The Experts below are selected from a list of 300 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Burkhard Heer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System
International Tax and Public Finance, 2003Co-Authors: Burkhard HeerAbstract:In Germany, as in many OECD countries, such as the United Kingdom, Unemployment compensation consists of Unemployment insurance and Unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance is provided subsequent to the expiration of entitlement to Unemployment insurance and is lower. The effects of this two-tier Unemployment compensation system are studied in a general equilibrium job search model with endogenous distributions of income, wealth, and employment which is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the German economy. Our results are as follows: (i) employment is a decreasing function of both Unemployment insurance and Unemployment assistance. (ii) Aggregate savings are (not) a monotone decreasing function of Unemployment assistance (Unemployment insurance) payments. (iii) Optimal Unemployment compensation payments are found to be a decreasing function over time.
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Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System
Computing in Economics and Finance, 2000Co-Authors: Burkhard HeerAbstract:In many OECD countries, e.g. in Germany, France, or the UK, unemploy-ment compensation consists of Unemployment insurance and Unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance is provided subsequent to the expiration of entitlement to Unemployment insurance and is lower. The effects of this two-tier Unemployment compensation system are studied in a general equilibrium job search model with endogenous distributions of in-come, wealth, and employment which is calibrated with regard to the charac-teristics of the German economy. Our results are as follows: i) employment is a decreasing function of both Unemployment insurance and Unemployment assistance. ii) Savings are (not) a monotone increasing function of Unemployment insurance (Unemployment assistance payments). iii) Optimal Unemployment compensation payments are found to be a decreasing function over time.
Konstantinos Tatsiramos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unemployment insurance in Europe: Unemployment duration and subsequent employment stability
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009Co-Authors: Konstantinos TatsiramosAbstract:The disincentive effect of Unemployment insurance on Unemployment duration has been the focus of the empirical literature. The potential effect of Unemployment insurance on post-Unemployment outcomes, which may be regarded as beneficial by improving job matching, has attracted much less attention. This paper provides evidence on the effect of Unemployment benefits on Unemployment and employment duration in Europe, using individual data from the European Community Household Panel for eight countries. Country specific estimates based on multivariate discrete-time duration models, controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, suggest that although receiving benefits has an adverse effect in the sense of increasing Unemployment duration, there is also a positive effect by increasing subsequent employment duration. This beneficial effect of Unemployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems, and for recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months. These findings are in line with theories suggesting a matching effect of Unemployment insurance.
Ofer Setty - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Accounts: The Best of Both Worlds
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2017Co-Authors: Ofer SettyAbstract:Unemployment accounts are mandatory individual savings accounts that can be used only during Unemployment or retirement. Unlike Unemployment insurance, Unemployment accounts solve the moral hazard problem but provide no public insurance to workers. I study a hybrid system that borrows from concepts of both Unemployment insurance and Unemployment accounts, in which workers are mandated to save when employed and can withdraw from the account when unemployed. Once the account is exhausted, the unemployed worker receives Unemployment benefits. This hybrid policy provides insurance to workers more efficiently than an Unemployment insurance system because it provides government benefits selectively. As a consequence, young workers can reduce their precautionary savings and better smooth their consumption over the life cycle. Calibrating the model to the US economy, I find that, relative to an optimal Unemployment insurance system, the optimal hybrid policy leads to a welfare gain of 2.4%, measured as consumption equivalent variation. JEL Classification: E24; E61; J64; J65
Tao Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does Unemployment Compensation Affect Unemployment Duration
2003Co-Authors: Knut Røed, Tao ZhangAbstract:We use a flexible hazard rate model with unrestricted spell duration and calendar time effects to analyse a dataset including all Norwegian Unemployment spells during the 1990s. The dataset provides a unique access to conditionally independent variation in Unemployment compensation. We find that a marginal increase in compensation reduces the escape rate from Unemployment significantly, irrespective of business cycle conditions and spell duration. The escape rate rises sharply in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion. While men are more responsive than women with respect to marginal changes in compensation, women are most responsive with respect to benefit exhaustion.
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Does Unemployment Compensation Affect Unemployment Duration
The Economic Journal, 2002Co-Authors: Knut Røed, Tao ZhangAbstract:Abstract We use a flexible hazard rate model with unrestricted spell duration and calendar timeeffects to analyse a dataset including all Norwegian Unemployment spells during the1990’s. The dataset provides a unique access to conditionally independent variation inUnemployment compensation. We find that a marginal increase in compensation re-duces the escape rate from Unemployment significantly, irrespective of business cycleconditions and spell duration. The escape rate rises sharply in the months just prior tobenefit exhaustion. While men are more responsive than women with respect to mar-ginal changes in compensation, women are most responsive with respect to benefitexhaustion. Keywords: Unemployment spells, business cycles, Unemployment compensation, non-parametric duration analysis. JEL Classification: C41, J64 . * The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Oslo. We wish to thank the Re-search Council of Norway for financial support and Christian Brinck, Harald Goldstein, Costas Meghir,Espen Moen, Steinar Strom, Rolf Aaberge and three anonomyous referees for helpful comments. Cor-respondence to: Knut Roed, The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadalleen 21, 0349Oslo, Norway. E-mail: knut.roed@frisch.uio.no.
David Scoones - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Dynamics
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1991Co-Authors: Ross Milbourne, Douglas D. Purvis, David ScoonesAbstract:One of the puzzling features of the recent behavior of the Canadian Unemployment rate is its persistence in the presence of a sustained expansion in real national income. Neither deficient aggregate demand nor a once-for-all, supply-side-induced increase in the natural rate provides a convincing explanation of this phenomenon. This paper presents a model that explains how aspects of Unemployment insurance in Canada will cause persistence: Unemployment will be highly serially correlated even if output is not. The authors document the increased persistence of the Unemployment rate since 1977 and show that the model accounts for much of this phenomenon.
