The Experts below are selected from a list of 27 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gaurav Gupta - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Software watermarking resilient to debugging attacks
2014Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef Pieprzyk, Josef Pieprzyk PresentedAbstract:an attack on the Branch-based software watermarking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based on replacing jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBS) by calls to a ngerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated ngerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the ngerprint and/or integrity checks change and the target address is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack uses debugger capabilities such as register and address lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the FBF and calls to the same is identi ed, correct displacemen
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A Low-Cost Attack on Branch-Based Software Watermarking Schemes
2013Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef PieprzykAbstract:Abstract. In 2005, Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin proposed a software watermarking scheme based on converting jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBSs) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and integrity checks change and the target address will not be computed correctly. In this paper, we present an attack based on tracking stack pointer modifications to break the scheme and provide implementation details. The key element of the attack is to remove the fingerprint and integrity check generating code from the program after disassociating the target address from the fingerprint and integrity value. Using the debugging tools that give vast control to the attacker to track stack pointer operations, we perform both subtractive and watermark replacement attacks. The major steps in the attack are automated resulting in a fast and low-cost attack
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Software Watermarking Resilient to Debugging Attacks
Academy Publisher, 2007Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef PieprzykAbstract:In 2006, Gaurav Gupta and Josef Pieprzyk presented an attack on the Branch-based software watermarking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based on replacing jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBS) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and/or integrity checks change and the target address is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack uses debugger capabilities such as register and address lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the FBF and calls to the same is identified, correct displacement values are generated and calls to FBF are replaced by the original UBS transferring control of the attack to the correct target instruction. In this paper, we propose a watermarking model that provides security against such debugging attacks. Two primary measures taken are shifting the stack pointer modification operation from the FBF to the individual UBSs, and coding the stack pointer modification in the same language as that of the rest of the code rather than assembly language to avoid conspicuous contents. The manual component complexity increases from O(1) in the previous scheme to O(n) in our proposed scheme.
Josef Pieprzyk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Software watermarking resilient to debugging attacks
2014Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef Pieprzyk, Josef Pieprzyk PresentedAbstract:an attack on the Branch-based software watermarking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based on replacing jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBS) by calls to a ngerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated ngerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the ngerprint and/or integrity checks change and the target address is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack uses debugger capabilities such as register and address lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the FBF and calls to the same is identi ed, correct displacemen
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A Low-Cost Attack on Branch-Based Software Watermarking Schemes
2013Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef PieprzykAbstract:Abstract. In 2005, Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin proposed a software watermarking scheme based on converting jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBSs) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and integrity checks change and the target address will not be computed correctly. In this paper, we present an attack based on tracking stack pointer modifications to break the scheme and provide implementation details. The key element of the attack is to remove the fingerprint and integrity check generating code from the program after disassociating the target address from the fingerprint and integrity value. Using the debugging tools that give vast control to the attacker to track stack pointer operations, we perform both subtractive and watermark replacement attacks. The major steps in the attack are automated resulting in a fast and low-cost attack
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Software Watermarking Resilient to Debugging Attacks
Academy Publisher, 2007Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef PieprzykAbstract:In 2006, Gaurav Gupta and Josef Pieprzyk presented an attack on the Branch-based software watermarking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based on replacing jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBS) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and/or integrity checks change and the target address is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack uses debugger capabilities such as register and address lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the FBF and calls to the same is identified, correct displacement values are generated and calls to FBF are replaced by the original UBS transferring control of the attack to the correct target instruction. In this paper, we propose a watermarking model that provides security against such debugging attacks. Two primary measures taken are shifting the stack pointer modification operation from the FBF to the individual UBSs, and coding the stack pointer modification in the same language as that of the rest of the code rather than assembly language to avoid conspicuous contents. The manual component complexity increases from O(1) in the previous scheme to O(n) in our proposed scheme.
Gupta Gaurav - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Software watermarking resilient to debugging attacks
'Estonian Academy Publishers', 2007Co-Authors: Gupta Gaurav, Pieprzyk JosefAbstract:In 2006, Gaurav Gupta and Josef Pieprzyk presented an attack on the Branch-based software watermarking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based on replacing jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBS) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and/or integrity checks change and the target address is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack uses debugger capabilities such as register and address lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the FBF and calls to the same is identified, correct displacement values are generated and calls to FBF are replaced by the original UBS transferring control of the attack to the correct target instruction. In this paper, we propose a watermarking model that provides security against such debugging attacks. Two primary measures taken are shifting the stack pointer modification operation from the FBF to the individual UBSs, and coding the stack pointer modification in the same language as that of the rest of the code rather than assembly language to avoid conspicuous contents. The manual component complexity increases from O(1) in the previous scheme to O(n) in our proposed scheme.7 page(s
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A Low-cost attack on Branch-based software watermarking schemes
'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2006Co-Authors: Gupta Gaurav, Pieprzy JosefAbstract:n 2005, Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin proposed a software watermarking scheme based on converting jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBSs) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and integrity checks change and the target address will not be computed correctly. In this paper, we present an attack based on tracking stack pointer modifications to break the scheme and provide implementation details. The key element of the attack is to remove the fingerprint and integrity check generating code from the program after disassociating the target address from the fingerprint and integrity value. Using the debugging tools that give vast control to the attacker to track stack pointer operations, we perform both subtractive and watermark replacement attacks. The major steps in the attack are automated resulting in a fast and low-cost attack.12 page(s
Pieprzy Josef - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Low-cost attack on Branch-based software watermarking schemes
'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2006Co-Authors: Gupta Gaurav, Pieprzy JosefAbstract:n 2005, Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin proposed a software watermarking scheme based on converting jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBSs) by calls to a fingerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated fingerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the fingerprint and integrity checks change and the target address will not be computed correctly. In this paper, we present an attack based on tracking stack pointer modifications to break the scheme and provide implementation details. The key element of the attack is to remove the fingerprint and integrity check generating code from the program after disassociating the target address from the fingerprint and integrity value. Using the debugging tools that give vast control to the attacker to track stack pointer operations, we perform both subtractive and watermark replacement attacks. The major steps in the attack are automated resulting in a fast and low-cost attack.12 page(s
Josef Pieprzyk Presented - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Software watermarking resilient to debugging attacks
2014Co-Authors: Gaurav Gupta, Josef Pieprzyk, Josef Pieprzyk PresentedAbstract:an attack on the Branch-based software watermarking scheme proposed by Ginger Myles and Hongxia Jin in 2005. The software watermarking model is based on replacing jump instructions or Unconditional Branch statements (UBS) by calls to a ngerprint Branch function (FBF) that computes the correct target address of the UBS as a function of the generated ngerprint and integrity check. If the program is tampered with, the ngerprint and/or integrity checks change and the target address is not computed correctly. Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack uses debugger capabilities such as register and address lookup and breakpoints to minimize the requirement to manually inspect the software. Using these resources, the FBF and calls to the same is identi ed, correct displacemen