The Experts below are selected from a list of 3723 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Wolfgang Peters - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tax evasion Tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest Taxation in europe
The Economic Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Eckhard Janeba, Wolfgang PetersAbstract:This paper uses a game-theoretic approach to analyze the Taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of Tax evasion. The model allows the authors to assess the success of various reform proposals. They argue that the Tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on Withholding Tax rates are made noncooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners dilemma. All countries discriminate but, in equilibrium, internationally mobile portfolio capital evades Taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, Tax competition leads to less Tax evasion.
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Tax evasion Tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest Taxation in europe
The Economic Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Eckhard Janeba, Wolfgang PetersAbstract:This paper uses a game-tlieoredc approach to analyse the Taxadon of interest income in Europe in the presence of Tax evasion. The model allows tis to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue tbat the Tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discriminatio n and on Withholding Tax rates are made noncooperadvely, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate, but in equilihrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades Taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, Tax competition leads to less Tax evasion. The integration of capital markets in Europe has hrought various benefits. At the same time, however, governments struggle to contain Tax evasion. International capital flight as an attempt to evade Taxes is particularly relevant in the area of Taxation of interest income. Banking secrecy laws in some EU countries and low Tax rates in small countries like Luxembourg, which hoost its role as financial centre, have led to the effective elimination ofthe Taxation of interest income for some investors. The Economist speaks, not surprisingly, about 'The Disappearing Taxpayer' (May 31, 1997). Several proposals have been made in order to overcome this situation.' The European Commission supports the introduction of a minimum Tax rate and/ or the status of a community resident. Under the concept of a community resident a country's Tax on interest income is independent of the residence of the investor (practically realising the source principle). By contrast, a proposal of the OECD (1977) argues in favour of a maximum Withholding Tax rate on interest income. None of these proposals has been unanimously accepted since gains and losses from non-coordinated policies differ greatly across member states. The main beneficiary of the present situation is Luxembourg which attracts large amounts of foreign capital, in particular from Germany. The United Kingdom opposes any coordination for political reasons and because Tax coordination may also threaten London's role as the leading financial centre in Europe. In contrast, Germany sticks to its traditional bank secrecy law which enables resident investors to evade German Taxation by investing abroad.
Eckhard Janeba - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tax evasion Tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest Taxation in europe
The Economic Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Eckhard Janeba, Wolfgang PetersAbstract:This paper uses a game-theoretic approach to analyze the Taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of Tax evasion. The model allows the authors to assess the success of various reform proposals. They argue that the Tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on Withholding Tax rates are made noncooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners dilemma. All countries discriminate but, in equilibrium, internationally mobile portfolio capital evades Taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, Tax competition leads to less Tax evasion.
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Tax evasion Tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest Taxation in europe
The Economic Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Eckhard Janeba, Wolfgang PetersAbstract:This paper uses a game-tlieoredc approach to analyse the Taxadon of interest income in Europe in the presence of Tax evasion. The model allows tis to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue tbat the Tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discriminatio n and on Withholding Tax rates are made noncooperadvely, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate, but in equilihrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades Taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, Tax competition leads to less Tax evasion. The integration of capital markets in Europe has hrought various benefits. At the same time, however, governments struggle to contain Tax evasion. International capital flight as an attempt to evade Taxes is particularly relevant in the area of Taxation of interest income. Banking secrecy laws in some EU countries and low Tax rates in small countries like Luxembourg, which hoost its role as financial centre, have led to the effective elimination ofthe Taxation of interest income for some investors. The Economist speaks, not surprisingly, about 'The Disappearing Taxpayer' (May 31, 1997). Several proposals have been made in order to overcome this situation.' The European Commission supports the introduction of a minimum Tax rate and/ or the status of a community resident. Under the concept of a community resident a country's Tax on interest income is independent of the residence of the investor (practically realising the source principle). By contrast, a proposal of the OECD (1977) argues in favour of a maximum Withholding Tax rate on interest income. None of these proposals has been unanimously accepted since gains and losses from non-coordinated policies differ greatly across member states. The main beneficiary of the present situation is Luxembourg which attracts large amounts of foreign capital, in particular from Germany. The United Kingdom opposes any coordination for political reasons and because Tax coordination may also threaten London's role as the leading financial centre in Europe. In contrast, Germany sticks to its traditional bank secrecy law which enables resident investors to evade German Taxation by investing abroad.
Kozo Kiyota - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of moving to a territorial Tax system on profit repatriation evidence from japan
Journal of Public Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Makoto Hasegawa, Kozo KiyotaAbstract:Abstract In an increasingly globalized world, the design of international Tax systems in terms of the Taxation of foreign corporate income has attracted much attention from policy makers and economists alike. In the past, Japan's worldwide Tax system Taxed foreign source income upon repatriation. However, to stimulate dividend repatriations from Japanese-owned foreign affiliates, the Japanese government introduced a foreign dividend exemption system in 2009 that exempted dividends remitted by Japanese-owned foreign affiliates to their parent firms from home-country Taxation. This paper examines the effect of this dividend exemption system on profit repatriation by Japanese multinationals. We find that the response of Japanese-owned affiliates to the dividend exemption was heterogeneous. More particularly, foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings were generally more responsive to the reform and significantly increased dividend payments to their parent firms in response to the enactment of the dividend exemption system. Dividend payments by these affiliates also became more sensitive to Withholding Tax rates on dividends levied by host countries under the new exemption system.
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the effect of moving to a territorial Tax system on profit repatriation evidence from japan
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Makoto Hasegawa, Kozo KiyotaAbstract:In an increasingly globalized world, the design of international Tax systems in terms of Taxation on foreign corporate incomes has received much attention from policymakers and economists alike. In the past, Japan's worldwide Tax system Taxed foreign source income upon repatriation. However, to stimulate dividend repatriations from Japanese-owned foreign affiliates, Japan introduced a foreign dividend exemption in 2009 that exempts dividends remitted by Japanese-owned foreign affiliates to their parent firms from home Taxation. This paper examines the effect of this dividend exemption on profit repatriations by Japanese multinationals. We find that the response of Japanese-owned affiliates to the dividend exemption was heterogeneous. More particularly, foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings were generally more responsive to the reform and significantly increased dividend payments to their parent firms in response to the enactment of the dividend exemption system. Dividend payments by these affiliates also became more sensitive to Withholding Tax rates on dividends levied by host countries under the new exemption system.
Riska Feranti 3011611078) - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Analisis kesesuaian perhitungan, pemotongan, pencatatan dan pelaporan pajak penghasilan (PPH) Pasal 21 atas gaji pegawai UPT Bakuda Wilayah Kabupaten Bangka Terhadap Undang-Undang No.36 Tahun 2008 tentang pajak penghasilan (PPH)
2021Co-Authors: Riska Feranti 3011611078)Abstract:Tujuan penelitian ini untuk menganalisis kesesuaian perhitungan dan pemotongan Pajak Penghasilan Pasal 21 terhadap gaji pegawai pada UPT Bakuda Wilayah Kabupaten Bangka dengan Undang-Undang No.36 Tahun 2008 tentang Pajak Penghasilan. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode deskriptif dan pengumpulan data melalui wawancara dan dokumentasi. Data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder berupa daftar pembayaran penghasilan pegawai UPT Bakuda Wilayah Kabupaten Bangka. Penghasilan yang diterima oleh pegawai akan dikenai Pajak Penghasilan Pasal 21 yang dipotong oleh juru bayar atau bendaharawan, sistem ini bernama Withholding Tax system. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dalam melakukan perhitungan dan pemotongan pajak masih ditemukan kesalahan hitung dalam PPh terutang. Akibat dari kesalahan ini yaitu pajak yang disetor dan dilaporkan menjadi lebih besar dari yang seharusnya
Aji, Irawan Purwo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Pemotongan PPh Pasal 21 atas Jasa Medis Dokter Pemotongan PPh Pasal 21 atas Jasa Medis Dokter
PROSEDING SEMINAR NASIONAL AKUNTANSI, 2020Co-Authors: Aji, Irawan PurwoAbstract:AbstractIncome Tax art. 21 is one of Withholding Tax. Doctor is a profession whose income becomes a subject to income Tax art.21. Doctor usuallly has two kind of income consist of basic salary and fee for services (fee for medical services). This two kind of income has a different Tax treatment. The differences in Tax treatment confuses the employer on how to calculate doctor’s income Tax. This study aims to explain how to determine the doctor’s income which become base of subject of income Tax art.21 and how to compute the income Tax art.21 of fee from services. This research uses descriptive method. This study concluded that the base of subject of income Tax art.21 in doctor’s income is all the income before deducted by fees, charges, and profit sharing with hospital. Furthermore, this research also showed that the Tax treatment in counting the income Tax art. 21 is by using art.17 par.1 letter a of income Tax law from cummulative Taxable income.Keywords : Income Tax art. 21, fee for medical services, docto
