evasion attempts – independently of whether they are successful or not – lead to efficiency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover Taxable transactions, by imposing risk on risk-averse Tax evaders and by distorting competition, but also by creating an additional efficiency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting possible gains from trade and by inducing insufficient quality provision. We call this the hidden costs of Tax Evasion.
