Access Regulation - Explore the Science & Experts | ideXlab

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Access Regulation

The Experts below are selected from a list of 80013 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Access Regulation – Free Register to Access Experts & Abstracts

Daniel Schnurr – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Wholesale Competition, Open Access Regulation and Tacit Collusion
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
    Co-Authors: Niklas Horstmann, Jan Kraemer, Daniel Schnurr

    Abstract:

    Although the Regulation of Access to an essential upstream resource is a perennial issue for policymakers and industry stakeholders, a set of new issues arises when there is more than one vertically integrated Access provider such that competition at the wholesale level may emerge in addition to retail competition. Especially in the likely case of a highly concentrated (duopoly) wholesale market the question arises whether regulatory intervention is (still) warranted. Evidently, the answer to this question will have direct ramifications on how regulators and competition authorities should deal with this kind of market structure, but also on whether authorities should promote the entry of a second integrated Access provider in markets in which the essential input is currently supplied monopolistically.Albeit not confined to this context, the analysis of this market scenario of competing Access providers is particularly relevant for the telecommunications industry. Due to technological progress and consolidation both the fixed and the mobile industries are characterized by few vertically integrated firms, as well as several non-integrated resellers that rely on Access to an upstream resource. On the one hand, with respect to fixed networks, technological progress led to the roll out of new fiber-optic networks as well as the evolution of broadband cable networks, which both created new vertically integrated firms that compete most notably in densely populated urban areas with the traditional telecommunications incumbent. On the other hand, mobile telecommunications markets recently experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions that reduced the number of independent operators maintaining a distinct cellular infrastructure, thus increasing market concentration at the wholesale level. We consider the market scenario where wholesale Access for a non-integrated reseller is provided competitively by two vertically integrated firms. In a continuous-time economic laboratory experiment with both student and expert participants we compare market outcomes under different modes of wholesale competition as well as under an open Access Regulation preventing a margin squeeze. In this vein and in the spirit of a more behaviorally oriented Regulation, this experimental analysis serves as a regulatory testbed, which points at possible behavioral issues that may arise in practice. We find that wholesale competition can facilitate tacit collusion, which yields wholesale and retail prices even above the monopoly level. We draw on the literature on upstream collusion and show in a theoretical analysis that incentives for tacit collusion are actually higher under wholesale competition if an infinitely repeated game context is considered. We demonstrate that wholesale competition may be intensified by a simple price commitment rule, which in turn restores the theoretical prediction to the extent that Access prices are lower than under a wholesale monopoly. Moreover, the experimental results give a clear indication regarding the theoretically ambiguous effect of margin squeeze Regulation on retail market prices, showing that consumers are never better off compared to no Regulation in both the monopoly and the duopoly wholesale scenario.

  • Wholesale Competition, Open Access Regulation and Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Niklas Horstmann, Jan Kraemer, Daniel Schnurr

    Abstract:

    We consider the market scenario where wholesale Access for a non-integrated reseller is provided competitively by two vertically integrated firms. In a continuous-time economic laboratory experiment with both student and expert participants we compare market outcomes under different modes of wholesale competition as well as under an open Access Regulation preventing a margin squeeze. We find that wholesale competition can facilitate tacit collusion, which yields wholesale and retail prices even above the monopoly level. However, we show that a simple price commitment rule can substantially reduce tacit collusion. Moreover, we do not find evidence that margin squeeze Regulation benefits consumers.

  • A unified framework for open Access Regulation of telecommunications infrastructure
    Telecommunications Policy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Jan Kramer, Daniel Schnurr

    Abstract:

    The concept of open Access (OA) plays a central role in the ongoing academic and political debate on the appropriate regulatory framework for next-generation Access networks in Europe. However, clear policy conclusions on the effect of OA Regulation were usually precluded by a fundamental lack in common understanding what actually defines an OA policy and along which dimensions of OA Regulation can be structured. This paper attempts to reconcile these diverse views by offering a definition and a conceptual framework by which OA endeavors can be identified and uniquely classified. The framework encompasses, among others, mandated OA Regulation of vertically integrated firms, public-sector participation, co-investments, and OA in the context of vertical separation. Along this framework, the extant economic literature is surveyed with regard to aspects of competition and social welfare, investment and innovation, as well as practical and legal issues. Based on these insights, a policy guideline is developed that shall assist policy makers in identifying the appropriate OA scenario for the Regulation of telecommunications infrastructure. HighlightsThe paper reconciles the diverse views on open Access Regulation.A unified definition and a conceptual framework for open Access Regulation are proposed.Relevant open Access scenarios are evaluated on the basis of a literature survey.A policy decision guideline for open Access Regulation is derived.

Larshendrik Roller – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Regulation and investment in network industries evidence from european telecoms
    The Journal of Law and Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Michal Grajek, Larshendrik Roller

    Abstract:

    AbstractWe provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between Access Regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants, a strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments, and endogenous Regulation. We find Access Regulation to have a negative effect on both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus, promoting market entry by means of regulated Access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher investments by incumbents encourage regulated Access provision.

Niklas Horstmann – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Wholesale Competition, Open Access Regulation and Tacit Collusion
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
    Co-Authors: Niklas Horstmann, Jan Kraemer, Daniel Schnurr

    Abstract:

    Although the Regulation of Access to an essential upstream resource is a perennial issue for policymakers and industry stakeholders, a set of new issues arises when there is more than one vertically integrated Access provider such that competition at the wholesale level may emerge in addition to retail competition. Especially in the likely case of a highly concentrated (duopoly) wholesale market the question arises whether regulatory intervention is (still) warranted. Evidently, the answer to this question will have direct ramifications on how regulators and competition authorities should deal with this kind of market structure, but also on whether authorities should promote the entry of a second integrated Access provider in markets in which the essential input is currently supplied monopolistically.Albeit not confined to this context, the analysis of this market scenario of competing Access providers is particularly relevant for the telecommunications industry. Due to technological progress and consolidation both the fixed and the mobile industries are characterized by few vertically integrated firms, as well as several non-integrated resellers that rely on Access to an upstream resource. On the one hand, with respect to fixed networks, technological progress led to the roll out of new fiber-optic networks as well as the evolution of broadband cable networks, which both created new vertically integrated firms that compete most notably in densely populated urban areas with the traditional telecommunications incumbent. On the other hand, mobile telecommunications markets recently experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions that reduced the number of independent operators maintaining a distinct cellular infrastructure, thus increasing market concentration at the wholesale level. We consider the market scenario where wholesale Access for a non-integrated reseller is provided competitively by two vertically integrated firms. In a continuous-time economic laboratory experiment with both student and expert participants we compare market outcomes under different modes of wholesale competition as well as under an open Access Regulation preventing a margin squeeze. In this vein and in the spirit of a more behaviorally oriented Regulation, this experimental analysis serves as a regulatory testbed, which points at possible behavioral issues that may arise in practice. We find that wholesale competition can facilitate tacit collusion, which yields wholesale and retail prices even above the monopoly level. We draw on the literature on upstream collusion and show in a theoretical analysis that incentives for tacit collusion are actually higher under wholesale competition if an infinitely repeated game context is considered. We demonstrate that wholesale competition may be intensified by a simple price commitment rule, which in turn restores the theoretical prediction to the extent that Access prices are lower than under a wholesale monopoly. Moreover, the experimental results give a clear indication regarding the theoretically ambiguous effect of margin squeeze Regulation on retail market prices, showing that consumers are never better off compared to no Regulation in both the monopoly and the duopoly wholesale scenario.

  • Wholesale Competition, Open Access Regulation and Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Niklas Horstmann, Jan Kraemer, Daniel Schnurr

    Abstract:

    We consider the market scenario where wholesale Access for a non-integrated reseller is provided competitively by two vertically integrated firms. In a continuous-time economic laboratory experiment with both student and expert participants we compare market outcomes under different modes of wholesale competition as well as under an open Access Regulation preventing a margin squeeze. We find that wholesale competition can facilitate tacit collusion, which yields wholesale and retail prices even above the monopoly level. However, we show that a simple price commitment rule can substantially reduce tacit collusion. Moreover, we do not find evidence that margin squeeze Regulation benefits consumers.