The Experts below are selected from a list of 108 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Michael Kremer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
Journal of Public Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:This brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study, entitled School governance, Teacher incentives, and pupil-Teacher ratios : experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools, conducted between 2005 and 2006 in Kenya. The study observed the impact of a program under which Kenyan parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) at randomly selected schools were funded to hire an additional Teacher on a renewable contract, outside normal ministry of education civil service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels on the student, Teacher, and school level. Despite a dramatic reduction in class size, the program generated little improvement for students who remained in the standard system. Civil service Teachers were 13 points less likely to be found in class teaching if their school received funding to hire a contract Teacher. The program increased test scores by 28 percent of a standard deviation for those students assigned to PTA contract Teachers. There is strong evidence that locally hired and monitored Teachers had better incentives, they were 15 percent more likely to be in class teaching during unannounced spot checks. The school based management program had significant positive impacts on the tendency for civil service Teachers to cut effort in response to introduction of a contract Teacher. Funding for the study derived from the World Bank, Government of Netherlands.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
2012Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice Teachers on short-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA Teachers earned approximately one-quarter as much as Teachers operating under central government civil-service institutions but were absent one day per week less and their students learned more. In the weak institutional environment we study, civil-service Teachers responded to the program along two margins: first, they reduced their effort in response to the drop in the pupil-Teacher ratio, and second, they influenced PTA committees to hire their relatives. Both effects reduced the educational impact of the program. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs mitigated both effects. Better performing contract Teachers are more likely to transition into civil-service positions and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits of contract Teacher programs on the Teacher workforce.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:Some education policymakers focus on bringing down pupil-Teacher ratios. Others argue that resources will have limited impact without systematic reforms to education governance, Teacher incentives, and pedagogy. We examine a program under which Kenyan Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) at randomly selected schools were funded to hire an additional Teacher on an annual contract renewable conditional on performance, outside normal Ministry of Education civil-service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels. For students randomly assigned to stay with existing classes, test scores did not increase significantly, despite a reduction in class size from 82 to 44 on average. In contrast, scores increased for students assigned to be taught by locally-hired contract Teachers. One reason may be that contract Teachers had low absence rates, while centrally-hired civil-service Teachers in schools randomly assigned PTA contract Teachers endogenously reduced their effort. Civil-service Teachers also captured rents for their families, with approximately 1/3 of contract Teacher positions going to relatives of existing Teachers. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs reduced both forms of capture. The best contract Teachers obtained civil service jobs over time, and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits from supplementing a civil service system with locally-hired contract Teachers brought in on a probationary basis and granted tenure conditional on performance.
Esther Duflo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
Journal of Public Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:This brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study, entitled School governance, Teacher incentives, and pupil-Teacher ratios : experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools, conducted between 2005 and 2006 in Kenya. The study observed the impact of a program under which Kenyan parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) at randomly selected schools were funded to hire an additional Teacher on a renewable contract, outside normal ministry of education civil service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels on the student, Teacher, and school level. Despite a dramatic reduction in class size, the program generated little improvement for students who remained in the standard system. Civil service Teachers were 13 points less likely to be found in class teaching if their school received funding to hire a contract Teacher. The program increased test scores by 28 percent of a standard deviation for those students assigned to PTA contract Teachers. There is strong evidence that locally hired and monitored Teachers had better incentives, they were 15 percent more likely to be in class teaching during unannounced spot checks. The school based management program had significant positive impacts on the tendency for civil service Teachers to cut effort in response to introduction of a contract Teacher. Funding for the study derived from the World Bank, Government of Netherlands.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
2012Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice Teachers on short-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA Teachers earned approximately one-quarter as much as Teachers operating under central government civil-service institutions but were absent one day per week less and their students learned more. In the weak institutional environment we study, civil-service Teachers responded to the program along two margins: first, they reduced their effort in response to the drop in the pupil-Teacher ratio, and second, they influenced PTA committees to hire their relatives. Both effects reduced the educational impact of the program. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs mitigated both effects. Better performing contract Teachers are more likely to transition into civil-service positions and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits of contract Teacher programs on the Teacher workforce.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:Some education policymakers focus on bringing down pupil-Teacher ratios. Others argue that resources will have limited impact without systematic reforms to education governance, Teacher incentives, and pedagogy. We examine a program under which Kenyan Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) at randomly selected schools were funded to hire an additional Teacher on an annual contract renewable conditional on performance, outside normal Ministry of Education civil-service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels. For students randomly assigned to stay with existing classes, test scores did not increase significantly, despite a reduction in class size from 82 to 44 on average. In contrast, scores increased for students assigned to be taught by locally-hired contract Teachers. One reason may be that contract Teachers had low absence rates, while centrally-hired civil-service Teachers in schools randomly assigned PTA contract Teachers endogenously reduced their effort. Civil-service Teachers also captured rents for their families, with approximately 1/3 of contract Teacher positions going to relatives of existing Teachers. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs reduced both forms of capture. The best contract Teachers obtained civil service jobs over time, and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits from supplementing a civil service system with locally-hired contract Teachers brought in on a probationary basis and granted tenure conditional on performance.
Pascaline Dupas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
Journal of Public Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:This brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study, entitled School governance, Teacher incentives, and pupil-Teacher ratios : experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools, conducted between 2005 and 2006 in Kenya. The study observed the impact of a program under which Kenyan parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) at randomly selected schools were funded to hire an additional Teacher on a renewable contract, outside normal ministry of education civil service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels on the student, Teacher, and school level. Despite a dramatic reduction in class size, the program generated little improvement for students who remained in the standard system. Civil service Teachers were 13 points less likely to be found in class teaching if their school received funding to hire a contract Teacher. The program increased test scores by 28 percent of a standard deviation for those students assigned to PTA contract Teachers. There is strong evidence that locally hired and monitored Teachers had better incentives, they were 15 percent more likely to be in class teaching during unannounced spot checks. The school based management program had significant positive impacts on the tendency for civil service Teachers to cut effort in response to introduction of a contract Teacher. Funding for the study derived from the World Bank, Government of Netherlands.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
2012Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice Teachers on short-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA Teachers earned approximately one-quarter as much as Teachers operating under central government civil-service institutions but were absent one day per week less and their students learned more. In the weak institutional environment we study, civil-service Teachers responded to the program along two margins: first, they reduced their effort in response to the drop in the pupil-Teacher ratio, and second, they influenced PTA committees to hire their relatives. Both effects reduced the educational impact of the program. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs mitigated both effects. Better performing contract Teachers are more likely to transition into civil-service positions and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits of contract Teacher programs on the Teacher workforce.
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school governance Teacher incentives and pupil Teacher ratios experimental evidence from kenyan primary schools
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael KremerAbstract:Some education policymakers focus on bringing down pupil-Teacher ratios. Others argue that resources will have limited impact without systematic reforms to education governance, Teacher incentives, and pedagogy. We examine a program under which Kenyan Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) at randomly selected schools were funded to hire an additional Teacher on an annual contract renewable conditional on performance, outside normal Ministry of Education civil-service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels. For students randomly assigned to stay with existing classes, test scores did not increase significantly, despite a reduction in class size from 82 to 44 on average. In contrast, scores increased for students assigned to be taught by locally-hired contract Teachers. One reason may be that contract Teachers had low absence rates, while centrally-hired civil-service Teachers in schools randomly assigned PTA contract Teachers endogenously reduced their effort. Civil-service Teachers also captured rents for their families, with approximately 1/3 of contract Teacher positions going to relatives of existing Teachers. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs reduced both forms of capture. The best contract Teachers obtained civil service jobs over time, and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits from supplementing a civil service system with locally-hired contract Teachers brought in on a probationary basis and granted tenure conditional on performance.
Christine Aduyeboah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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mapping the incidence of school dropouts a case study of communities in northern ghana
Comparative Education, 2009Co-Authors: Joseph Ghartey Ampiah, Christine AduyeboahAbstract:This paper examines the issue of school dropout in six communities in the Savelugu‐Nanton District in the Northern Region of Ghana. The study focused on 89 children (64 boys and 25 girls) aged 7–16 years, who had dropped out of school. A snowballing sampling method was employed to recruit participants to the study. Two researchers interviewed the children using semi‐structured interview schedules over a period of three weeks. School dropouts were asked to tell their own stories about their schooling experiences and the factors which led to them leaving school. From their accounts dropping out of school appears to be the result of a series of events involving a range of interrelated factors, rather than a single factor. The complex nature of the processes leading to dropout demands input from various actors (i.e. Teachers, head Teachers, parent‐Teacher Associations, school management committees and community members) to detect and address at‐risk factors early in order to reduce the likelihood of dropout.
Joseph Ghartey Ampiah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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mapping the incidence of school dropouts a case study of communities in northern ghana
Comparative Education, 2009Co-Authors: Joseph Ghartey Ampiah, Christine AduyeboahAbstract:This paper examines the issue of school dropout in six communities in the Savelugu‐Nanton District in the Northern Region of Ghana. The study focused on 89 children (64 boys and 25 girls) aged 7–16 years, who had dropped out of school. A snowballing sampling method was employed to recruit participants to the study. Two researchers interviewed the children using semi‐structured interview schedules over a period of three weeks. School dropouts were asked to tell their own stories about their schooling experiences and the factors which led to them leaving school. From their accounts dropping out of school appears to be the result of a series of events involving a range of interrelated factors, rather than a single factor. The complex nature of the processes leading to dropout demands input from various actors (i.e. Teachers, head Teachers, parent‐Teacher Associations, school management committees and community members) to detect and address at‐risk factors early in order to reduce the likelihood of dropout.
