The Experts below are selected from a list of 393 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Aiman Erbad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    Computers & Security, 2020
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    Abstract With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting publicly available information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor Hidden Services could lead to deanonymization of these Services’ users. Such linking is possible by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

  • when a small leak sinks a great ship deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2018
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor Hidden Services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor Hidden Service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

Nicolas Christin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • traveling the silk road a measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace
    The Web Conference, 2013
    Co-Authors: Nicolas Christin
    Abstract:

    We perform a comprehensive measurement analysis of Silk Road, an anonymous, international online marketplace that operates as a Tor Hidden Service and uses Bitcoin as its exchange currency. We gather and analyze data over eight months between the end of 2011 and 2012, including daily crawls of the marketplace for nearly six months in 2012. We obtain a detailed picture of the type of goods sold on Silk Road, and of the revenues made both by sellers and Silk Road operaTors. Through examining over 24,400 separate items sold on the site, we show that Silk Road is overwhelmingly used as a market for controlled substances and narcotics, and that most items sold are available for less than three weeks. The majority of sellers disappears within roughly three months of their arrival, but a core of 112 sellers has been present throughout our measurement interval. We evaluate the total revenue made by all sellers, from public listings, to slightly over USD 1.2 million per month; this corresponds to about USD 92,000 per month in commissions for the Silk Road operaTors. We further show that the marketplace has been operating steadily, with daily sales and number of sellers overall increasing over our measurement interval. We discuss economic and policy implications of our analysis and results, including ethical considerations for future research in this area.

  • traveling the silk road a measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace
    arXiv: Computers and Society, 2012
    Co-Authors: Nicolas Christin
    Abstract:

    We perform a comprehensive measurement analysis of Silk Road, an anonymous, international online marketplace that operates as a Tor Hidden Service and uses Bitcoin as its exchange currency. We gather and analyze data over eight months between the end of 2011 and 2012, including daily crawls of the marketplace for nearly six months in 2012. We obtain a detailed picture of the type of goods being sold on Silk Road, and of the revenues made both by sellers and Silk Road operaTors. Through examining over 24,400 separate items sold on the site, we show that Silk Road is overwhelmingly used as a market for controlled substances and narcotics, and that most items sold are available for less than three weeks. The majority of sellers disappears within roughly three months of their arrival, but a core of 112 sellers has been present throughout our measurement interval. We evaluate the total revenue made by all sellers, from public listings, to slightly over USD 1.2 million per month; this corresponds to about USD 92,000 per month in commissions for the Silk Road operaTors. We further show that the marketplace has been operating steadily, with daily sales and number of sellers overall increasing over our measurement interval. We discuss economic and policy implications of our analysis and results, including ethical considerations for future research in this area.

  • traveling the silk road a measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace cmu cylab 12 018
    2012
    Co-Authors: Nicolas Christin
    Abstract:

    We perform a comprehensive measurement analysis of Silk Road, an anonymous, international online marketplace that operates as a Tor Hidden Service and uses Bitcoin as its exchange currency. We gather and analyze data over eight months between the end of 2011 and 2012, including daily crawls of the marketplace for nearly six months in 2012. We obtain a detailed picture of the type of goods being sold on Silk Road, and of the revenues made both by sellers and Silk Road operaTors. Through examining over 24,400 separate items sold on the site, we show that Silk Road is overwhelmingly used as a market for controlled substances and narcotics. A relatively small “core” of about 60 sellers has been present throughout our measurement interval, while the majority of sellers leaves (or goes “underground”) within a couple of weeks of their first appearance. We evaluate the total revenue made by all sellers to approximately USD 1.9 million per month; this corresponds to about USD 143,000 per month in commissions perceived by the Silk Road operaTors. We further show that the marketplace has been operating steadily, with daily sales and number of sellers overall increasing over the past few months. We discuss economic and policy implications of our analysis and results, including ethical considerations for future research in this area.

  • of a large anonymous online marketplace
    2012
    Co-Authors: Nicolas Christin
    Abstract:

    We perform a comprehensive measurement analysis of Silk Road, an anonymous, international online marketplace that operates as a Tor Hidden Service and uses Bitcoin as its exchange currency. We gather and analyze data over eight months between the end of 2011 and 2012, including daily crawls of the marketplace for nearly six months in 2012. We obtain a detailed picture of the type of goods being sold on Silk Road, and of the revenues made both by sellers and Silk Road operaTors. Through examining over 24,400 separate items sold on the site, we show that Silk Road is overwhelmingly used as a market for controlled substances and narcotics, and that most items sold are available for less than three weeks. The majority of sellers disappears within roughly three months of their arrival, but a core of 112 sellers has been present throughout our measurement interval. We evaluate the total revenue made by all sellers, from public listings, to slightly over USD 1.2 million per month; this corresponds to about USD 92,000 per month in commissions for the Silk Road operaTors. We further show that the marketplace has been operating steadily, with daily sales and number of sellers overall increasing over our measurement interval. We discuss economic and policy implications of our analysis and results, including ethical considerations for future research in this area

Husam Al Jawaheri - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    Computers & Security, 2020
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    Abstract With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting publicly available information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor Hidden Services could lead to deanonymization of these Services’ users. Such linking is possible by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

  • Deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis
    2019
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Boshmaf Yazan, Erbad Aiman
    Abstract:

    With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor Hidden Services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor Hidden Service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity

  • when a small leak sinks a great ship deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2018
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor Hidden Services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor Hidden Service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

Mashael Al Sabah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    Computers & Security, 2020
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    Abstract With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting publicly available information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor Hidden Services could lead to deanonymization of these Services’ users. Such linking is possible by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

  • Deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis
    2019
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Boshmaf Yazan, Erbad Aiman
    Abstract:

    With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor Hidden Services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor Hidden Service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity

  • when a small leak sinks a great ship deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2018
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor Hidden Services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor Hidden Service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

Yazan Boshmaf - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    Computers & Security, 2020
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    Abstract With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting publicly available information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor Hidden Services could lead to deanonymization of these Services’ users. Such linking is possible by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.

  • when a small leak sinks a great ship deanonymizing Tor Hidden Service users through bitcoin transactions analysis
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2018
    Co-Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
    Abstract:

    With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means hisTorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor Hidden Services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor Hidden Service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K Hidden Services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor Hidden Services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor Hidden Service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.