Monopoly

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Hu Kai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • On the Access Regulation in Bottleneck Monopoly
    Economic Survey, 2009
    Co-Authors: Hu Kai
    Abstract:

    After competition is introduced in natural Monopoly industries,access reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck Monopoly firms,which intend to maintain the Monopoly in the vertical-integration market and limit the competition in the downstream market.The support of administrative Monopoly power to bottleneck Monopoly may reinforce the access-reject.Theoretical analyses show that access-reject may lead to the close of downstream competitive market in the natural Monopoly industries and the retrogression of marketization.Therefore it is necessary to introduce access regulation to promote competition.Because the bottleneck Monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative Monopoly in the transitional period,the efficiency of access regulation depends on breaking the administrative Monopoly in which government and enterprises are unseparated.

  • Access regulation under the bottleneck Monopoly and the administrative Monopoly
    Journal of Xi'an University of Post and Telecommunications, 2009
    Co-Authors: Hu Kai
    Abstract:

    After introducing competition in the natural Monopoly industries,access-reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck Monopoly firm which gets hold of the support of the administrative Monopoly power.The aim of access-reject is to maintain the Monopoly in the vertical-integration market and to limit the competition in the downstream market.Theory analysis shows that access-reject may lead to market foreclosure and retrogression of marketization in the natural Monopoly industries.Therefore,access regulation is necessary to push competition.Access regulation ioncludes direct regulation by government and indirect regulation by Anti-trust Law.Because the bottleneck Monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative Monopoly,the efficiency of access regulation depends on the break of the latter.

Yang Qian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the regulation and administrative Monopoly in natural monopolies take china s telecom industry as an example
    Journal of Shijiazhuang of University of Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Yang Qian
    Abstract:

    Natural Monopoly always contains some administrative Monopoly.The "Anti-Monopoly Law" gives the exemption to natural Monopoly,but gives more limitation to administrative Monopoly.So distinguishing administrative Monopoly from natural Monopoly is very important.It is considered that improper entry and price regulation is the main cause of the administrative Monopoly in the natural Monopoly.The administrative Monopoly causes more state-owned enterprises and higher concentration ratio.It also causes the transform from the real profits to the income of workers and a huge efficiency loss.So some reform is needed.

  • The Regulation and Administrative Monopoly in Natural Monopolies——Take China′s Telecom Industry as an Example
    Journal of Shijiazhuang of University of Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Yang Qian
    Abstract:

    Natural Monopoly always contains some administrative Monopoly.The "Anti-Monopoly Law" gives the exemption to natural Monopoly,but gives more limitation to administrative Monopoly.So distinguishing administrative Monopoly from natural Monopoly is very important.It is considered that improper entry and price regulation is the main cause of the administrative Monopoly in the natural Monopoly.The administrative Monopoly causes more state-owned enterprises and higher concentration ratio.It also causes the transform from the real profits to the income of workers and a huge efficiency loss.So some reform is needed.

Li Yun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Peng Teng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Raul V. Fabella - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Consumer resistance and Monopoly behavior under franchise contestability
    Public Choice, 1993
    Co-Authors: Raul V. Fabella
    Abstract:

    The probability of a deregulation under anti-Monopoly consumer lobby is generated at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a lobbying game which depends on the Monopoly rent and the deadweight loss. This probability is increasing and convex in Monopoly price. When the deregulation probability constraint is binding, the monopolist's price rises with the number of consumers, the competitive price and the given ceiling probability. The social cost of a Monopoly under franchise contestability differs from the Posner measure.