The Experts below are selected from a list of 942 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Sd Blacksell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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laboratory acquired scrub typhus and murine typhus infections the argument for a risk based approach to biosafety requirements for orientia tsutsugamushi and rickettsia typhi laboratory activities
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2019Co-Authors: Sd Blacksell, Matthew T Robinson, Paul N Newton, Nicholas P J DayAbstract:This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and Biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931 to 2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the preantibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that the highest-risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation, or bite-related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require that only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high-containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low-risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL-2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet.
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Laboratory-acquired scrub typhus and murine typhus infections: The argument for risk-based approach to biosafety requirements for Orientia tsutsugamushi and Rickettsia typhi laboratory activities
'Oxford University Press (OUP)', 2018Co-Authors: Sd Blacksell, Mt Robinson, Pn Newton, Day NpjAbstract:This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and Biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931-2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the pre-antibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that highest risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation or bite related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high containment BSL3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet
Nicholas P J Day - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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laboratory acquired scrub typhus and murine typhus infections the argument for a risk based approach to biosafety requirements for orientia tsutsugamushi and rickettsia typhi laboratory activities
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2019Co-Authors: Sd Blacksell, Matthew T Robinson, Paul N Newton, Nicholas P J DayAbstract:This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and Biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931 to 2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the preantibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that the highest-risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation, or bite-related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require that only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high-containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low-risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL-2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet.
Christopher J Anderson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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synthetic auxotrophs with ligand dependent essential genes for a bl21 de3 biosafety strain
ACS Synthetic Biology, 2015Co-Authors: Gabriel Lopez, Christopher J AndersonAbstract:Synthetic auxotrophs are organisms engineered to require the presence of a particular molecule for viability. They have potential applications in Biocontainment and enzyme engineering. We show that these organisms can be generated by engineering ligand-dependence into essential genes. We demonstrate a method for generating a Synthetic auxotroph based on a Ligand-Dependent Essential gene (SLiDE) using 5 essential genes as test cases: pheS, dnaN, tyrS, metG, and adk. We show that a single SLiDE strain can have a 1 × 108-fold increase in viability when chemically complemented with the ligand benzothiazole. The optimized SLiDE strain engineering protocol required less than 1 week and $100 USD. We combined multiple SLiDE strain alleles into the industrial Escherichia coli strain BL21(DE3), yielding an organism that exceeds the biosafety criteria with an escape frequency below the limit of detection of 3 × 10–11.
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Synthetic Auxotrophs with Ligand-Dependent Essential Genes for a BL21(DE3) Biosafety Strain
2015Co-Authors: Gabriel Lopez, Christopher J AndersonAbstract:Synthetic auxotrophs are organisms engineered to require the presence of a particular molecule for viability. They have potential applications in Biocontainment and enzyme engineering. We show that these organisms can be generated by engineering ligand-dependence into essential genes. We demonstrate a method for generating a Synthetic auxotroph based on a Ligand-Dependent Essential gene (SLiDE) using 5 essential genes as test cases: pheS, dnaN, tyrS, metG, and adk. We show that a single SLiDE strain can have a 1 × 108-fold increase in viability when chemically complemented with the ligand benzothiazole. The optimized SLiDE strain engineering protocol required less than 1 week and $100 USD. We combined multiple SLiDE strain alleles into the industrial Escherichia coli strain BL21(DE3), yielding an organism that exceeds the biosafety criteria with an escape frequency below the limit of detection of 3 × 10–11
George M Church - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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corrigendum Biocontainment of genetically modified organisms by synthetic protein design
Nature, 2015Co-Authors: Daniel J Mandell, Marc J Lajoie, Michael T Mee, Ryo Takeuchi, Gleb Kuznetsov, Julie E Norville, Christopher J Gregg, Barry L Stoddard, George M ChurchAbstract:Nature 518, 55–60 (2015); doi:10.1038/nature14121 In the interests of transparency, we wish to amend the competing financial interests of this Article to read: “Harvard has filed a provisional patent application. G.M.C. is a founder of Enevolv Inc. and Gen9bio. Other potentially relevant financial interests are listed at http://arep.
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Biocontainment of genetically modified organisms by synthetic protein design
Nature, 2015Co-Authors: Daniel J Mandell, Marc J Lajoie, Michael T Mee, Ryo Takeuchi, Gleb Kuznetsov, Julie E Norville, Christopher J Gregg, Barry L Stoddard, George M ChurchAbstract:Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are increasingly deployed at large scales and in open environments. Genetic Biocontainment strategies are needed to prevent unintended proliferation of GMOs in natural ecosystems. Existing Biocontainment methods are insufficient because they impose evolutionary pressure on the organism to eject the safeguard by spontaneous mutagenesis or horizontal gene transfer, or because they can be circumvented by environmentally available compounds. Here we computationally redesign essential enzymes in the first organism possessing an altered genetic code (Escherichia coli strain C321.ΔA) to confer metabolic dependence on non-standard amino acids for survival. The resulting GMOs cannot metabolically bypass their Biocontainment mechanisms using known environmental compounds, and they exhibit unprecedented resistance to evolutionary escape through mutagenesis and horizontal gene transfer. This work provides a foundation for safer GMOs that are isolated from natural ecosystems by a reliance on synthetic metabolites.
Matthew T Robinson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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laboratory acquired scrub typhus and murine typhus infections the argument for a risk based approach to biosafety requirements for orientia tsutsugamushi and rickettsia typhi laboratory activities
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2019Co-Authors: Sd Blacksell, Matthew T Robinson, Paul N Newton, Nicholas P J DayAbstract:This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and Biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931 to 2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the preantibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that the highest-risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation, or bite-related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require that only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high-containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low-risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL-2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet.