Attack Strategy - Explore the Science & Experts | ideXlab

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Attack Strategy

The Experts below are selected from a list of 5913 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Guihua Zeng – 1st expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • ISPEC – Trojan horse Attack Strategy on quantum private communication
    Information Security Practice and Experience, 2006
    Co-Authors: Jinye Peng, Guangqiang He, Jin Xiong, Guihua Zeng

    Abstract:

    Fragility of quantum private communication based on Einstein-Podosky-Rosen (EPR) pair as pre-shared key against trojan horse Attack Strategy is investigated in detail. To prevent this kind of Attack Strategy, the EPR pairs employed in the quantum private communication is transferred into non-orthogonal entangled states by employing unitary transformations which are actually rotation operations on the quantum signal. Analysis show that the improved scheme is robust against the trojan horse Attack Strategy without reducing the security against other kinds of Attack strategies.

  • trojan horse Attack Strategy on quantum private communication
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006
    Co-Authors: Jinye Peng, Guangqiang He, Jin Xiong, Guihua Zeng

    Abstract:

    Fragility of quantum private communication based on Einstein-Podosky-Rosen (EPR) pair as pre-shared key against trojan horse Attack Strategy is investigated in detail. To prevent this kind of Attack Strategy, the EPR pairs employed in the quantum private communication is transferred into non-orthogonal entangled states by employing unitary transformations which are actually rotation operations on the quantum signal. Analysis show that the improved scheme is robust against the trojan horse Attack Strategy without reducing the security against other kinds of Attack strategies.

Haibo He – 2nd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • GLOBECOM – Load distribution vector based Attack strategies against power grid systems
    2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2012
    Co-Authors: Haibo He

    Abstract:

    Security issues in complex systems such as power grid, communication network, Internet, among others have attracted wide attention from academic, government and industry. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerabilities of power grid under a topology-based network model in the context of cascading failures caused by physical Attacks against substations and transmission lines. In particular, we develop Attack strategies from the Attackers’ points of view, aiming to cause severe damage to the network efficiency, as a way to revealing the vulnerability of the system. We propose a new and useful metric, load distribution vector (LDV), to describe the properties of nodes and links. Based on the LDV, we develop a multi-node Attack Strategy and a multi-link Attack Strategy, which are proved to be stronger Attacks than the traditional load-based Attacks using the Western North American power grid data. For example, the removal of only three critical nodes in the grid can reduce more than 30% of the original network efficiency, and the removal of only three critical links can reduce the network efficiency by 23%. In the above cases, the traditional load-based schemes reduce the network efficiency by 23.57% and 18.35%, respectively.

  • Load distribution vector based Attack strategies against power grid systems
    2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2012
    Co-Authors: Haibo He

    Abstract:

    Security issues in complex systems such as power grid, communication network, Internet, among others have attracted wide attention from academic, government and industry. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerabilities of power grid under a topology-based network model in the context of cascading failures caused by physical Attacks against substations and transmission lines. In particular, we develop Attack strategies from the Attackers’ points of view, aiming to cause severe damage to the network efficiency, as a way to revealing the vulnerability of the system. We propose a new and useful metric, load distribution vector (LDV), to describe the properties of nodes and links. Based on the LDV, we develop a multi-node Attack Strategy and a multi-link Attack Strategy, which are proved to be stronger Attacks than the traditional load-based Attacks using the Western North American power grid data. For example, the removal of only three critical nodes in the grid can reduce more than 30% of the original network efficiency, and the removal of only three critical links can reduce the network efficiency by 23%. In the above cases, the traditional load-based schemes reduce the network efficiency by 23.57% and 18.35%, respectively.

Jun Wu – 3rd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • Generalized Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing for Cognitive Radio Networks
    IEEE Access, 2018
    Co-Authors: Jun Wu, Tiecheng Song, Yue Yu, Cong Wang, Jing Hu

    Abstract:

    Cognitive radio (CR) is a revolutionary paradigm to solve the spectrum scarcity problem in wireless networks. In cognitive radio networks, cooperative spectrum sensing is regarded as a promising approach method to significantly improve the performance of spectrum sensing, but it can be threatened by Byzantine Attack. The existing defense references have focused on how to mitigate the negative effect of Byzantine Attack, but with some strong assumptions, such as the Attackers are in minority and/or a trusted node exists for data fusion. This observation motivates us to comprehensively analyze the strategies of Byzantine Attack and the fusion center (FC) in the absence of these restrictions. To be specific, we consider a generic Byzantine Attack model by analyzing sophisticated malicious behaviors, which goes beyond the existing models for its generalization. Under this generalized Attack model, we derive the condition which makes the FC blind from malicious perspective. On this basis, the optimal Attack Strategy to maximize Bayes risk is analyzed, respectively, in the case of the unknown and known fusion rule. Furthermore, we extend our analysis to the scenario where the FC has the knowledge of the Attack Strategy by an estimation algorithm and adopts the optimal fusion rule. Thus, we also give the closed form expression, in terms of the optimal Attack Strategy under different scenarios, sequentially. At last, the extensive numerical results are provided to verify our theoretical analyses and proposed estimation algorithm.

  • optimal Attack Strategy of complex networks based on tabu search
    Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 2016
    Co-Authors: Ye Deng, Jun Wu

    Abstract:

    The problem of network disintegration has broad applications and recently has received growing attention, such as network confrontation and disintegration of harmful networks. This paper presents an optimized Attack Strategy model for complex networks and introduces the tabu search into the network disintegration problem to identify the optimal Attack Strategy, which is a heuristic optimization algorithm and rarely applied to the study of network robustness. The efficiency of the proposed solution was verified by comparing it with other Attack strategies used in various model networks and real-world network. Numerical experiments suggest that our solution can improve the effect of network disintegration and that the “best” choice for node failure Attacks can be identified through global searches. Our understanding of the optimal Attack Strategy may also shed light on a new property of the nodes within network disintegration and deserves additional study.

  • SMC – Optimal Attack Strategy Based on Limited Cost Model on Complex Network
    2015 IEEE International Conference on Systems Man and Cybernetics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Ye Deng, Jun Wu

    Abstract:

    The problem of network disintegration has broad applications and recently has received growing attention, such as network confrontation and disintegration of harmful networks. This paper first presents a limited cost model of Attack Strategy on complex networks, and the network performance is quantitatively measured by the size of the largest connected component. Here, we introduce the unequal probability sampling into the network disintegration problem to identify the optimal Attack Strategy, in which node coding is proposed. The efficiency of the proposed solution was verified by applying in model network and real-world network. Numerical experiments suggest that our solution can sift the optimal Attack Strategy regarding the Attack cost. We get some insightful conclusions about the relationship between Attack cost and the optimal Attack Strategy. We find that the low-degree nodes are Attacked preferentially when the total cost is deficient, moreover, the high-degree nodes are Attacked preferentially when the total cost is sufficient. However, there is a climax, the high-degree nodes won’t be Attacked preferentially if the cost of single node is more than a threshold. We believe our understanding will be helpful to decision-maker.