The Experts below are selected from a list of 87 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ikuo Kume - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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explaining mass support for Agricultural Protectionism evidence from a survey experiment during the global recession
International Organization, 2011Co-Authors: Megumi Naoi, Ikuo KumeAbstract:Why are citizens in advanced industrialized countries willing to accept high prices for Agricultural products? Conventional wisdom suggests that agricul- tural interests secure government protection because producers are concentrated and better politically organized than diffused consumers+ Due to its focus on pro- ducer capacity for collective action, however, the literature fails to account for the high levels of mass support for Agricultural Protectionism in advanced industrial- ized nations+ This article presents new evidence from a survey experiment in Japan conducted during the recent global recession ~December 2008! that accounts for this puzzle+ Using randomly assigned visual stimuli, the experiment activates respon- dents' identification with either producer or consumer interests and proceeds to ask attitudinal questions regarding food imports+ The results suggest that consumer priming has no reductive or additive effects on the respondents' support for liberal- izing food imports+ Surprisingly, producer priming increases respondents' opposi- tion to food import, particularly among those who fear future job insecurity+ We further disentangle the puzzling finding that consumers think like producers on the issue of food import along two mechanisms: "sympathy" for farmers and "projec- tion" of their own job insecurity+ The results lend strong support to the projection hypothesis+
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explaining mass support for Agricultural Protectionism evidence from a survey experiment during the global recession
2010Co-Authors: Megumi Naoi, Ikuo KumeAbstract:Why do citizens in advanced industrialized countries bear the high price of Agricultural products? Conventional wisdom suggests that Agricultural interests secure government protection because producers are concentrated and better politically organized than diffused consumers. Due to its focus on producer capacity for collective action, however, the literature fails to account for the high levels of mass support for Agricultural Protectionism in advanced industrialized nations. This paper presents new evidence from a survey experiment in Japan conducted during the current global recession (December 2008) that accounts for this puzzle. Using randomly assigned visual stimuli, the experiment activates respondents’ identification with either producer or consumer interests and proceeds to ask attitudinal questions regarding food imports. The results suggest that consumer-priming has no reductive or additive effects on the respondents’ support for liberalizing food imports. Surprisingly, the producer-priming increases respondents’ opposition to food import, particularly among those who fear future job insecurity. We further disentangle the puzzling finding that consumers think like producers for the issue of food import along two mechanisms: “sympathy” for farmers and “projection” of their own job insecurities. The results lend strong support to the projection hypothesis.
Megumi Naoi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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explaining mass support for Agricultural Protectionism evidence from a survey experiment during the global recession
International Organization, 2011Co-Authors: Megumi Naoi, Ikuo KumeAbstract:Why are citizens in advanced industrialized countries willing to accept high prices for Agricultural products? Conventional wisdom suggests that agricul- tural interests secure government protection because producers are concentrated and better politically organized than diffused consumers+ Due to its focus on pro- ducer capacity for collective action, however, the literature fails to account for the high levels of mass support for Agricultural Protectionism in advanced industrial- ized nations+ This article presents new evidence from a survey experiment in Japan conducted during the recent global recession ~December 2008! that accounts for this puzzle+ Using randomly assigned visual stimuli, the experiment activates respon- dents' identification with either producer or consumer interests and proceeds to ask attitudinal questions regarding food imports+ The results suggest that consumer priming has no reductive or additive effects on the respondents' support for liberal- izing food imports+ Surprisingly, producer priming increases respondents' opposi- tion to food import, particularly among those who fear future job insecurity+ We further disentangle the puzzling finding that consumers think like producers on the issue of food import along two mechanisms: "sympathy" for farmers and "projec- tion" of their own job insecurity+ The results lend strong support to the projection hypothesis+
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explaining mass support for Agricultural Protectionism evidence from a survey experiment during the global recession
2010Co-Authors: Megumi Naoi, Ikuo KumeAbstract:Why do citizens in advanced industrialized countries bear the high price of Agricultural products? Conventional wisdom suggests that Agricultural interests secure government protection because producers are concentrated and better politically organized than diffused consumers. Due to its focus on producer capacity for collective action, however, the literature fails to account for the high levels of mass support for Agricultural Protectionism in advanced industrialized nations. This paper presents new evidence from a survey experiment in Japan conducted during the current global recession (December 2008) that accounts for this puzzle. Using randomly assigned visual stimuli, the experiment activates respondents’ identification with either producer or consumer interests and proceeds to ask attitudinal questions regarding food imports. The results suggest that consumer-priming has no reductive or additive effects on the respondents’ support for liberalizing food imports. Surprisingly, the producer-priming increases respondents’ opposition to food import, particularly among those who fear future job insecurity. We further disentangle the puzzling finding that consumers think like producers for the issue of food import along two mechanisms: “sympathy” for farmers and “projection” of their own job insecurities. The results lend strong support to the projection hypothesis.
Jun Saito - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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cultivating rice and votes the institutional origins of Agricultural Protectionism in japan
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Yusaku Horiuchi, Jun SaitoAbstract:We explore in this article an institutional foundation of Agricultural Protectionism in Japan, a country long recognized as resisting international pressures to open up its rice market. Using our qualitative analysis of postwar politics of Agricultural Protectionism and a simple formal model, we argue that farmers in Japan have stronger incentives to mobilize electoral support for the governing party in multimember district systems than in single-member district systems, because the marginal effects of mobilization on policy benefits are different under these electoral systems. Our empirical findings corroborate this claim and provide implications for the gradual changes in Japan's farm policies occurring after the electoral reform in 1994.
Yuki Asaba - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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clientelism and trade liberalization institutional foundations of Agricultural Protectionism in japan and korea
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Yuki AsabaAbstract:This paper examines the development and transformation of farm Protectionism, in particular protection of rice farms, in Japan and Korea. While Japan fails to break with the status quo price distortionary and clientelistic farm policy that combines acreage control and pork barrel, Korea is successfully making a transition to direct payment to producers, which is commonly used in other advanced economies. Despite similarities such as the farm sector’s loss of comparative advantage, preexisting outright price control schemes, electoral institutions, and strong farm lobbies, Korea has been more aggressive in trade liberalization in concluding FTAs with the US and EU than Japan has. It is shown that the strength of political parties which is a function of the constitutional structure systematically affected the divergent policy paths in Japan and Korea. In Japan, divided government and weak party cohesion in bicameral parliamentarism with strong and rural-biased upper house prevent prime minister from implementing more programmatic policy. On the other hand, elected in one nationwide constituency and limited to one-term, Korean president has the preferences and the capabilities to carry out policies that emphasize the national economy as a whole.
Yusaku Horiuchi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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cultivating rice and votes the institutional origins of Agricultural Protectionism in japan
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Yusaku Horiuchi, Jun SaitoAbstract:We explore in this article an institutional foundation of Agricultural Protectionism in Japan, a country long recognized as resisting international pressures to open up its rice market. Using our qualitative analysis of postwar politics of Agricultural Protectionism and a simple formal model, we argue that farmers in Japan have stronger incentives to mobilize electoral support for the governing party in multimember district systems than in single-member district systems, because the marginal effects of mobilization on policy benefits are different under these electoral systems. Our empirical findings corroborate this claim and provide implications for the gradual changes in Japan's farm policies occurring after the electoral reform in 1994.