The Experts below are selected from a list of 20652 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Dani Rodrik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
labor market shocks and the demand for trade protection evidence from online surveys
The Economic Journal, 2020Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Dani RodrikAbstract:We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labour-market shocks. We consider: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Support for government intervention rises sharply in response to shocks and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Trade shocks generate more demand for Protectionism, and among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for Protectionism. The 'bad management' shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labour abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
-
labor market shocks and the demand for trade protection evidence from online surveys
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Dani RodrikAbstract:We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choice among no government action, compensatory transfers, and trade protection. In response to these shocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for Protectionism, and among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for Protectionism than outsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
Rafael Di Tella - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
labor market shocks and the demand for trade protection evidence from online surveys
The Economic Journal, 2020Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Dani RodrikAbstract:We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labour-market shocks. We consider: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Support for government intervention rises sharply in response to shocks and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Trade shocks generate more demand for Protectionism, and among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for Protectionism. The 'bad management' shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labour abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
-
labor market shocks and the demand for trade protection evidence from online surveys
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella, Dani RodrikAbstract:We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choice among no government action, compensatory transfers, and trade protection. In response to these shocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for Protectionism, and among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for Protectionism than outsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
Reto Meyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the green side of Protectionism environmental concerns and three facets of trade policy preferences
Review of International Political Economy, 2012Co-Authors: Michael M Bechtel, Thomas Bernauer, Reto MeyerAbstract:ABSTRACT A large literature in international political economy views individuals’ trade policy preferences as a function of the income effects of economic openness. We argue that the expected environmental consequences of free trade play a noteworthy role for protectionist attitudes that has not been noted so far. We use unique Swiss survey data that contain measures of individuals’ environmental concerns and different aspects of trade policy preferences to examine whether those who are more concerned about the environment also hold more protectionist trade policy preferences. Our results support this expectation. Individuals who are more concerned about the environment tend to think that globalization has more negative than positive effects, more strongly support jobs-related Protectionism, and place more emphasis on aspects that go beyond price and quality when evaluating foreign products. Our results suggest that also the expected environmental consequences of free trade matter for trade policy prefere...
-
the green side of Protectionism environmental concerns and three facets of trade policy preferences
2010Co-Authors: Michael M Bechtel, Thomas Bernauer, Reto MeyerAbstract:A large literature in international political economy views individuals’ trade policy preferences as a function of the income effects of economic openness. We argue that the expected environmental consequences of free trade play a noteworthy and underappreciated role for protectionist attitudes that has not been noted so far. We use unique Swiss survey data that contains measures of individuals’ environmental concerns and different aspects of trade policy preferences to examine whether those who are more concerned about the environment also hold more protectionist trade policy preferences. Our results support this expectation. Individuals who are more concerned about the environment tend to think that globalization has more negative than positive effects, more strongly support jobs-related Protectionism, and place more emphasis on aspects that go beyond price and quality when evaluating foreign products. Our results suggest that also the expected environmental consequences of free trade matter for trade policy preferences and not just the potential effects on the domestic wage distribution.
Douglas A Irwin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the slide to Protectionism in the great depression who succumbed and why
The Journal of Economic History, 2010Co-Authors: Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A IrwinAbstract:The Great Depression was marked by a severe outbreak of protectionist trade policies. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to Protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Just as the gold standard constraint on monetary policy is critical to understanding macroeconomic developments in this period, exchange rate policies help explain changes in trade policy.
-
the slide to Protectionism in the great depression who succumbed and why
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009Co-Authors: Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A IrwinAbstract:The Great Depression was marked by a severe outbreak of protectionist trade policies. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to Protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Gold standard countries chose to maintain their fixed exchange rate and reduce spending on imports rather than allow their currency to depreciate. Trade protection in the 1930s was less an instance of special interest politics than second-best macroeconomic policy when monetary and fiscal policies were constrained.
Dimitra Petropoulou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Mirabelle Muûls, Dimitra PetropoulouAbstract:This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for Protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.
