Agency Regulation

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 117 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Daniel Cash - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Daniel R Coquillette - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation
    The San Diego law review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Daniel R Coquillette, Judith A. Mcmorrow
    Abstract:

    In his 1994 seminal article on Federalizing Legal Ethics, Prof. Fred Zacharias examined the need for a national and uniform code of ethics for attorneys. Prof. Zacharias was correct that there has been increasing pressure to federalize legal ethics, but that process is occurring not through articulation of national norms but rather through decentralized contextualization of attorney conduct norms. Federal agencies that direct securities practice, immigration, tax, patent, labor and many other areas of federal practice are increasingly supplementing state Regulations to specifically regulate the attorneys who appear before their agencies. Targeted substantive federal law and treaty obligations also increasingly apply to attorneys. The effect is to slowly move the center of gravity of attorney Regulation toward a complex web of federal Regulation in the many areas that involve federal interests. This process offers some important benefits of contextualization and carries some risk, including conflicts between federal and state norms. Our robust experience with federalism provides a mechanism to work through these tensions and differences.

  • zacharias s prophecy the federalization of legal ethics through legislative court and Agency Regulation
    The San Diego law review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Daniel R Coquillette, Judith A. Mcmorrow
    Abstract:

    In his 1994 seminal article on Federalizing Legal Ethics, Prof. Fred Zacharias examined the need for a national and uniform code of ethics for attorneys. Prof. Zacharias was correct that there has been increasing pressure to federalize legal ethics, but that process is occurring not through articulation of national norms but rather through decentralized contextualization of attorney conduct norms. Federal agencies that direct securities practice, immigration, tax, patent, labor and many other areas of federal practice are increasingly supplementing state Regulations to specifically regulate the attorneys who appear before their agencies. Targeted substantive federal law and treaty obligations also increasingly apply to attorneys. The effect is to slowly move the center of gravity of attorney Regulation toward a complex web of federal Regulation in the many areas that involve federal interests. This process offers some important benefits of contextualization and carries some risk, including conflicts between federal and state norms. Our robust experience with federalism provides a mechanism to work through these tensions and differences.

Judith A. Mcmorrow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation
    The San Diego law review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Daniel R Coquillette, Judith A. Mcmorrow
    Abstract:

    In his 1994 seminal article on Federalizing Legal Ethics, Prof. Fred Zacharias examined the need for a national and uniform code of ethics for attorneys. Prof. Zacharias was correct that there has been increasing pressure to federalize legal ethics, but that process is occurring not through articulation of national norms but rather through decentralized contextualization of attorney conduct norms. Federal agencies that direct securities practice, immigration, tax, patent, labor and many other areas of federal practice are increasingly supplementing state Regulations to specifically regulate the attorneys who appear before their agencies. Targeted substantive federal law and treaty obligations also increasingly apply to attorneys. The effect is to slowly move the center of gravity of attorney Regulation toward a complex web of federal Regulation in the many areas that involve federal interests. This process offers some important benefits of contextualization and carries some risk, including conflicts between federal and state norms. Our robust experience with federalism provides a mechanism to work through these tensions and differences.

  • zacharias s prophecy the federalization of legal ethics through legislative court and Agency Regulation
    The San Diego law review, 2011
    Co-Authors: Daniel R Coquillette, Judith A. Mcmorrow
    Abstract:

    In his 1994 seminal article on Federalizing Legal Ethics, Prof. Fred Zacharias examined the need for a national and uniform code of ethics for attorneys. Prof. Zacharias was correct that there has been increasing pressure to federalize legal ethics, but that process is occurring not through articulation of national norms but rather through decentralized contextualization of attorney conduct norms. Federal agencies that direct securities practice, immigration, tax, patent, labor and many other areas of federal practice are increasingly supplementing state Regulations to specifically regulate the attorneys who appear before their agencies. Targeted substantive federal law and treaty obligations also increasingly apply to attorneys. The effect is to slowly move the center of gravity of attorney Regulation toward a complex web of federal Regulation in the many areas that involve federal interests. This process offers some important benefits of contextualization and carries some risk, including conflicts between federal and state norms. Our robust experience with federalism provides a mechanism to work through these tensions and differences.

Charles D. Kolstad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Law and Economics of Hazardous Materials Transportation: Regulating Harm by Administrative Agency and Tort Liability
    Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 1993
    Co-Authors: Thomas S. Ulen, Charles D. Kolstad
    Abstract:

    This paper concerns the appropriate method of regulating the transportation of hazardous materials. These materials, when in transit, present the possibility of harm to innocent parties and thus raise the public policy issue of how best to achieve the socially optimal amount of precaution. Current policy relies principally on ex ante administrative Agency Regulation of shippers through the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (HMTUSA). There is a complementary method of regulating these harms—exposing the potential wrongdoer to ex post tort liability. We argue here for two changes in current policy: (1) relatively greater reliance than is currently the case on ex post tort liability and less reliance on ex ante administrative Agency Regulation, and (2) a method for deciding whether strict liability or negligence liability is the more appropriate liability standard to use to achieve the socially optimal amount of precaution from harms arising from the transportation of hazardous materials.

Emmanuelle Auriol - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries
    The World Bank Economic Review, 2006
    Co-Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol, Pierre Picard
    Abstract:

    The paper analyzes governments' tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries. Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers. In developing countries, tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments. For highly profitable public utilities, the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favor public ownership. Finally, once a market segment gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory Agency, Regulation is achieved through public ownership.

  • infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries and the government s budget constraint
    The World Bank Economic Review, 2006
    Co-Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol, Pierre Picard
    Abstract:

    The paper analyses governments’ trade-off between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus in privatization reforms of noncompetitive industries in developing countries. Under privatization, the control rights are transferred to private interests so that public subsidies decline. This benefit for tax-payers comes at the cost of price increases for consumers. In developing countries, tight budget constraints imply that privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments. For highly profitable public utilities, the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical budgetary conditions may favour public ownership. Finally, once a market segment gives room for more than one firm, governments prefer to regulate the industry. In the absence of a credible regulatory Agency, Regulation is achieved through public ownership.