The Experts below are selected from a list of 9765 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Simon Hix - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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from doves to hawks a spatial analysis of Voting in the monetary policy committee of the bank of england
European Journal of Political Research, 2010Co-Authors: Simon Hix, Bjørn Høyland, Nick VivyanAbstract:This article examines the making of monetary policy in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2008 by analysing Voting Behaviour in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It provides a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members by estimating a Bayesian item response model. The article demonstrates the usefulness of these measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their successors and by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC. The analysis indicates that the British Government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the MPC through its appointments to the Committee. This highlights the importance of central bank appointments for monetary policy.
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democratic politics in the european parliament
2007Co-Authors: Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, Gerard RolandAbstract:With the European Parliament comprising politicians from many different countries, cultures, languages, national parties and institutional backgrounds, one might expect politics in the Parliament to be highly-fragmented and unpredictable. By studying more than 12,000 recorded votes between 1979 and 2004 this 2007 book establishes that the opposite is in fact true: transnational parties in the European Parliament are highly cohesive and the classic 'left-right' dimension dominates Voting Behaviour. Furthermore, the cohesion of parties in the European Parliament has increased as the powers of the Parliament have increased. The authors suggest that the main reason for these developments is that like-minded MEPs have incentives to form stable transnational party organizations and to use these organizations to compete over European Union policies. They suggest that this is a positive development for the future of democratic accountability in the European Union.
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legislative Behaviour and party competition in the european parliament an application of nominate to the eu
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2001Co-Authors: Simon HixAbstract:This article looks at the Voting Behaviour of Members of the European Parliament in the first year of the 1999–2004 European Parliament. The research applies the Nominate scaling method (developed to map Voting in the US Congress) to the 1,031 ‘roll-call votes’ in the EP in this period. This method enables us to locate each MEP in a multi-dimensional policy space, and to plot a ‘cutting line’ for each vote. From this information we find that legislative Behaviour in the EP is mainly along left—right lines, transnational party group affiliation is more important than national affiliation for determining how MEPs vote, different majority-commanding coalitions form on different issues, and the difference between the simple majority and absolute majority rules has no effect on the Voting Behaviour of the two main party groups.
Monika Muhlbock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Voting in the Consensual Council *
2020Co-Authors: Bjørn Høyland, Vibeke Wøien Hansen, Fabio Franchino, Scott Gates, Simon Hug, Monika MuhlbockAbstract:ABSTRACT In the Council governments refrain from opposing new legislation at the final Voting stage, although preferring the existing policy to the proposed legislation. This type of Behaviour is attributed to the norm of consensus. We evaluate the strength of this norm by combining positional data with Voting data on 44 controversial directives. We measure the magnitude of the norm of consensus. The results show that there is a positive, but very weak, relationship between the spatial location of a government and its actual Voting Behaviour. However, all governments are substantively more supportive of new legislation than the spatial model predicts. Nevertheless, on salient issues the norm of consensus breaks down. The norm is hence best understood as a conditional. We combine positional data with Voting data in order to evaluate to what extent governments base their Voting decisions on a comparison between the status quo and the new policy and measure the extent to which the norm of consensus changes the probability that a government will vote in favour of a proposal. Instead of measuring "ideal -points", we measure the deviation from the prediction of the spatial model. This deviation can be interpreted as a measure of the norm of consensus. Keywords The next section situates our contribution in the existing literature. Although the different strands in the literature have made valuable contributions by either shedding light on bargaining processes or on Voting Behaviour, the interaction between issue positions, the norm of consensual decision-making and Voting Behaviour is not fully understood. We can think of the norm of consensus as a fixed cost of dissenting. Some governments may have a higher cost than others. A conditional formulation of the norm of consensus could imply that governments oppose if the legislation is sufficiently controversial. We then describe the data and method employed to test these two formulations of the norm of consensus. We combine positional data on 104 issues on 44 directives (Thomson et al., 2006
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responsiveness to different national interests Voting Behaviour on genetically modified organisms in the council of the european union
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2018Co-Authors: Monika Muhlbock, Jale TosunAbstract:Does Voting Behaviour in the Council of Ministers reflect different national interests? In this article, we explore this question by studying requests for authorization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The fact that GMOs constitute a highly contentious issue in the European Union enables us to look underneath the ‘culture of consensus’ which usually characterizes Voting Behaviour in the Council. We argue that the focus on one issue area can help us to discover more specific Voting patterns than those that have previously been found in EU legislative studies. Indeed, based on a dataset comprising all authorization requests voted on in the Council between 2004 and 2014, we find that ministers' Voting Behaviour is significantly influenced by important national factors such as public opinion, party politics, and structural as well as sectoral interests.
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linking council and european parliament Voting unity of national parties in bicameral eu decision making
Journal of European Public Policy, 2013Co-Authors: Monika MuhlbockAbstract:The two institutions forming the bicameral EU legislature, Council and European Parliament, are composed of representatives who belong to national political parties. In traditional European bicameral systems, parties are the main factor linking the different chambers. Do national parties similarly provide a linkage mechanism between chambers in the EU, by co-ordinating Voting Behaviour of ministers and MEPs? For example, do MEPs unite with ‘their’ minister against a proposal if sincere national or party-political interests are touched? Based on a dataset combining Council votes with EP roll-calls, the analysis reveals that Voting Behaviour might differ considerably between institutions. While ministers are subject to the logic of Council consensus, MEPs are influenced by their transnational EP groups. Internal party co-ordination across institutions is thus rare. Ministers and MEPs hardly ever vote united against a proposal.
Sara B Hobolt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the second order election model revisited an experimental test of vote choices in european parliament elections
Electoral Studies, 2011Co-Authors: Sara B Hobolt, Jill WittrockAbstract:This paper examines the micro-foundations of the second-order elections model of European Parliament (EP) elections. We extend the existing literature in several ways. First, we propose an individual-level model of Voting Behaviour in second-order elections. Second, we present the first study using experimental methods to test the predictions of the second-order model, allowing us to test the individual-level propositions about vote choice in a controlled environment. Importantly, we also examine the conditioning effect of information on the ‘second-order’ nature of Voting Behaviour in EP elections. Our findings show that while voters base their EP vote choices primarily on domestic preferences, those who are given additional information about the European integration dimension are also more likely to vote on this basis.
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europe in question referendums on european integration
2009Co-Authors: Sara B HoboltAbstract:Comprehensive comparative analysis of EU referendums from 1972 to 2008 Variety of sources used including survey data, content analysis of media coverage, experimental studies, and elite interviews not found elsewhere in the literature How do voters decide in referendums on European integration? Direct democracy has become an increasingly common feature of European politics with important implications for policy-making in the European Union. Attempts to reform the EU treaties have been stalled, and even abandoned, due to no-votes in referendums. Europe in Question sheds new light on the pivotal issue of electoral Behaviour in referendums and provides a major contribution to the study of democracy in the European Union and Voting Behaviour more generally. Hobolt develops a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding Voting Behaviour in referendums and presents a comparative analysis of EU referendums from 1972 to 2008. To examine why people vote the way they do, the role of political elites and the impact of the campaign dynamics, this books relies on a variety of sources including survey data, content analysis of media coverage, survey experiments, and elite interviews. The book illustrates the importance of campaign dynamics and elite endorsements in shaping public opinion, electoral mobilization and vote choices. Referendums are often criticized for presenting citizens with choices that are too complex and thereby generating outcomes that have little or no connection with the ballot proposal. Importantly this book shows that voters are smarter than they are often given credit for. They may not be fully informed about European politics, but they do consider the issues at stake before they go to the ballot box and they make use of the information provided by parties and the campaign environment. Readership: Scholars and students of political science, especially those interested in political Behaviour, political parties, and European studies.
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when europe matters the impact of political information on Voting Behaviour in eu referendums
Journal of Elections Public Opinion & Parties, 2005Co-Authors: Sara B HoboltAbstract:This article investigates how voters decide in referendums on European integration. More specifically, it analyses how political information influences Voting Behaviour. It argues that political information conditions the way in which people make decisions in referendums. The impact of political information is examined not only at the individual, but also at the contextual level. It is hypothesized that variations in the context of the referendum – the intensity of the campaign – produce differences in the way in which citizens act in referendums. As the intensity of the referendum campaign increases, more information is available to citizens and voters will rely more heavily on sophisticated criteria, such as attitudes and issue positions on the European Union (EU). While the informational context influences Voting patterns, individuals also vary in their awareness of politics. It is argued that people with high levels of political awareness receive more information and consequently rely more on their ow...
Martin Schultze - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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cognitive dissonance and the effects of Voting advice applications on Voting Behaviour evidence from the european elections 2014
Journal of Elections Public Opinion & Parties, 2017Co-Authors: Jonas Israel, Stefan Marschall, Martin SchultzeAbstract:ABSTRACTVoting Advice Applications (VAAs) – also known as Voting Engagement Applications – are online tools which inform users about their proximity to party positions before elections by indicating which parties are closest to the policy preferences of the individual voters. Referring to the theory of cognitive dissonance, this article examines the impact of using a VAA on Voting Behaviour by looking at the effect mechanisms. For the empirical analyses, we draw on data of a two-wave panel study we conducted before the European Elections 2014, thereby focusing on the German VAA – the Wahl-O-Mat. The findings show that irritation emerges if the preferred party is not positioned at the top of the VAA result list. In turn, a strong irritation can lead to a change in vote choice.
Nick Hanley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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validation of stated preferences for public goods a comparison of contingent valuation survey response and Voting Behaviour
Ecological Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Felix Schlapfer, Anna Roschewitz, Nick HanleyAbstract:This study reports the results from an in-person comparison of contingent valuation (CV) survey response and subsequent Voting Behaviour on comparable propositions to increase public spending for landscape protection. A substantial proportion of CV responses were not consistent with self-reported actual Voting decisions, suggesting an upward bias of stated willingness to pay. Item non-response and protest zero bids were more frequently given by those rejecting than those approving the actual proposition. Self-reported actual decisions yielded a more consistent explanatory pattern than did hypothetical choices. The official aggregate Voting records show that these results cannot be explained simply by errors in self-reported votes. We conclude that referenda provide a valuable opportunity to test stated preference methods for public goods, particularly public goods with significant passive-use values. However, an important requirement is that the stated choices to be compared with the referendum decisions, unlike in previous studies, come from independent contingent valuation surveys.
