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Availability Heuristic

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Leonidas A A Doumas – 1st expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • CogSci – The Availability Heuristic in a symbolic-connectionist architecture
    Cognitive Science, 2020
    Co-Authors: Aaron Hamer, Leonidas A A Doumas

    Abstract:

    The Availability Heuristic in a Symbolic-Connectionist Architecture Aaron J. Hamer (ahamer@hawaii.edu) University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Linguistics 1890 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA Leonidas A. A. Doumas (alex.doumas@ed.ac.uk) University of Edinburgh, Department of Psychology 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK Abstract instances of less frequent classes. Indeed, this phenomena fits well with accounts relying on frequency to mediate access (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Recent theoretical work on the Availability Heuristic relies on the dual-process theory of reasoning (for a review, see Evans, 2008). Following Stanovich & West (2000), we shall refer to these processes as System 1 and System 2. System 1 processes are characterized as fast, automatic, and reflexive whereas System 2 processes are characterized as slow, controlled, and reflective (e.g., Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). An integrated account of these processes has been identified as a key element in how people reason about relations differently than non-human animals (e.g., Hummel & Choplin, 2000; Doumas, Bassok, Guthormson, & Hummel, 2006). To our knowledge, no dual-process account explains how the Availability (or any other) Heuristic emerges without assuming it a priori as these accounts focus on a description of System 1 and System 2 at a computational level. We simulated several classic studies of the Availability Heuristic in Doumas, Sandhofer, and Hummel’s (2008) Discovery of Relations by Analogy (DORA) model, a theory of concept development and relational reasoning which provides an account of how such Heuristics might arise as schemas developed through experience. Theories of how cognitive biases arise rely on Heuristics that influence attention and reasoning. These Heuristics serve as a post-hoc description of how attention and reasoning is weighted to produce the patterns of deviation in judgment. We are unaware of any process account of how these Heuristics arise. In this article, we present several simulations of classic studies of the Availability Heuristic and describe how the Availability Heuristic arises through distributed symbolic representations and simple process interactions in an existing model of relational reasoning and concept development (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008). Keywords: Availability Heuristic, retrievability biases, symbolic-connectionism Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Tversky & Kahneman’s (1974) seminal paper on cognitive biases (patterns of deviation in judgment) identified several Heuristics (rules that constrain which hypotheses are entertained) that limit how people reason in uncertain situations. These cognitive biases have captured the imagination of scientists and laypeople alike, resulting in a massive body of research and a Nobel prize for Kahneman. Three major Heuristics were identified in the Tversky & Kahneman (1974) paper: representativeness (the degree to which an event is prototypical of its class or the process that generates it), Availability (the ease of recall of instances or properties), and adjustment and anchoring (early experiences serve as an anchor and adjustments due to subsequent experience fall short of the mark). Despite the deep literature base and interest from fields ranging from behavioral economics to military science, the development and processing of Heuristics held to account for cognitive biases remains largely unexplored. This gap in the literature seems strange given how much ink has been spilled on how such Heuristics might operate, the cognitive biases that arise due to the interactions of various Heuristics, and even the relative importance of each Heuristic involved in a particular pattern of behavior. In this paper we focus on the Availability Heuristic – in short, what is easily recalled has a large influence on reasoning, especially around assessments of frequency or probability. This Heuristic is intuitively satisfying, as it is likely that instances of large classes (i.e., ones which occur frequently) are recalled more quickly and completely than Methods In this section we describe two studies from Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article on the Availability Heuristic, followed by a brief overview of the DORA model, and present task simulations. Task Description Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article outlines 10 studies designed to investigate the existence of cognitive biases attributed to the Availability Heuristic. We simulated Studies 5 and 10. In Study 5, adolescents (N = 118) enrolled in college- preparatory high schools provided estimates of the number of distinct combinations of committees of two to eight members that could be formed from a pool of ten candidates. Although the number of distinct committees of two and eight members are the same (as any committee of eight members drawn from a pool of ten candidates defines a unique unchosen group of two), the Availability Heuristic suggests that estimates of number of possible committees of

  • the Availability Heuristic in a symbolic connectionist architecture
    Cognitive Science, 2014
    Co-Authors: Aaron Hamer, Leonidas A A Doumas

    Abstract:

    The Availability Heuristic in a Symbolic-Connectionist Architecture Aaron J. Hamer (ahamer@hawaii.edu) University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Linguistics 1890 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA Leonidas A. A. Doumas (alex.doumas@ed.ac.uk) University of Edinburgh, Department of Psychology 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK Abstract instances of less frequent classes. Indeed, this phenomena fits well with accounts relying on frequency to mediate access (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Recent theoretical work on the Availability Heuristic relies on the dual-process theory of reasoning (for a review, see Evans, 2008). Following Stanovich & West (2000), we shall refer to these processes as System 1 and System 2. System 1 processes are characterized as fast, automatic, and reflexive whereas System 2 processes are characterized as slow, controlled, and reflective (e.g., Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). An integrated account of these processes has been identified as a key element in how people reason about relations differently than non-human animals (e.g., Hummel & Choplin, 2000; Doumas, Bassok, Guthormson, & Hummel, 2006). To our knowledge, no dual-process account explains how the Availability (or any other) Heuristic emerges without assuming it a priori as these accounts focus on a description of System 1 and System 2 at a computational level. We simulated several classic studies of the Availability Heuristic in Doumas, Sandhofer, and Hummel’s (2008) Discovery of Relations by Analogy (DORA) model, a theory of concept development and relational reasoning which provides an account of how such Heuristics might arise as schemas developed through experience. Theories of how cognitive biases arise rely on Heuristics that influence attention and reasoning. These Heuristics serve as a post-hoc description of how attention and reasoning is weighted to produce the patterns of deviation in judgment. We are unaware of any process account of how these Heuristics arise. In this article, we present several simulations of classic studies of the Availability Heuristic and describe how the Availability Heuristic arises through distributed symbolic representations and simple process interactions in an existing model of relational reasoning and concept development (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008). Keywords: Availability Heuristic, retrievability biases, symbolic-connectionism Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Tversky & Kahneman’s (1974) seminal paper on cognitive biases (patterns of deviation in judgment) identified several Heuristics (rules that constrain which hypotheses are entertained) that limit how people reason in uncertain situations. These cognitive biases have captured the imagination of scientists and laypeople alike, resulting in a massive body of research and a Nobel prize for Kahneman. Three major Heuristics were identified in the Tversky & Kahneman (1974) paper: representativeness (the degree to which an event is prototypical of its class or the process that generates it), Availability (the ease of recall of instances or properties), and adjustment and anchoring (early experiences serve as an anchor and adjustments due to subsequent experience fall short of the mark). Despite the deep literature base and interest from fields ranging from behavioral economics to military science, the development and processing of Heuristics held to account for cognitive biases remains largely unexplored. This gap in the literature seems strange given how much ink has been spilled on how such Heuristics might operate, the cognitive biases that arise due to the interactions of various Heuristics, and even the relative importance of each Heuristic involved in a particular pattern of behavior. In this paper we focus on the Availability Heuristic – in short, what is easily recalled has a large influence on reasoning, especially around assessments of frequency or probability. This Heuristic is intuitively satisfying, as it is likely that instances of large classes (i.e., ones which occur frequently) are recalled more quickly and completely than Methods In this section we describe two studies from Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article on the Availability Heuristic, followed by a brief overview of the DORA model, and present task simulations. Task Description Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article outlines 10 studies designed to investigate the existence of cognitive biases attributed to the Availability Heuristic. We simulated Studies 5 and 10. In Study 5, adolescents (N = 118) enrolled in college- preparatory high schools provided estimates of the number of distinct combinations of committees of two to eight members that could be formed from a pool of ten candidates. Although the number of distinct committees of two and eight members are the same (as any committee of eight members drawn from a pool of ten candidates defines a unique unchosen group of two), the Availability Heuristic suggests that estimates of number of possible committees of

Thomas E Nelson – 2nd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • Availability Heuristic in judgments of set size and frequency of occurrence
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993
    Co-Authors: Melvin Manis, Jonathan Shedler, John Jonides, Thomas E Nelson

    Abstract:

    The Availability Heuristic has been widely cited as an important factor in the judgment process. However, the evidence that Availability is important in judging category size is not fully convincing. Moreover, several reports suggest that Availability may not be a factor in judging frequency of occurrence. Path analysis was used in 3 experiments designed to assess the role of memorial Availability in judgments of category size and frequency of occurrence. In judging set size, there was consistent support for the Availability Heuristic; that is, set size judgments were reliably influenced by the contents of memory. By contrast, in accordance with earlier results, Availability was not a significant factor when Ss judged frequency of occurrence

Aaron Hamer – 3rd expert on this subject based on the ideXlab platform

  • CogSci – The Availability Heuristic in a symbolic-connectionist architecture
    Cognitive Science, 2020
    Co-Authors: Aaron Hamer, Leonidas A A Doumas

    Abstract:

    The Availability Heuristic in a Symbolic-Connectionist Architecture Aaron J. Hamer (ahamer@hawaii.edu) University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Linguistics 1890 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA Leonidas A. A. Doumas (alex.doumas@ed.ac.uk) University of Edinburgh, Department of Psychology 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK Abstract instances of less frequent classes. Indeed, this phenomena fits well with accounts relying on frequency to mediate access (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Recent theoretical work on the Availability Heuristic relies on the dual-process theory of reasoning (for a review, see Evans, 2008). Following Stanovich & West (2000), we shall refer to these processes as System 1 and System 2. System 1 processes are characterized as fast, automatic, and reflexive whereas System 2 processes are characterized as slow, controlled, and reflective (e.g., Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). An integrated account of these processes has been identified as a key element in how people reason about relations differently than non-human animals (e.g., Hummel & Choplin, 2000; Doumas, Bassok, Guthormson, & Hummel, 2006). To our knowledge, no dual-process account explains how the Availability (or any other) Heuristic emerges without assuming it a priori as these accounts focus on a description of System 1 and System 2 at a computational level. We simulated several classic studies of the Availability Heuristic in Doumas, Sandhofer, and Hummel’s (2008) Discovery of Relations by Analogy (DORA) model, a theory of concept development and relational reasoning which provides an account of how such Heuristics might arise as schemas developed through experience. Theories of how cognitive biases arise rely on Heuristics that influence attention and reasoning. These Heuristics serve as a post-hoc description of how attention and reasoning is weighted to produce the patterns of deviation in judgment. We are unaware of any process account of how these Heuristics arise. In this article, we present several simulations of classic studies of the Availability Heuristic and describe how the Availability Heuristic arises through distributed symbolic representations and simple process interactions in an existing model of relational reasoning and concept development (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008). Keywords: Availability Heuristic, retrievability biases, symbolic-connectionism Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Tversky & Kahneman’s (1974) seminal paper on cognitive biases (patterns of deviation in judgment) identified several Heuristics (rules that constrain which hypotheses are entertained) that limit how people reason in uncertain situations. These cognitive biases have captured the imagination of scientists and laypeople alike, resulting in a massive body of research and a Nobel prize for Kahneman. Three major Heuristics were identified in the Tversky & Kahneman (1974) paper: representativeness (the degree to which an event is prototypical of its class or the process that generates it), Availability (the ease of recall of instances or properties), and adjustment and anchoring (early experiences serve as an anchor and adjustments due to subsequent experience fall short of the mark). Despite the deep literature base and interest from fields ranging from behavioral economics to military science, the development and processing of Heuristics held to account for cognitive biases remains largely unexplored. This gap in the literature seems strange given how much ink has been spilled on how such Heuristics might operate, the cognitive biases that arise due to the interactions of various Heuristics, and even the relative importance of each Heuristic involved in a particular pattern of behavior. In this paper we focus on the Availability Heuristic – in short, what is easily recalled has a large influence on reasoning, especially around assessments of frequency or probability. This Heuristic is intuitively satisfying, as it is likely that instances of large classes (i.e., ones which occur frequently) are recalled more quickly and completely than Methods In this section we describe two studies from Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article on the Availability Heuristic, followed by a brief overview of the DORA model, and present task simulations. Task Description Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article outlines 10 studies designed to investigate the existence of cognitive biases attributed to the Availability Heuristic. We simulated Studies 5 and 10. In Study 5, adolescents (N = 118) enrolled in college- preparatory high schools provided estimates of the number of distinct combinations of committees of two to eight members that could be formed from a pool of ten candidates. Although the number of distinct committees of two and eight members are the same (as any committee of eight members drawn from a pool of ten candidates defines a unique unchosen group of two), the Availability Heuristic suggests that estimates of number of possible committees of

  • the Availability Heuristic in a symbolic connectionist architecture
    Cognitive Science, 2014
    Co-Authors: Aaron Hamer, Leonidas A A Doumas

    Abstract:

    The Availability Heuristic in a Symbolic-Connectionist Architecture Aaron J. Hamer (ahamer@hawaii.edu) University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Linguistics 1890 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA Leonidas A. A. Doumas (alex.doumas@ed.ac.uk) University of Edinburgh, Department of Psychology 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK Abstract instances of less frequent classes. Indeed, this phenomena fits well with accounts relying on frequency to mediate access (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Recent theoretical work on the Availability Heuristic relies on the dual-process theory of reasoning (for a review, see Evans, 2008). Following Stanovich & West (2000), we shall refer to these processes as System 1 and System 2. System 1 processes are characterized as fast, automatic, and reflexive whereas System 2 processes are characterized as slow, controlled, and reflective (e.g., Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). An integrated account of these processes has been identified as a key element in how people reason about relations differently than non-human animals (e.g., Hummel & Choplin, 2000; Doumas, Bassok, Guthormson, & Hummel, 2006). To our knowledge, no dual-process account explains how the Availability (or any other) Heuristic emerges without assuming it a priori as these accounts focus on a description of System 1 and System 2 at a computational level. We simulated several classic studies of the Availability Heuristic in Doumas, Sandhofer, and Hummel’s (2008) Discovery of Relations by Analogy (DORA) model, a theory of concept development and relational reasoning which provides an account of how such Heuristics might arise as schemas developed through experience. Theories of how cognitive biases arise rely on Heuristics that influence attention and reasoning. These Heuristics serve as a post-hoc description of how attention and reasoning is weighted to produce the patterns of deviation in judgment. We are unaware of any process account of how these Heuristics arise. In this article, we present several simulations of classic studies of the Availability Heuristic and describe how the Availability Heuristic arises through distributed symbolic representations and simple process interactions in an existing model of relational reasoning and concept development (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008). Keywords: Availability Heuristic, retrievability biases, symbolic-connectionism Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Tversky & Kahneman’s (1974) seminal paper on cognitive biases (patterns of deviation in judgment) identified several Heuristics (rules that constrain which hypotheses are entertained) that limit how people reason in uncertain situations. These cognitive biases have captured the imagination of scientists and laypeople alike, resulting in a massive body of research and a Nobel prize for Kahneman. Three major Heuristics were identified in the Tversky & Kahneman (1974) paper: representativeness (the degree to which an event is prototypical of its class or the process that generates it), Availability (the ease of recall of instances or properties), and adjustment and anchoring (early experiences serve as an anchor and adjustments due to subsequent experience fall short of the mark). Despite the deep literature base and interest from fields ranging from behavioral economics to military science, the development and processing of Heuristics held to account for cognitive biases remains largely unexplored. This gap in the literature seems strange given how much ink has been spilled on how such Heuristics might operate, the cognitive biases that arise due to the interactions of various Heuristics, and even the relative importance of each Heuristic involved in a particular pattern of behavior. In this paper we focus on the Availability Heuristic – in short, what is easily recalled has a large influence on reasoning, especially around assessments of frequency or probability. This Heuristic is intuitively satisfying, as it is likely that instances of large classes (i.e., ones which occur frequently) are recalled more quickly and completely than Methods In this section we describe two studies from Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article on the Availability Heuristic, followed by a brief overview of the DORA model, and present task simulations. Task Description Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) article outlines 10 studies designed to investigate the existence of cognitive biases attributed to the Availability Heuristic. We simulated Studies 5 and 10. In Study 5, adolescents (N = 118) enrolled in college- preparatory high schools provided estimates of the number of distinct combinations of committees of two to eight members that could be formed from a pool of ten candidates. Although the number of distinct committees of two and eight members are the same (as any committee of eight members drawn from a pool of ten candidates defines a unique unchosen group of two), the Availability Heuristic suggests that estimates of number of possible committees of