The Experts below are selected from a list of 19320 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
David R Hannah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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should i keep a secret the effects of trade secret protection procedures on employees obligations to protect trade secrets
Organization Science, 2005Co-Authors: David R HannahAbstract:Organizations' trade secrets (which can be chemical formulae, recipes, customer files, machinery designs, or many other types of information) are often valuable, enduring sources of competitive advantage. In this study, the influence of organizations' formal efforts to protect trade secrets on employees' beliefs about their obligations to protect those secrets was investigated. Quantitative and qualitative data were gathered by means of survey interviews with 111 employees of two high-tech organizations. Employees' obligations were influenced by their levels of familiarity with, and their perceptions of the enforcement of, two types of trade secret protection procedures (TSPPs): trade secret Access Restriction procedures (ARs) and trade secret handling procedures (HPs). Employees' levels of familiarity with ARs were negatively related to their felt obligations to protect trade secrets, but the opposite was true for HPs: Employees' levels of familiarity with HPs were positively related to the obligations they felt to protect trade secrets. For both types of TSPPs, the relationship between familiarity and felt obligations was moderated by employees' perceptions of the degree to which the TSPPs were enforced.
Anshul Sawant - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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network cournot competition
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Melika Abolhassani, Mohammadhossein Bateni, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Anshul SawantAbstract:Cournot competition, introduced in 1838 by Antoine Augustin Cournot, is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility—naturally a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product—by deciding on the amount of production. This problem has been studied comprehensively in Economics and Game Theory; however, in today’s dynamic and diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the Access Restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has Access to a market or not. We call this game Network Cournot Competition (NCC). Computation of equilibrium, taking into account a network of markets and firms and the different forms of cost and price functions, makes challenging and interesting new problems.
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network cournot competition
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2014Co-Authors: Melika Abolhassani, Mohammadhossein Bateni, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Anshul SawantAbstract:Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product---by deciding on the amount of production. In today's dynamic and diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the Access Restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has Access to a market or not. We call this game \emph{Network Cournot Competition} (NCC). In this paper, we propose algorithms for finding pure Nash equilibria of NCC games in different situations. First, we carefully design a potential function for NCC, when the price functions for markets are linear functions of the production in that market. However, for nonlinear price functions, this approach is not feasible. We model the problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem in this case, and design a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an equilibrium of the game for strongly convex cost functions and strongly monotone revenue functions. We also explore the class of price functions that ensures strong monotonicity of the revenue function, and show it consists of a broad class of functions. Moreover, we discuss the uniqueness of equilibria in both of these cases which means our algorithms find the unique equilibria of the games. Last but not least, when the cost of production in one market is independent from the cost of production in other markets for all firms, the problem can be separated into several independent classical \emph{Cournot Oligopoly} problems. We give the first combinatorial algorithm for this widely studied problem.
Qun Li - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Elliptic curve cryptography-based Access control in sensor networks
International Journal of Security and Networks, 2006Co-Authors: Haodong Wang, Bo Sheng, Qun LiAbstract:Access control in sensor networks is used to authorise and grant users the right to Access the network and data collected by sensors. Different users have different Access right due to the Access Restriction implicated by the data security and confidentiality. Even though symmetric-key scheme, which has been investigated extensively for sensor networks, can fulfil the requirement, public-key cryptography is more flexible and simple rendering a clean interface for the security component. Against the popular belief that a public key scheme is not practical for sensor networks, this paper describes a public-key implementation of Access control in a sensor network. We detail the implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) over primary field, a public-key cryptography scheme, on TelosB, which is the latest sensor network platform. We evaluate the performance of our implementation and compare with other implementations we have ported to TelosB.
Melika Abolhassani - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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network cournot competition
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Melika Abolhassani, Mohammadhossein Bateni, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Anshul SawantAbstract:Cournot competition, introduced in 1838 by Antoine Augustin Cournot, is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility—naturally a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product—by deciding on the amount of production. This problem has been studied comprehensively in Economics and Game Theory; however, in today’s dynamic and diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the Access Restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has Access to a market or not. We call this game Network Cournot Competition (NCC). Computation of equilibrium, taking into account a network of markets and firms and the different forms of cost and price functions, makes challenging and interesting new problems.
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network cournot competition
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2014Co-Authors: Melika Abolhassani, Mohammadhossein Bateni, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Anshul SawantAbstract:Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product---by deciding on the amount of production. In today's dynamic and diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the Access Restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has Access to a market or not. We call this game \emph{Network Cournot Competition} (NCC). In this paper, we propose algorithms for finding pure Nash equilibria of NCC games in different situations. First, we carefully design a potential function for NCC, when the price functions for markets are linear functions of the production in that market. However, for nonlinear price functions, this approach is not feasible. We model the problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem in this case, and design a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an equilibrium of the game for strongly convex cost functions and strongly monotone revenue functions. We also explore the class of price functions that ensures strong monotonicity of the revenue function, and show it consists of a broad class of functions. Moreover, we discuss the uniqueness of equilibria in both of these cases which means our algorithms find the unique equilibria of the games. Last but not least, when the cost of production in one market is independent from the cost of production in other markets for all firms, the problem can be separated into several independent classical \emph{Cournot Oligopoly} problems. We give the first combinatorial algorithm for this widely studied problem.
Heejo Lee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an energy efficient Access control scheme for wireless sensor networks based on elliptic curve cryptography
Journal of Communications and Networks, 2009Co-Authors: Sungyoung Lee, Ismail Butun, Murad Khalid, Ravi Sankar, Miso Kim, Manhyung Han, Youngkoo Lee, Heejo LeeAbstract:For many mission-critical related wireless sensor network applications such as military and homeland security, user's Access Restriction is necessary to be enforced by Access control mechanisms for different Access rights. Public key-based Access control schemes are more attractive than symmetric-key based approaches due to high scalability, low memory requirement, easy key-addition/revocation for a new node, and no key pre-distribution requirement. Although Wang et al. recently introduced a promising Access control scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), it is still burdensome for sensors and has several security limitations (it does not provide mutual authentication and is strictly vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks). This paper presents an energy-efficient Access control scheme based on ECC to overcome these problems and more importantly to provide dominant energy-efficiency. Through analysis and simulation based evaluations, we show that the proposed scheme overcomes the security problems and has far better energy-efficiency compared to current scheme proposed by Wang et al.
