Account Security

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Elissa M. Redmiles - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • "Should I Worry?" A Cross-Cultural Examination of Account Security Incident Response
    2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2019
    Co-Authors: Elissa M. Redmiles
    Abstract:

    Digital Security technology is able to identify and prevent many threats to users Accounts. However, some threats remain that, to provide reliable Security, require human intervention: e.g., through users paying attention to warning messages or completing secondary authentication procedures. While prior work has broadly explored people's mental models of digital Security threats, we know little about users' precise, in-the-moment response process to in-the-wild threats. In this work, we conduct a series of qualitative interviews (n=67) with users who had recently experienced suspicious login incidents on their real Facebook Accounts in order to explore this process of Account Security incident response. We find a common process across participants from five countries - with differing online and offline cultures - allowing us to identify areas for future technical development to best support user Security. We provide additional insights on the unique nature of incident-response information seeking, known attacker threat models, and lessons learned from a large, cross-cultural qualitative study of digital Security.

  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - "Should I Worry?" A Cross-Cultural Examination of Account Security Incident Response
    2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2019
    Co-Authors: Elissa M. Redmiles
    Abstract:

    Digital Security technology is able to identify and prevent many threats to users Accounts. However, some threats remain that, to provide reliable Security, require human intervention: e.g., through users paying attention to warning messages or completing secondary authentication procedures. While prior work has broadly explored people's mental models of digital Security threats, we know little about users' precise, in-the-moment response process to in-the-wild threats. In this work, we conduct a series of qualitative interviews (n=67) with users who had recently experienced suspicious login incidents on their real Facebook Accounts in order to explore this process of Account Security incident response. We find a common process across participants from five countries -- with differing online and offline cultures -- allowing us to identify areas for future technical development to best support user Security. We provide additional insights on the unique nature of incident-response information seeking, known attacker threat models, and lessons learned from a large, cross-cultural qualitative study of digital Security.

Maxi Van Aardt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Li Zhou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • web service provider selection under qos and Security constraints
    Joint Conferences on Pervasive Computing, 2009
    Co-Authors: Li Zhou
    Abstract:

    In pervasive computing environment, web services are widely adopted in dynamic business processes. When selecting service providers, quality of service (QoS) and Security constraints should be considered simultaneously. However, most current research works about provider selection either focus on quality of service, or just take into Account Security constraints. In this paper, we propose an evaluation model for business process, which considers the above two factors at the same time. Two key criterias are introduced to measure the overall cost and benefit of QoS parameters respectively. Typical Security constraints, such as separation of duty (SoD) constraints and binding of duty (BoD) constraints, are also considered. We define the service provider selection problem and present a linear programming based solution. Some experiments are performed to evaluate our model and the results show that our approach is effective in solving the problem.

Harry Halpin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Semantic InSecurity: Security and the Semantic Web
    2017
    Co-Authors: Harry Halpin
    Abstract:

    Strangely enough, the Semantic Web has fallen behind the rest of the Web in terms of Security. In particular, we note how TLS is not in use currently for the majority of URIs on the Semantic Web, and how existing Semantic Web standards need to be updated to take into Account Security best practices. We point out Security and privacy flaws in WebID+TLS, and propose alternatives and solutions.

  • PrivOn@ISWC - Semantic InSecurity: Security and the Semantic Web.
    2017
    Co-Authors: Harry Halpin
    Abstract:

    Strangely enough, the Semantic Web has fallen behind the rest of the Web in terms of Security. In particular, we note how TLS is not in use currently for the majority of URIs on the Semantic Web, and how existing Semantic Web standards need to be updated to take into Account Security best practices. We point out Security and privacy flaws in WebID+TLS, and propose alternatives and solutions.

Cindy Guerrazzi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • you can never be too thin skinny client technology
    SIGUCCS: User Services Conference, 2005
    Co-Authors: Anita Schwartz, Cindy Guerrazzi
    Abstract:

    The University of Delaware Information Technologies-User Services department was responsible for evaluating and replacing old X-terminal systems that were being used in our public computing sites. Our objective was to determine a low cost, reliable solution with minimal impact on staff resources. In addition, we wanted to improve the functionality of X-based application software on the central UNIX system, reduce theft, and provide better Account Security in un-staffed sites. We deployed 22 Sun Ray systems in our Willard Hall computing site during the spring semester 2004 and then installed an additional 21 systems in the Smith Hall computing site during the summer of 2004. Sun Ray clients are truly thin clients and are considered "skinny" since they do not contain an operating system and are network appliances only.

  • SIGUCCS - You can never be too thin: skinny-client technology
    Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM SIGUCCS conference on User services - SIGUCCS '05, 2005
    Co-Authors: Anita Schwartz, Cindy Guerrazzi
    Abstract:

    The University of Delaware Information Technologies-User Services department was responsible for evaluating and replacing old X-terminal systems that were being used in our public computing sites. Our objective was to determine a low cost, reliable solution with minimal impact on staff resources. In addition, we wanted to improve the functionality of X-based application software on the central UNIX system, reduce theft, and provide better Account Security in un-staffed sites. We deployed 22 Sun Ray systems in our Willard Hall computing site during the spring semester 2004 and then installed an additional 21 systems in the Smith Hall computing site during the summer of 2004. Sun Ray clients are truly thin clients and are considered "skinny" since they do not contain an operating system and are network appliances only.