Wireless Attack

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Sea W Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • api do tools for exploring the Wireless Attack surface in smart meters
    Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Travis Goodspeed, Sergey Atus, Ricky Melgares, Rya Speers, Sea W Smith
    Abstract:

    Security will be critical for the Wireless interface offered by soon-to-be-ubiquitous smart meters -- since if not secure, this technology will provide an remotely accessible Attack surface distributed throughout many homes and businesses. However, history shows that new network interfaces remained brittle and vulnerable (although believed otherwise) until security researchers could thoroughly explore their Attack surface. Unfortunately, for the majority of currently available smart meter Wireless networking solutions, we are still in that pre-exploration phase, "closed" radio stacks with proprietary features impede exploration by posing multiple hardware and software obstacles to standard network Attack surface exploration techniques. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting open and extensible software tools for 802.15.4-based proprietary stacks that work on commodity digital radio platforms. We hope this contribution advances the state of the art beyond the pre-exploration tipping point, and toward real security.

  • HICSS - Api-do: Tools for Exploring the Wireless Attack Surface in Smart Meters
    2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Travis Goodspeed, Ricky Melgares, Sergey Bratus, Ryan Speers, Sea W Smith
    Abstract:

    Security will be critical for the Wireless interface offered by soon-to-be-ubiquitous smart meters -- since if not secure, this technology will provide an remotely accessible Attack surface distributed throughout many homes and businesses. However, history shows that new network interfaces remained brittle and vulnerable (although believed otherwise) until security researchers could thoroughly explore their Attack surface. Unfortunately, for the majority of currently available smart meter Wireless networking solutions, we are still in that pre-exploration phase, "closed" radio stacks with proprietary features impede exploration by posing multiple hardware and software obstacles to standard network Attack surface exploration techniques. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting open and extensible software tools for 802.15.4-based proprietary stacks that work on commodity digital radio platforms. We hope this contribution advances the state of the art beyond the pre-exploration tipping point, and toward real security.

Travis Goodspeed - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • api do tools for exploring the Wireless Attack surface in smart meters
    Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Travis Goodspeed, Sergey Atus, Ricky Melgares, Rya Speers, Sea W Smith
    Abstract:

    Security will be critical for the Wireless interface offered by soon-to-be-ubiquitous smart meters -- since if not secure, this technology will provide an remotely accessible Attack surface distributed throughout many homes and businesses. However, history shows that new network interfaces remained brittle and vulnerable (although believed otherwise) until security researchers could thoroughly explore their Attack surface. Unfortunately, for the majority of currently available smart meter Wireless networking solutions, we are still in that pre-exploration phase, "closed" radio stacks with proprietary features impede exploration by posing multiple hardware and software obstacles to standard network Attack surface exploration techniques. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting open and extensible software tools for 802.15.4-based proprietary stacks that work on commodity digital radio platforms. We hope this contribution advances the state of the art beyond the pre-exploration tipping point, and toward real security.

  • HICSS - Api-do: Tools for Exploring the Wireless Attack Surface in Smart Meters
    2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Travis Goodspeed, Ricky Melgares, Sergey Bratus, Ryan Speers, Sea W Smith
    Abstract:

    Security will be critical for the Wireless interface offered by soon-to-be-ubiquitous smart meters -- since if not secure, this technology will provide an remotely accessible Attack surface distributed throughout many homes and businesses. However, history shows that new network interfaces remained brittle and vulnerable (although believed otherwise) until security researchers could thoroughly explore their Attack surface. Unfortunately, for the majority of currently available smart meter Wireless networking solutions, we are still in that pre-exploration phase, "closed" radio stacks with proprietary features impede exploration by posing multiple hardware and software obstacles to standard network Attack surface exploration techniques. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting open and extensible software tools for 802.15.4-based proprietary stacks that work on commodity digital radio platforms. We hope this contribution advances the state of the art beyond the pre-exploration tipping point, and toward real security.

Ricky Melgares - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • api do tools for exploring the Wireless Attack surface in smart meters
    Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Travis Goodspeed, Sergey Atus, Ricky Melgares, Rya Speers, Sea W Smith
    Abstract:

    Security will be critical for the Wireless interface offered by soon-to-be-ubiquitous smart meters -- since if not secure, this technology will provide an remotely accessible Attack surface distributed throughout many homes and businesses. However, history shows that new network interfaces remained brittle and vulnerable (although believed otherwise) until security researchers could thoroughly explore their Attack surface. Unfortunately, for the majority of currently available smart meter Wireless networking solutions, we are still in that pre-exploration phase, "closed" radio stacks with proprietary features impede exploration by posing multiple hardware and software obstacles to standard network Attack surface exploration techniques. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting open and extensible software tools for 802.15.4-based proprietary stacks that work on commodity digital radio platforms. We hope this contribution advances the state of the art beyond the pre-exploration tipping point, and toward real security.

  • HICSS - Api-do: Tools for Exploring the Wireless Attack Surface in Smart Meters
    2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Travis Goodspeed, Ricky Melgares, Sergey Bratus, Ryan Speers, Sea W Smith
    Abstract:

    Security will be critical for the Wireless interface offered by soon-to-be-ubiquitous smart meters -- since if not secure, this technology will provide an remotely accessible Attack surface distributed throughout many homes and businesses. However, history shows that new network interfaces remained brittle and vulnerable (although believed otherwise) until security researchers could thoroughly explore their Attack surface. Unfortunately, for the majority of currently available smart meter Wireless networking solutions, we are still in that pre-exploration phase, "closed" radio stacks with proprietary features impede exploration by posing multiple hardware and software obstacles to standard network Attack surface exploration techniques. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting open and extensible software tools for 802.15.4-based proprietary stacks that work on commodity digital radio platforms. We hope this contribution advances the state of the art beyond the pre-exploration tipping point, and toward real security.

Dong Hoon Lee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Practical Wireless Attack on the Connected Car and Security Protocol for In-Vehicle CAN
    IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2015
    Co-Authors: Samuel Woo, Hyo Jin Jo, Dong Hoon Lee
    Abstract:

    Vehicle-IT convergence technology is a rapidly rising paradigm of modern vehicles, in which an electronic control unit (ECU) is used to control the vehicle electrical systems, and the controller area network (CAN), an in-vehicle network, is commonly used to construct an efficient network of ECUs. Unfortunately, security issues have not been treated properly in CAN, although CAN control messages could be life-critical. With the appearance of the connected car environment, in-vehicle networks (e.g., CAN) are now connected to external networks (e.g., 3G/4G mobile networks), enabling an adversary to perform a long-range Wireless Attack using CAN vulnerabilities. In this paper we show that a long-range Wireless Attack is physically possible using a real vehicle and malicious smartphone application in a connected car environment. We also propose a security protocol for CAN as a countermeasure designed in accordance with current CAN specifications. We evaluate the feasibility of the proposed security protocol using CANoe software and a DSP-F28335 microcontroller. Our results show that the proposed security protocol is more efficient than existing security protocols with respect to authentication delay and communication load.

Hyo Jin Jo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A Practical Wireless Attack on the Connected Car and Security Protocol for In-Vehicle CAN
    IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2015
    Co-Authors: Samuel Woo, Hyo Jin Jo, Dong Hoon Lee
    Abstract:

    Vehicle-IT convergence technology is a rapidly rising paradigm of modern vehicles, in which an electronic control unit (ECU) is used to control the vehicle electrical systems, and the controller area network (CAN), an in-vehicle network, is commonly used to construct an efficient network of ECUs. Unfortunately, security issues have not been treated properly in CAN, although CAN control messages could be life-critical. With the appearance of the connected car environment, in-vehicle networks (e.g., CAN) are now connected to external networks (e.g., 3G/4G mobile networks), enabling an adversary to perform a long-range Wireless Attack using CAN vulnerabilities. In this paper we show that a long-range Wireless Attack is physically possible using a real vehicle and malicious smartphone application in a connected car environment. We also propose a security protocol for CAN as a countermeasure designed in accordance with current CAN specifications. We evaluate the feasibility of the proposed security protocol using CANoe software and a DSP-F28335 microcontroller. Our results show that the proposed security protocol is more efficient than existing security protocols with respect to authentication delay and communication load.

  • a message authentication and key distribution mechanism secure against can bus Attack
    Information Security and Cryptology, 2012
    Co-Authors: Hyo Jin Jo
    Abstract:

    According to advance on vehicle technology, many kinds of ECU(Electronic Control Unit) are equipped inside the vehicle. In-vehicle communication among ECUs is performed through CAN(Controller Area Networks). CAN have high reliability. However, it has many vulnerabilities because there is not any security mechanism for CAN. Recently, many papers proposed Attacks of in-vehicle communication by using these vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose an Wireless Attack model using a mobile radio communication network. We propose a secure authentication mechanism for in-vehicle network communication that assure confidentiality and integrity of data packets and also protect in-vehicle communication from the replay Attack.