The Experts below are selected from a list of 297 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
George Kesidis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant Providers
2015Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Douglas Mercer, Christopher Griffin, Serge FdidaAbstract:We consider a simple two-player game involving a large incumbent and small entrant into a cellular wireless Access Provider marketplace. The entrant's customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are regulated, because if they are dictated by the incumbent then they could be set so high so as to be a barrier to entry in the marketplace. The game is studied at its Nash equilibrium. A roaming charge is identified that is arguably fair in the sense that revenues for the Access Providers are proportionate to their infrastructure costs.
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INFOCOM Workshops - Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant Providers
2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2015Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Douglas Mercer, Christopher Griffin, Serge FdidaAbstract:We consider a simple two-player game involving a large incumbent and small entrant into a cellular wireless Access Provider marketplace. The entrant’s customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are regulated to prevent an incumbent from creating barriers to entry in the marketplace. The game is studied at its Nash equilibrium. A roaming charge is identified that is arguably fair in the sense that revenues for the Access Providers are proportionate to their infrastructure costs.
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Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant and incumbent Providers
arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture, 2014Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Douglas Mercer, Christopher Griffin, Serge FdidaAbstract:In some countries, cellular wireless roaming charges are prohibitive possibly because the incumbent Access-Provider is actually or essentially state-run, unlike potential entrants, i.e., the regulator (state) is in a con ict of inter- est. In other countries, e.g., France, there is a lot of competition among Internet Service (Access) Providers (ISPs). Recently, Free purchased a spec- trum license to compete in the 4G market. Free is an established discount broadband (wired) ISP likely intending to bundle its existing oerings with cellular wireless. The cellular-wireless incumbents such as Orange disputed Free's position on roaming charges for its customers while Free builds out its wireless infrastructure and oers highly discounted Access rates to attract customers (though Free's service is quota limited and considered of poorer quality and support, the latter particularly through physical store-fronts) [3]. Orange does lease some of its existing infrastructure to third-party discount Providers such as Virgin Wireless (which does not oer bundled services in direct competition with Orange).
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The Effect of Caching on a Model of Content and Access Provider Revenues in Information-centric Networks
2013Co-Authors: Fatih Kocak, George Kesidis, Tuan Minh Pham, Serge FdidaAbstract:In this paper, we consider a game between an Internet Service (Access) Provider (ISP) and content Provider (CP) on a platform of end-user demand. A price-convex demand-response is motivated based on the delay sensitive applications that are expected to be subjected to the assumed usage-priced priority service over best-effort service. Thus, we are considering a two-sided market with multiclass demand wherein one class (that under consideration herein) is delay-sensitive. Both the Internet and proposed Information Centric Network (ICN, encompassing Content Centric Networking (CCN)) scenarios are considered. For our purposes, the ICN case is basically different in the polarity of the side-payment (from ISP to CP in an ICN) and, more importantly here, in that content caching by the ISP is incentivized. A price-convex demand-response model is extended to account for content caching. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived and studied numerically.
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Variation of "The effect of caching on a model of content and Access Provider revenues in information-centric networks"
arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture, 2013Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Ee DeptsAbstract:This is a variation of the two-sided market model of [10]: Demand D is concave in ~ D in (16) of [10]. So, in (5) of [10] and after Theorem 2, take the parametric case 0 < a 1. Thus, demand D is both decreasing and concave in price p, and so the utilities (U = pD) are also concave in price. Also, herein a simpler illustrative demandresponse model is used in Appendix A and B.
Douglas A Galbi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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regulating prices for shifting between service Providers
Information Economics and Policy, 2001Co-Authors: Douglas A GalbiAbstract:Abstract The price that a regulated Access Provider charges for shifting customers between service Providers has significant welfare implications. Typical regulatory approaches to pricing, such as pricing based on fully allocated cost or incremental cost, ignore the characteristics of consumer demand. A theoretical alternative, Ramsey pricing, considers only the elasticity of demand for given products. This paper directs attention to the competitive process. Using US long-distance telephone services as an example, this paper shows how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service Providers can help to inform price regulation.
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regulating prices for shifting between service Providers
1999Co-Authors: Douglas A GalbiAbstract:The price that a regulated Access Provider charges for shifting customers between service Providers has significant welfare implications. Typical regulatory approaches to pricing, such as pricing based on fully allocated cost or incremental cost, ignore the characteristics of consumer demand. A theoretical alternative, Ramsey pricing, considers only the elasticity of demand for given products. This paper directs attention to the competitive process. Using U.S. long-distance telephone services as an example, this paper shows how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service Providers can help to inform price regulation. Attention to such factors highlights for regulators trade-offs involved in promoting different forms and dimensions of competition.
David Mcmenemy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Emergent digital services in public libraries: a domain study
New Library World, 2012Co-Authors: David McmenemyAbstract:Purpose – This paper aims to explore the emergence of digital services in the public library domain via an extensive study of the websites of all Scottish public library services.Design/methodology/approach – In a four‐month period all 32 of Scotland's public library authority websites were visited by a researcher. The goal of the researcher was to record the options available from the library homepages in the following way: role of library in providing page content: content Provider or Access Provider; was the page providing a digital service; what was the audience for the page: adult, child, or not specified; description of page content; and any noted usability issues. Each site was only visited to three levels below that of the initial homepage.Findings – The study found a good standard of innovation in digital services around LMS functions, offering users the ability to keep in control of their borrowing and reserving. In addition there was a consistent set of electronic reference resources subscribed...
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the emergence of digital services in the scottish public library sector a survey
Internet Librarian 2010, 2010Co-Authors: David Mcmenemy, Steven Buchanan, MARKKU OJALA, D RaittAbstract:In an era of unprecedented technological innovation and evolving user expectations and information seeking behaviour (Leong, 2008; Parry, 2008), a review of emerging public library (PL) digital services is important and timely. We are now an online society, with digital services increasingly common and increasingly preferred (Tonta, 2008). As a trusted source of public information, PLs are in an advantageous position to respond. However, evidence suggests that many PL websites are little more than 'digitised leaflets' or directory listings within parent local authority (LA) websites (Harden, 2007; McMenemy, 2007), and a recent UK report found that while overall visitor numbers to such LA websites increased by 21.7% in 2009, user satisfaction dropped by 18% (Socitm, 2010). An associated issue is how to present digital information to the public 'without confusion, duplication of effort and in a user friendly way' (Atherton, 2002), particularly common services with shared goals such as lifelong learning, community development, and health & wellbeing. Challenges include limited definition of digital services and PL role, the nascent state of digital service design (Williams et al, 2008), and limited empirical evidence of digital collaboration, or broader evaluations of PL Internet services (Aitta, 2007). We believe this to be the first extensive survey of its kind, which comprehensively identifies and reports on emerging PL digital services across a devolved jurisdiction of the UK, encompassing 32 PLs. Extent and range of digital services is identified, including emergent trends, and the role of the PL as either content Provider or Access Provider.
Serge Fdida - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant Providers
2015Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Douglas Mercer, Christopher Griffin, Serge FdidaAbstract:We consider a simple two-player game involving a large incumbent and small entrant into a cellular wireless Access Provider marketplace. The entrant's customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are regulated, because if they are dictated by the incumbent then they could be set so high so as to be a barrier to entry in the marketplace. The game is studied at its Nash equilibrium. A roaming charge is identified that is arguably fair in the sense that revenues for the Access Providers are proportionate to their infrastructure costs.
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INFOCOM Workshops - Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant Providers
2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2015Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Douglas Mercer, Christopher Griffin, Serge FdidaAbstract:We consider a simple two-player game involving a large incumbent and small entrant into a cellular wireless Access Provider marketplace. The entrant’s customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are regulated to prevent an incumbent from creating barriers to entry in the marketplace. The game is studied at its Nash equilibrium. A roaming charge is identified that is arguably fair in the sense that revenues for the Access Providers are proportionate to their infrastructure costs.
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Roaming charges for customers of cellular-wireless entrant and incumbent Providers
arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture, 2014Co-Authors: George Kesidis, Douglas Mercer, Christopher Griffin, Serge FdidaAbstract:In some countries, cellular wireless roaming charges are prohibitive possibly because the incumbent Access-Provider is actually or essentially state-run, unlike potential entrants, i.e., the regulator (state) is in a con ict of inter- est. In other countries, e.g., France, there is a lot of competition among Internet Service (Access) Providers (ISPs). Recently, Free purchased a spec- trum license to compete in the 4G market. Free is an established discount broadband (wired) ISP likely intending to bundle its existing oerings with cellular wireless. The cellular-wireless incumbents such as Orange disputed Free's position on roaming charges for its customers while Free builds out its wireless infrastructure and oers highly discounted Access rates to attract customers (though Free's service is quota limited and considered of poorer quality and support, the latter particularly through physical store-fronts) [3]. Orange does lease some of its existing infrastructure to third-party discount Providers such as Virgin Wireless (which does not oer bundled services in direct competition with Orange).
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The Effect of Caching on a Model of Content and Access Provider Revenues in Information-centric Networks
2013Co-Authors: Fatih Kocak, George Kesidis, Tuan Minh Pham, Serge FdidaAbstract:In this paper, we consider a game between an Internet Service (Access) Provider (ISP) and content Provider (CP) on a platform of end-user demand. A price-convex demand-response is motivated based on the delay sensitive applications that are expected to be subjected to the assumed usage-priced priority service over best-effort service. Thus, we are considering a two-sided market with multiclass demand wherein one class (that under consideration herein) is delay-sensitive. Both the Internet and proposed Information Centric Network (ICN, encompassing Content Centric Networking (CCN)) scenarios are considered. For our purposes, the ICN case is basically different in the polarity of the side-payment (from ISP to CP in an ICN) and, more importantly here, in that content caching by the ISP is incentivized. A price-convex demand-response model is extended to account for content caching. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived and studied numerically.
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SocialCom - The Effect of Caching on a Model of Content and Access Provider Revenues in Information-centric Networks
2013 International Conference on Social Computing, 2013Co-Authors: Fatih Kocak, George Kesidis, Tuan Minh Pham, Serge FdidaAbstract:In this paper, we consider a game between an Internet Service (Access) Provider (ISP) and content Provider (CP) on a platform of end-user demand. A price-convex demand-response is motivated based on the delay sensitive applications that are expected to be subjected to the assumed usage-priced priority service over best-effort service. Thus, we are considering a two-sided market with multiclass demand wherein one class (that under consideration herein) is delay-sensitive. Both the Internet and proposed Information Centric Network (ICN, encompassing Content Centric Networking (CCN)) scenarios are considered. For our purposes, the ICN case is basically different in the polarity of the side-payment (from ISP to CP in an ICN) and, more importantly here, in that content caching by the ISP is incentivized. A price-convex demand-response model is extended to account for content caching. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived and studied numerically.
Sulan Wong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A model of network neutrality with usage-based prices
Telecommunication Systems, 2013Co-Authors: Eitan Altman, George Kesidis, Pierre Bernhard, Stephane Caron, Julio Rojas-mora, Sulan WongAbstract:Hahn and Wallsten [7] wrote that network neutrality "usually means that broadband service Providers charge consumers only once for Internet Access, do not favor one content Provider over another, and do not charge content Providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of non-neutral behaviors under a simple model of linear demand-response to usage-based prices. We take into account advertising revenues for the content Provider and consider both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In particular, we model the: impact of side-payments between service and content Providers, consider an Access Provider that offers multiple service classes, and model leader-follower (Stackelberg game) dynamics. We finally study the additional option for one Provider to determine the amount of side payment from the other Provider. We show that not only do the content Provider and the internaut suffer, but also the Access Provider's performance degrades.
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A model of network neutrality with usage-based prices
Telecommunication Systems, 2011Co-Authors: Eitan Altman, George Kesidis, Pierre Bernhard, Stephane Caron, Julio Rojas-mora, Sulan WongAbstract:Hahn and Wallsten (Econ. Voice 3(6):1---7, 2006) wrote that network neutrality "usually means that broadband service Providers charge consumers only once for Internet Access, do not favor one content Provider over another, and do not charge content Providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of non-neutral behaviors under a simple model of linear demand-response to usage-based prices. We take into account advertising revenues for the content Provider and consider both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In particular, we model the: impact of side-payments between service and content Providers, consider an Access Provider that offers multiple service classes, and model leader-follower (Stackelberg game) dynamics. We finally study the additional option for one Provider to determine the amount of side payment from the other Provider. We show that not only do the content Provider and the internaut suffer, but also the Access Provider's performance degrades.
