The Experts below are selected from a list of 13548 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Philip F. S. Berg - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People from Serving as Officers and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Vanderbilt Law Review, 2003Co-Authors: Philip F. S. BergAbstract:I. INTRODUCTION On June 4, 2003, lifestyle guru Martha Stewart was indicted on multiple criminal and civil charges by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission).1 The charges, including obstruction of justice and civil insider trading, stemmed from Stewart's sale of ImClone stock shortly before the Food and Drug Administration rejected a drug produced by ImClone and sent the Company's stock price tumbling.2 Although Stewart could face a number of serious penalties under her criminal indictment, the primary remedy sought by the SEC for her civil insider trading charges is rather uncommon-a bar from serving as a director of Martha Stewart Living or any other public Company.3 The SEC's attempt to bar Martha Stewart from serving as a director came on the heels of new "officer and director bar" legislation that was passed in the wake of the collapse of Enron and other recent corporate scandals.4 In response to public outcry over these corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which President Bush signed into law on July 30, 2002.5 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added a number of provisions to the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) in an attempt to increase the accuracy of audits and financial disclosures and to increase the accountability of and penalties for dishonest corporate officers and directors.6 In comments at the signing, President Bush discussed the need to restore public faith in America's economic system and noted ways that the new bill would increase corporate oversight and stiffen penalties for corporate wrongdoers.7 SarbanesOxley increased authority to the SEC by allowing the SEC to permanently bar corporate wrongdoers from serving as officers or directors of any publicly Traded Company.8 Upon signing the act into law, President Bush declared that "[t]he SEC will now have the administrative authority to bar dishonest directors and officers from ever again serving in positions of corporate responsibility."9 Two specific sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed the existing law concerning suspension of officers and directors. The first is section 305, "Officer and Director Bars and Penalties," which modifies the 1933 and 1934 Acts by lowering the standard that the SEC has to meet to persuade a federal court to issue an officer or director bar.10 The second, more important change is found in section 1105, "Authority of the Commission to Prohibit Persons from Serving as Officers or Directors."11 This section allows the SEC, for the first time, to issue officer and director bars directly as part of a cease-and-desist proceeding, thereby eliminating the requirement that the SEC go through a federal court.12 Under these provisions, if an officer or director's conduct both violates an antifraud provision of federal securities laws13 and demonstrates "unfitness" to serve, the SEC may bar that officer or director from serving in that capacity with any other public Company in the future.14 The SEC can pursue such a bar in an administrative cease-and-desist proceeding or an action brought in the courts.15 By enacting sections 305 and 1105 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress has made it easier for the SEC to permanently bar securities law violators from corporate boardrooms. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, relatively few such permanent suspensions were obtained.16 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC no longer has to show a defendant's "substantial unfitness" to serve as an officer or director but, instead, only has to show his or her "unfitness."17 This deletion of one word may appear insignificant, but it is the result of substantial congressional debate, and it should signal to courts that Congress is not satisfied with the high standard judges have required the SEC to meet in the past.18 Moreover, the permanent suspension may become increasingly important in the future as political pressure in the wake of the Enron debacle and other scandals forces the SEC to crack down on corporate fraud more vigilantly. …
Noah A Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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predicting risk from financial reports with regression
North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 2009Co-Authors: Shimon Kogan, Dimitry Levin, Bryan R Routledge, Jacob S Sagi, Noah A SmithAbstract:We address a text regression problem: given a piece of text, predict a real-world continuous quantity associated with the text's meaning. In this work, the text is an SEC-mandated financial report published annually by a publicly-Traded Company, and the quantity to be predicted is volatility of stock returns, an empirical measure of financial risk. We apply well-known regression techniques to a large corpus of freely available financial reports, constructing regression models of volatility for the period following a report. Our models rival past volatility (a strong baseline) in predicting the target variable, and a single model that uses both can significantly outperform past volatility. Interestingly, our approach is more accurate for reports after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, giving some evidence for the success of that legislation in making financial reports more informative.
Andrew Zacharakis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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speed to initial public offering of vc backed companies
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2001Co-Authors: Dean A Shepherd, Andrew ZacharakisAbstract:Venture capitalists realize returns on their investments when their portfolio companies either go public (IPO) or are acquired by a publicly Traded Company. Finance theory implies that the sooner a particular return can be realized the higher the “real” return to the investor. We use an ecosystem perspective to investigate speed to initial Public Offering. Findings indicate that geography of the portfolio Company matters, that non high-tech portfolio companies go public faster than do those in the computer-related sector, and that speed is increased with the recent favorable IPO market but not at the same rate for all regions.
Dennis R. Reinstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the guideline publicly Traded Company method and the market value of invested capital should market value of stakeholder capital be the appropriate reference
Business Valuation Review, 2006Co-Authors: Peter Butler, Keith Pinkerton, Dennis R. ReinsteinAbstract:Abstract If a business appraiser ignores the value of employee stock options when calculating the market value of invested capital (MVIC) for guideline publicly Traded companies, the appraiser may significantly undervalue his or her subject Company, all else being equal.
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The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and the Market Value of “Invested” Capital: Should Market Value of “Stakeholder” Capital be the Appropriate Reference?
Business Valuation Review, 2006Co-Authors: Peter Butler, Keith Pinkerton, Dennis R. ReinsteinAbstract:Abstract If a business appraiser ignores the value of employee stock options when calculating the market value of invested capital (MVIC) for guideline publicly Traded companies, the appraiser may significantly undervalue his or her subject Company, all else being equal.
Luís M. A. Bettencourt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The mortality of companies
Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 2015Co-Authors: Madeleine I. G. Daepp, Marcus J. Hamilton, Geoffrey B. West, Luís M. A. BettencourtAbstract:The firm is a fundamental economic unit of contemporary human societies. Studies on the general quantitative and statistical character of firms have produced mixed results regarding their lifespans and mortality. We examine a comprehensive database of more than 25 000 publicly Traded North American companies, from 1950 to 2009, to derive the statistics of firm lifespans. Based on detailed survival analysis, we show that the mortality of publicly Traded companies manifests an approximately constant hazard rate over long periods of observation. This regularity indicates that mortality rates are independent of a Company's age. We show that the typical half-life of a publicly Traded Company is about a decade, regardless of business sector. Our results shed new light on the dynamics of births and deaths of publicly Traded companies and identify some of the necessary ingredients of a general theory of firms.
