The Experts below are selected from a list of 14169 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Makoto Yokoo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems, 2005Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and Prices of exchange are controlled by the Threshold Price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.
-
A double auction protocol robust to false‐name bids
Electronics and Communications in Japan (Part II: Electronics), 2005Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:The auction is a fast-developing, important area of electronic commerce in which software agent techniques are expected to find promising applications. By the use of the Internet, large-scale auctions can be realized at low cost. On the other hand, there arises the problem of illegal conduct of a new type, utilizing the name-concealment properties of the network. This paper proposes a new double auction protocol guaranteeing robustness to false-name bids, which constitute one type of such illegal conduct. The double auction is an auction in which multiple buyers/sellers exist and engage in bidding. It is widely used in dealing with foreign currency, credit, stocks, and other goods. For cases in which there is no false-name bid, the double auction protocol (PMD protocol) has been proposed, which is motivation-compatible in the dominant strategy. Considering the possible case in which the seller pretends to be a buyer and bids under another name, it is possible in the PMD protocol for the bidder to increase his benefit by a false-name bid. Thus, motivation compatibility is not guaranteed. This paper proposes the Threshold Price double auction protocol (TPD), which is motivation-compatible in the dominant strategy even if false-name bids are possible. The TPD protocol has the feature that the number of deals and the Prices of deals are controlled by using the Threshold Price of the good. It is shown by simulation experiments that the TPD protocol realizes a social surplus which is very close to the Pareto-efficient assignment by appropriately setting the Threshold Price. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electron Comm Jpn Pt 2, 88(5): 50–59, 2005; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/ecjb.20180
-
A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values
Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, 2004Co-Authors: Yuko Sakurai, Makoto YokooAbstract:We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the Threshold Price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.
-
AAMAS - A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '03, 2003Co-Authors: Yuko Sakurai, Makoto YokooAbstract:We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments.In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the Threshold Price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.
-
ICDCS - Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Proceedings 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:Internet auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Double auctions are an important subclass of auction protocols that permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a good, and have been widely used in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible. On the other hand, if we consider the possibility of false-name bids, the PMD protocol is no longer dominant-strategy incentive compatible. We develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit false-name bids. The characteristics of the TPD protocol is that the number of trades and Prices of exchange are controlled by the Threshold Price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.
Joe H Chow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
store or sell a Threshold Price policy for revenue maximization in windfarms with on site storage
Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, 2016Co-Authors: Zamiyad Dar, Koushik Kar, Joe H ChowAbstract:We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue of a windfarm with on-site storage, and propose and analyze a scheme for a windfarm to store or sell energy based on a Threshold Price. The Threshold Price is calculated based on long-term distributions of the electricity Price and wind power generation processes, and is chosen so as to balance the energy flows in and out of the storage-equipped windfarm. We apply our method on real time data from a windfarm in New York, along with real time electricity Prices from NYISO for the same region and time period. Comparing it with the optimal policy that has knowledge of the future, we observe that the revenue obtained by our Threshold policy increases as the storage capacity is increased, and is approximately 90% of the maximum attainable revenue at a storage capacity of 10–15 times the power rating.
-
CISS - Store or sell? A Threshold Price policy for revenue maximization in windfarms with on-site storage
2016 Annual Conference on Information Science and Systems (CISS), 2016Co-Authors: Zamiyad Dar, Koushik Kar, Joe H ChowAbstract:We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue of a windfarm with on-site storage, and propose and analyze a scheme for a windfarm to store or sell energy based on a Threshold Price. The Threshold Price is calculated based on long-term distributions of the electricity Price and wind power generation processes, and is chosen so as to balance the energy flows in and out of the storage-equipped windfarm. We apply our method on real time data from a windfarm in New York, along with real time electricity Prices from NYISO for the same region and time period. Comparing it with the optimal policy that has knowledge of the future, we observe that the revenue obtained by our Threshold policy increases as the storage capacity is increased, and is approximately 90% of the maximum attainable revenue at a storage capacity of 10–15 times the power rating.
Shigeo Matsubara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems, 2005Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and Prices of exchange are controlled by the Threshold Price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.
-
A double auction protocol robust to false‐name bids
Electronics and Communications in Japan (Part II: Electronics), 2005Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:The auction is a fast-developing, important area of electronic commerce in which software agent techniques are expected to find promising applications. By the use of the Internet, large-scale auctions can be realized at low cost. On the other hand, there arises the problem of illegal conduct of a new type, utilizing the name-concealment properties of the network. This paper proposes a new double auction protocol guaranteeing robustness to false-name bids, which constitute one type of such illegal conduct. The double auction is an auction in which multiple buyers/sellers exist and engage in bidding. It is widely used in dealing with foreign currency, credit, stocks, and other goods. For cases in which there is no false-name bid, the double auction protocol (PMD protocol) has been proposed, which is motivation-compatible in the dominant strategy. Considering the possible case in which the seller pretends to be a buyer and bids under another name, it is possible in the PMD protocol for the bidder to increase his benefit by a false-name bid. Thus, motivation compatibility is not guaranteed. This paper proposes the Threshold Price double auction protocol (TPD), which is motivation-compatible in the dominant strategy even if false-name bids are possible. The TPD protocol has the feature that the number of deals and the Prices of deals are controlled by using the Threshold Price of the good. It is shown by simulation experiments that the TPD protocol realizes a social surplus which is very close to the Pareto-efficient assignment by appropriately setting the Threshold Price. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electron Comm Jpn Pt 2, 88(5): 50–59, 2005; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/ecjb.20180
-
ICDCS - Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Proceedings 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:Internet auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Double auctions are an important subclass of auction protocols that permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a good, and have been widely used in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible. On the other hand, if we consider the possibility of false-name bids, the PMD protocol is no longer dominant-strategy incentive compatible. We develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit false-name bids. The characteristics of the TPD protocol is that the number of trades and Prices of exchange are controlled by the Threshold Price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.
Gregorio Levis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
hydrogen as a long term large scale energy storage solution when coupled with renewable energy sources or grids with dynamic electricity pricing schemes
International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 2020Co-Authors: Ahmad Mayyas, Max Wei, Gregorio LevisAbstract:Abstract One of the key challenges that still facing the adoption of renewable energy systems is having a powerful energy storage system (ESS) that can store energy at peak production periods and return it back when the demand exceeds the supply. In this paper, we discuss the costs associated with storing excess energy from power grids in the form of hydrogen using proton exchange membrane (PEM) reversible fuel cells (RFC). The PEM-RFC system is designed to have dual functions: (1) to use electricity from the wholesale electricity market when the wholesale Price reaches low competitive values, use it to produce hydrogen and then convert it back to electricity when the Prices are competitive, and (2) to produce hydrogen at low costs to be used in other applications such as a fuel for fuel cell electric vehicles. The main goal of the model is to minimize the levelized cost of energy storage (LCOS), thus the LCOS is used as the key measure for evaluating this economic point. LCOS in many regions in United States can reach competitive costs, for example lowest LCOS can reach 16.4¢/kWh in Illinois (MISO trading hub) when the Threshold wholesale electricity Price is set at $25/MWh, and 19.9¢/kWh in Texas (ERCOT trading hub) at Threshold Price of $20/MWh. Similarly, the levelized cost of hydrogen production shows that hydrogen can be produced at very competitive costs, for example the levelized cost of hydrogen production can reach $2.54/kg-H2 when using electricity from MISO hub. This value is close to the target set by the U.S. Department of Energy.
Yuko Sakurai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems, 2005Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and Prices of exchange are controlled by the Threshold Price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.
-
A double auction protocol robust to false‐name bids
Electronics and Communications in Japan (Part II: Electronics), 2005Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:The auction is a fast-developing, important area of electronic commerce in which software agent techniques are expected to find promising applications. By the use of the Internet, large-scale auctions can be realized at low cost. On the other hand, there arises the problem of illegal conduct of a new type, utilizing the name-concealment properties of the network. This paper proposes a new double auction protocol guaranteeing robustness to false-name bids, which constitute one type of such illegal conduct. The double auction is an auction in which multiple buyers/sellers exist and engage in bidding. It is widely used in dealing with foreign currency, credit, stocks, and other goods. For cases in which there is no false-name bid, the double auction protocol (PMD protocol) has been proposed, which is motivation-compatible in the dominant strategy. Considering the possible case in which the seller pretends to be a buyer and bids under another name, it is possible in the PMD protocol for the bidder to increase his benefit by a false-name bid. Thus, motivation compatibility is not guaranteed. This paper proposes the Threshold Price double auction protocol (TPD), which is motivation-compatible in the dominant strategy even if false-name bids are possible. The TPD protocol has the feature that the number of deals and the Prices of deals are controlled by using the Threshold Price of the good. It is shown by simulation experiments that the TPD protocol realizes a social surplus which is very close to the Pareto-efficient assignment by appropriately setting the Threshold Price. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electron Comm Jpn Pt 2, 88(5): 50–59, 2005; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/ecjb.20180
-
A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values
Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, 2004Co-Authors: Yuko Sakurai, Makoto YokooAbstract:We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the Threshold Price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.
-
AAMAS - A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '03, 2003Co-Authors: Yuko Sakurai, Makoto YokooAbstract:We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments.In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the Threshold Price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.
-
ICDCS - Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Proceedings 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1Co-Authors: Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo MatsubaraAbstract:Internet auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Double auctions are an important subclass of auction protocols that permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a good, and have been widely used in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible. On the other hand, if we consider the possibility of false-name bids, the PMD protocol is no longer dominant-strategy incentive compatible. We develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit false-name bids. The characteristics of the TPD protocol is that the number of trades and Prices of exchange are controlled by the Threshold Price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.
