The Experts below are selected from a list of 213 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jens Tolle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Arms Control in cyberspace architecture for a trust based implementation framework based on conventional Arms Control methods
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016Co-Authors: Markus Maybaum, Jens TolleAbstract:This paper explores verification mechanisms, as well as confidence and security building measures, within the scope of existing conventional and strategic Arms Control regimes. In particular, it analyses the concepts of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna Document as an implementation regime for confidence and security building measures as well as the Open Skies Treaty, representing three major conventional Arms Control regimes. As an example for strategic Arms Control, we analyse the Chemical Weapons Convention. The objective of this paper is to identify those means and methods from these successful frameworks that can be adapted and potentially incorporated into a cyber-domain Arms Control regime. Based on this discussion, the authors suggest a general technical architecture for a trust-based future framework for Arms Control for cyberspace.
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CyCon - Arms Control in cyberspace - architecture for a trust-based implementation framework based on conventional Arms Control methods
2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2016Co-Authors: Markus Maybaum, Jens TolleAbstract:This paper explores verification mechanisms, as well as confidence and security building measures, within the scope of existing conventional and strategic Arms Control regimes. In particular, it analyses the concepts of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna Document as an implementation regime for confidence and security building measures as well as the Open Skies Treaty, representing three major conventional Arms Control regimes. As an example for strategic Arms Control, we analyse the Chemical Weapons Convention. The objective of this paper is to identify those means and methods from these successful frameworks that can be adapted and potentially incorporated into a cyber-domain Arms Control regime. Based on this discussion, the authors suggest a general technical architecture for a trust-based future framework for Arms Control for cyberspace.
Markus Maybaum - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Arms Control in cyberspace architecture for a trust based implementation framework based on conventional Arms Control methods
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016Co-Authors: Markus Maybaum, Jens TolleAbstract:This paper explores verification mechanisms, as well as confidence and security building measures, within the scope of existing conventional and strategic Arms Control regimes. In particular, it analyses the concepts of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna Document as an implementation regime for confidence and security building measures as well as the Open Skies Treaty, representing three major conventional Arms Control regimes. As an example for strategic Arms Control, we analyse the Chemical Weapons Convention. The objective of this paper is to identify those means and methods from these successful frameworks that can be adapted and potentially incorporated into a cyber-domain Arms Control regime. Based on this discussion, the authors suggest a general technical architecture for a trust-based future framework for Arms Control for cyberspace.
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CyCon - Arms Control in cyberspace - architecture for a trust-based implementation framework based on conventional Arms Control methods
2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2016Co-Authors: Markus Maybaum, Jens TolleAbstract:This paper explores verification mechanisms, as well as confidence and security building measures, within the scope of existing conventional and strategic Arms Control regimes. In particular, it analyses the concepts of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna Document as an implementation regime for confidence and security building measures as well as the Open Skies Treaty, representing three major conventional Arms Control regimes. As an example for strategic Arms Control, we analyse the Chemical Weapons Convention. The objective of this paper is to identify those means and methods from these successful frameworks that can be adapted and potentially incorporated into a cyber-domain Arms Control regime. Based on this discussion, the authors suggest a general technical architecture for a trust-based future framework for Arms Control for cyberspace.
William A. Pokorny - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Naval Arms Control: Yes or No?
1991Co-Authors: William A. PokornyAbstract:Abstract : Naval Arms Control is one of the most highly controversial issues facing the United States government today. The U.S. firmly supports Arms Control measures in all areas except those related to the high seas. In this area alone, the government, and particularly the United States Navy, has been unwilling to even address the issue. This position is becoming so controversial that even members of the sister services of the United States armed forces find themselves wondering why the Navy continually escapes the Arms Control hatchet when the other services are not so fortunate. This study begins by examining several arguments in support of naval Arms Control, followed by the counter arguments. A conclusion is then reached as to whether this issue is truly in the best interest of the United States. The second half of the study closely examines several different individual naval Arms Control proposals and concludes with some new ideas on the subject. These ideas not only represent a new proposal, but more importantly, are designed to demonstrate the level of strategic vision that the Navy must begin dedicating to this subject in order to avoid becoming a big looser in the long run.
Steven A. Maaranen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Arms Control and the Future of Nuclear Weapons
Challenges to American National Security in the 1990s, 1991Co-Authors: Steven A. MaaranenAbstract:Arms Control, to include both actual treaties and the Arms-Control process, has had a notable impact on U.S. nuclear weapons over the past twenty-five years or more. The influence of Arms Control is likely to continue and, in combination with other factors, to contribute to a substantial reorientation of future U.S. military strategy with narrower, though still crucial, roles for nuclear weapons. In particular:
Richard K. Betts - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Farewell to Arms Control
International Security, 1992Co-Authors: Michael J. Mazarr, Richard K. BettsAbstract:The first half of Richard Betts' article, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe" (International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, [Summer 1992], pp. 5-43), makes a major contribution to clarifying the ongoing debate over international security systems. Betts soundly refutes the strict model of collective security, and his suggestion of an "Unorganized Pacified Europe" (UPE) makes sense. Indeed, one wonders these days whether the United States needs a "grand strategy" at all, or whether we would be better served by a series of more ad-hoc regional strategies. In my opinion, however, the second half of the Betts article, his critique of Arms Control, fails to make its case. Even if Betts is right and we need a UPE rather than collective security, Arms Control can help preserve peace and stability in Europe in important ways. This is particularly true if Arms Control is conceived, as it should be, more broadly than simply as exercises in weapons reduction. Arms Control is important today primarily to build trust and to reinforce the current trend of integration and reform on the Continent. If Europe is truly to become single, whole, and free, its nations must continue to build mutual trust and delegitimize the use of force as a solution to international disputes. Arms Control treaties can signal peaceful intent and symbolize a rejection of military adventurism. Betts does not agree. He contends that Arms Control will not help, and may imperil, security in Europe. His critiques, however, are off the mark. Betts makes a host of arguments, but I have grouped them for convenience into three primary categories: crisis realignment, offense dominance, and mobilization instability. I will consider his arguments individually, but they suffer from a number of common flaws. First, Betts discusses theoretical dangers outside the context of the real world, the new Europe as it is developing. Second, he ignores the ability of nuclear weapons to help stabilize situations of conventional imbalance, as they have done so reliably since 1950. Third, he blames Arms Control for problems actually created by the collapse of communism; that collapse, and not the Treaty on Conven-