The Experts below are selected from a list of 4287 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Eric Rescorla - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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unknown key share attacks on uses of tls with the session description protocol sdp
RFC, 2021Co-Authors: Martin Thomson, Eric RescorlaAbstract:This document describes unknown key-share attacks on the use of Datagram transport layer security for the Secure Real-Time transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). Similar attacks are described on the use of DTLS-SRTP with the identity bindings used in Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) and SIP identity. These attacks are difficult to mount, but they cause a victim to be mislead about the identity of a communicating peer. Mitigation techniques are defined that implementations of RFC 8122 are encouraged to deploy.
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The Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
2020Co-Authors: Eric Rescorla, H. (arm Limited) Tschofenig, Nagendra ModaduguAbstract:This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the transport layer security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection/non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.
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the transport layer security tls protocol version 1 3
RFC, 2018Co-Authors: Eric RescorlaAbstract:This document specifies version 1.3 of the transport layer security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705, and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.
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the datagram transport layer security dtls connection identifier
2017Co-Authors: Thomas Fossati, Eric Rescorla, Tobias Gondrom, H. (arm Limited) TschofenigAbstract:This document specifies the "Connection ID" concept for the Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) protocol, version 1.2 and version 1.3. A Connection ID is an identifier carried in the record layer header that gives the recipient additional information for selecting the appropriate security association. In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple. If the source IP address and/or source port changes during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context.
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unknown key share attacks on uses of transport layer security with the session description protocol sdp
2017Co-Authors: Martin Thomson, Eric RescorlaAbstract:Unknown key-share attacks on the use of Datagram transport layer security for the Secure Real-Time transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP) and its use with Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) identity assertions are described. Simple mitigation techniques are defined.
Joseph Salowey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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using authenticated encryption with replay protection aero in datagram transport layer security dtls
2013Co-Authors: John Foley, David Mcgrew, Joseph SaloweyAbstract:Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) is a communication security protocol that is attractive for use in constrained environments, in which it is important to minimize the data expansion added by the security protocol, and to support multicast security . Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO) is a cryptographic technique that is well suited for use in DTLS, especially in these scenarios: it has minimal data expansion, avoids the need to manage implicit state, works well with multiple receivers and multiple senders, and provides strong misuse resistance. This document describes how AERO can be used in DTLS.
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dynamic provisioning using flexible authentication via secure tunneling extensible authentication protocol eap fast
RFC, 2009Co-Authors: Nancy Camwinget, David Mcgrew, Hao Zhou, Joseph SaloweyAbstract:The flexible authentication via secure tunneling EAP method (EAP- FAST) enables secure communication between a peer and a server by using transport layer security (TLS) to establish a mutually authenticated tunnel. EAP-FAST also enables the provisioning credentials or other information through this protected tunnel. This document describes the use of EAP-FAST for dynamic provisioning.
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transport layer security tls session resumption without server side state
RFC, 2008Co-Authors: Joseph SaloweyAbstract:This document describes a mechanism that enables the transport layer security (TLS) server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a ticket and forwards it to the client. The client can subsequently resume a session using the obtained ticket. This document obsoletes RFC 4507. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
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the flexible authentication via secure tunneling extensible authentication protocol method eap fast
RFC, 2007Co-Authors: Nancy Camwinget, David Mcgrew, Hao Zhou, Joseph SaloweyAbstract:This document defines the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) based Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST) protocol. EAP-FAST is an EAP method that enables secure communication between a peer and a server by using the transport layer security (TLS) to establish a mutually authenticated tunnel. Within the tunnel, Type-Length-Value (TLV) objects are used to convey authentication related data between the peer and the EAP server. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Peter Saintandre - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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use of transport layer security tls in the extensible messaging and presence protocol xmpp
RFC, 2015Co-Authors: Peter SaintandreAbstract:This document provides recommendations for the use of transport layer security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120.
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summarizing known attacks on transport layer security tls and datagram tls dtls
RFC, 2015Co-Authors: Ralph Holz, Yaron Sheffer, Peter SaintandreAbstract:Over the last few years, there have been several serious attacks on transport layer security (TLS), including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the goal of motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on the usage of TLS and Datagram TLS (DTLS).
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representation and verification of domain based application service identity within internet public key infrastructure using x 509 pkix certificates in the context of transport layer security tls
RFC, 2011Co-Authors: Jeff Hodges, Peter SaintandreAbstract:Many application technologies enable a secure connection between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of transport layer security (TLS). This document specifies best current practices for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions.
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best practices for checking of server identities in the context of transport layer security tls
2011Co-Authors: R Bob L Morgan, Jeff Hodges, Kurt D Zeilenga, Peter SaintandreAbstract:This document specifies the how an entity establishing a TLS connection, or other PKI-based interaction, with a server should verify the server identity.
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xtls end to end encryption for the extensible messaging and presence protocol xmpp using transport layer security tls
2009Co-Authors: Dirk Meyer, Peter SaintandreAbstract:This document specifies "XTLS", a protocol for end-to-end encryption of Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) traffic via an application-level usage of transport layer security (TLS). XTLS treats the end-to-end exchange of XML stanzas as a virtual transport and uses TLS to secure that transport, thus enabling XMPP entities to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and forgery of XML stanzas. The protocol can be used for secure end-to-end messaging as well as any others application such as file transfer.
Michael Tuexen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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transport layer security (TLS) and Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension
2012Co-Authors: Michael Tuexen, Robin Seggelmann, Michael WilliamsAbstract:This document describes the Heartbeat Extension for the transport layer security (TLS) and Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) protocol. The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing the usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a renegotiation and a basis for path maximum transmission unit (PMTU) discovery for DTLS.
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datagram transport layer security dtls for stream control transmission protocol sctp
RFC, 2011Co-Authors: Michael Tuexen, Robin Seggelmann, Eric RescorlaAbstract:This document describes the usage of the Datagram transport layer security (DTLS) protocol over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). The user of DTLS over SCTP can take advantage of most of the features provided by SCTP and its extensions, especially support of o multi-homing to provide network level fault tolerance. o dynamic reconfiguration of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. o multiple streams to avoid head of line blocking. o unordered delivery. o dynamic reconfiguration of streams. o partially reliable data transfer. However, the DTLS maximum user message size limit of 2^14 bytes applies also to DTLS over SCTP. Since DTLS over SCTP uses the SCTP- AUTH extension, the DTLS user can not manage the keying material, since this is done by the DTLS layer.
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transport layer security over stream control transmission protocol
RFC, 2002Co-Authors: Andreas Jungmaier, Eric Rescorla, Michael TuexenAbstract:This document describes the usage of the transport layer security (TLS) protocol, as defined in RFC 2246, over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in RFC 2960 and RFC 3309.
Wang Tongyang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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secure and efficient wtls handshake protocol
Journal of Computer Applications, 2008Co-Authors: Wang TongyangAbstract:The primary goal of Wireless transport layer security(WTLS) is to provide the security of the wireless communication.An efficient WTLS handshake protocol would speed up establishing the session between the client and the server,and at the same time reduce the spending of resource on the mobile.A new WTLS handshake protocol called Light online compute WTLS(L-WTLS) was proposed.L-WTLS was much more economic since it had less computation,especially the online ones.At last,that the L-WTLS is more suitable for the low power mobile terminal is proved.
